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ABSTRACT
The Emergence of Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management from the Groundfish Crisis in New
England: An Actor-Network Theory Analysis
by
Catherine King

Advisor: Dr. Kenneth A. Gould
This research investigates the emergence of ecosystems-based fisheries management (EBFM)
for New England's marine fisheries in the context of the "crisis" that is escalating in its
groundfish fishery. Close observations of the practices of fisheries scientists in coordination
with managers at the New England Fisheries Management Council, with focus on how
knowledge is being produced and employed, allows for understanding EBFM as an emergent
construction produced by networks of associations between actants, human and non-human,
material and semiotic, and not strictly as a policy prescription informed by experts on biology,
ecology, and socio-economics. This analysis identifies and elucidates the multiplicity of the
groundfish crisis as it is being conceptualized and enacted and how this is resulting in both
coherence and dissipation in the network. Examination of the translation of Ecosystems-Based
Management theory and federal guidance on EBFM into concepts and strategies for the
eventual development of an Ecosystems Fishery Management Plan shows that the same
processes involved in the construction of the groundfish crisis are shaping the emergence of
EBFM. This includes the devaluation of some actants’ explanations as biased or arbitrary
viewpoints, rather than being accepted as a multiplicity of understandings that are performed
through practices that produce contradictory realities. Debates over epistemological and
ideological conflicts consume time and effort and limit proposed solutions to the understanding
of the actants with the most stable associations in the network. Ecosystems-based management
theory emphasizes that uncertainty and complexity in socioecological systems are poorly
addressed by solutions that require controllable and predictable objects for management; this
means that EBFM in New England needs to be imagined and constructed with opportunities for
experimentation and adaptive learning and more epistemically-inclusive and transdisciplinary
approaches.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
At the root of the problem lay a particular ideological conception of the relationship among
individuals, communities, and the environment, conditioned and apparently proven by many
years of expansion across a lightly defended frontier. Key to this conception was that human life
had no ecological nature at all: The earth was a store of resources to be used for the satisfaction
of human wants, a passive stage for the unfolding of human progress.
Arthur F. McCoy, The Fisherman’s Problem,
Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries 18501980
1.1 Overview of Project
This research investigates the current ecological, social, and economic predicaments of
the New England groundfish fishery and the possibilities of Ecosystems-Based Fisheries
Management to address a persistent management crisis. Despite collaborative efforts of fisheries
scientists, managers, and stakeholders to understand and manage the fishery, stock assessments
are at record lows for several of the groundfish species, including cod and yellowtail flounder,
and socioeconomic impacts are rippling through the sector. The recent plummeting trend or
"bust" for local cod stocks began with record low stock assessments in 2010 leading to an
official Disaster Declaration by the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2012. The cod fishery has
not seen any relief from inauspicious stock status reports and reduction in harvest quotas in the
past ten years and many regard the crisis as a failure of fisheries science and management. As a
new management paradigm Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM) is being
developed, the New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) is grappling with its
potential to address some of the failures in management that have been identified. Stakeholders
are asking: "Will a shift away from reliance on single-species stock assessments for management
decisions and toward a more comprehensive ecosystem-based conceptualization of the fishery
improve the status of the groundfish fishery? Or, will EBFM add greater complexity and
1

uncertainty to the point of making the fishery unmanageable?" To understand the emergence of
this science-based management paradigm in New England, it is necessary to examine historical
accounts and recent activities of regional groundfish management, as communicated from
multiple perspectives, to understand the socio-ecological and institutional context it is arising
from.
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and its
Reauthorization Acts serve as the legal blueprint for all fisheries management in the United
States, mandating that all fisheries regulations are based on the "best scientific information
available” (Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 1976). Contributions of the best
science the towards understanding the biology and ecology of marine environments, and the
application of sophisticated resource economics and social science, do not directly translate into
a successful governance system with thriving ecosystems and fishing communities. Many
mediating activities occur between the specification of bioeconomic models by fisheries
scientists and the development and implementation of management plans and fishing regulations.
This research focuses on these intermediate spaces and closely examines the complex
intersection between science, management, industry, and ecology, analyzing how specific actors,
institutions, practices, and relationships function together as a network to negotiate the
management of this fishery.
Current approaches to fisheries science and management in New England, and many other
fisheries globally, do not adequately capture the complexity or account for the relational
dynamics of the fishery system. Assumptions about ecological, social, and economic processes
and relationships used in bioeconomic modeling and quota-based management schemes need to
be examined more closely to understand how they affect the outcomes for all actors involved

2

(Kevin St. Martin, 2001, 2006). Tensions exist between collaborators who contribute to
management because individuals and institutions analyze and define the fishery in different ways
based on their roles within the fishery and their epistemological approaches to understanding it
(Olson, 2011; Kevin St. Martin & Hall-Arber, 2008). To address these gaps and differences in
understanding, this research project considers the "web of relations" between the many aspects of
the fishery, and analyzes how this network of relationships produces social and environmental
outcomes through everyday practices and processes (Bridge, 2002; Latour, 2005; Lee, 2006; D.
Rocheleau, 2011).
1.1.1 Description of Case Study
This project is a case study of the New England fishery governance with description and
analysis of its network of institutional and individual relationships. Through ethnography and
discourse analysis, it closely examines the practices of fisheries scientists at NOAA's Northeast
Fisheries Science Center (NFSC) and other regional research institutions, that generate scientific
and social scientific information used in the management of the fishery. This analysis of how
science and management are enacted focuses on the locations and events where actors come
together to produce management strategies and plans through the New England Fisheries
Management Council (NEFMC). To include the associations of fishermen1 and other community
members who historically have been marginalized from governance processes despite their
central roles and relationships, data and analysis from recent academic and popular studies on
community and management in New England fisheries is incorporated into the network analysis,
along with written correspondence solicited by the Council as part of the management process,

1

Fisheries literature uses both the terms "fishers" and "fishermen" to represent the boat owners and those who work on the boats.
This dissertation will use the term fishermen to indicate both men and women who are involved in fishing because it is the
commonly used locution. I observed in fisheries management discourse in New England. Additionally, as described by
Bavington (2010), a fisherman told him that a fisher refers to a "'vicious weasel,' not a person who catches fish."
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in-person stakeholder input at Council meetings and other local fisheries events, and published
media interviews with community members.
Building on insights from Socio-ecological Systems (SES) theory and Actor-Network
Theory (ANT), a relational conceptualization of the fishery is developed. This network analysis
contributes to an understanding of how the political and cultural matters and practices of power
affect the construction of knowledge about the nature of the fishery itself – and nature, more
generally (Bridge, 2011). Although this research aims to capture the complexity of the New
England groundfish fishery specifically, it also has potential to provide insights for the
management of similar fishery crises throughout the world. Trends of overexploited and depleted
marine fish stocks are concerns across the globe (Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, 2010; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Pollution, ocean acidification,
habitat degradation, and climate change add to the issues impacting fisheries worldwide that
must be addressed by management councils (Sumaila et al., 2011). This case study provides
analysis and conclusions that are natural resources management paradigms more generally.
A salient case study of the New England groundfish fishery provides an opportunity to
investigate the composition of the groundfish crisis and contribute to knowledge that is needed to
build more robust governance with Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management. Examining the
dynamic relationships in this network illuminates how governance of the fishery is functioning to
both mitigate and exacerbate problems. Learning from the ongoing and evolving processes is
important to achieve EBMF guiding principles of flexibility and adaptability, as outlined in
NOAA Fisheries Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management Road Map (2016). Analysis of
environmental and social outcomes as products of this relational network contribute to the
development of strategies to strengthen institutions that foster and support effective relationships.

4

1.1.2 Research Questions
In this effort, this research seeks to address three overarching questions about the New
England fishery: 1) How do regional and wide-scale ecological, cultural, social, and economic
processes and relationships, in conjunction with practices of fisheries science, social science, and
management, mediate and produce New England’s groundfish fishery and its ongoing crisis
status?; 2) How are ongoing groundfish governance processes affecting the New England
Fisheries Management Council’s efforts to construct the ecosystem as a category for governance
through Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management (EBFM); and 3) How can analysis of the New
England fishery as a dynamic and contingent network advance our understanding of natural
resource policy and management and yield insights into opportunities for more equitable and
successful governance strategies?

1.2 Background: Management of the Cod Crisis and Hope for EBFM
Despite immense efforts to set sustainable catch quotas and enforce protective regulations,
recent stock assessments of the most highly valued groundfish, cod and yellowtail flounder, on
the Georges Bank and in the Gulf of Maine off the coast of New England continue to be
precariously low. In 2012, the severity of the stock declines prompted the U.S. Department of
Commerce to declare a National Fishery Disaster in New England. Stock assessments for cod
and yellowtail flounder have continued to plummet since then (New England Groundfish
Management Testimony, Written Statement, 2011; Murphy et al., 2012). Allowable catches for
these stocks have decreased to levels that are driving many fishermen out of business. Disaster
status was intended to provide federal funding for buyouts, subsidies, monitoring, and additional
scientific research. On January 16, 2014, the U.S. Senate approved $75 million in funding for
fisheries disaster assistance about half of the funding that was originally requested. Debates
5

about the strategies and methods for improving the information about and governance of the
groundfish fishery have become increasingly tense within the past decade as the threat of a cod
stock collapse and total closure to fishing is looming. Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management
is considered by many scientists, fishermen, and managers, alike, as a way to improve the
management of the groundfish fishery.
In 2015, the groundfish fishery including cod, haddock, and flounders, made up 4%2 of the
$1.2B of landings revenue in the New England; 85% comes from shellfish3 (National Marine
Fisheries Service, 2017). The regional seafood industry is roughly 0.003%4 of the region’s
$900B GDP and accounts for 1.6%5 of the 6 million jobs (National Marine Fisheries Service,
2017). Since 2012, there have been less than 400 groundfish vessels active in New England
(MRAG Americas, n.d.). The groundfish fishery is no longer a lucrative enterprise, but that does
not diminish the commitment of groundfish fishermen, or the effort being exerted to save it.
Between the costs for NEFMC administration, NOAA and NEFSC scientific and economic and
social science research, onboard observers, and enforcement, the tax-payer funds committed to
the groundfish fishery through these difficult times is considerable.6
1.2.1 Arriving at a Groundfish Crisis in New England: A Brief History of the Management
Efforts7
For centuries, the principle of "Freedom of the Seas" precluded exclusive territorial

2

$19M cod and haddock, $28M flounders
including $615M American lobster, $287M sea scallop
4
$2.4B
5
98,000 jobs
6
The Measuring the Effects of Catch Shares project of MRAG Americas consulting company is conducted by a team from
academic institutions and private consulting firms used an indicator-based approaches to analyze data on ecological, economic,
social, and governance changes to study the effects of catch share programs. This research included interviews with groundfish
fishermen as part of the analysis. Their reports include many economic indicators including the costs related to management for
catch shares in New England. This impressive effort is also worth mentioning as another investment in addressing the groundfish
crisis. http://www.catchshareindicators.org/northeast/
7
The historical narrative presented here was developed from numerous personal accounts; documentaries (e.g. A Fish Story,
http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/fishstory/film.html); web articles (e.g. Brief history of the Groundfishing Industry of New
England, https://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/history/stories/groundfish/grndfsh1.html); academic articles (e.g Shelley, Atkinson,
Dorsey, & Brooks, 1996); and manuscripts (e.g. Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008; Dewer, 1983)
3
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claims to fishing grounds. Because the seas were considered "free to all and belonging to none,"
fleets travelled far from their local shores to exploit the most productive continental shelves.
Large fishing vessels, capable of staying away from port for months at a time, fished virtually
free from regulation. However, by the seventeenth century, local disputes led to the convention
that a state could claim three nautical miles (5.6 km) seaward from land as its own.8
In 1871, The United States established its first federal conservation agency devoted to the
protection, study, management, and restoration of fish and fisheries, and dedicated fisheries
research began in Woods Hole, MA on Cape Cod under the direction of Spencer Fullerton Baird
as the first US Commissioner of Fisheries. By mid-twentieth century, the U.S., and most other
countries, claimed out to twelve nautical miles (22 km) from the coast as their territorial waters.
Up through this time, before New England's groundfish fishery was under close monitoring and
management, historical booms and busts in groundfish catch occurred; however, on average,
groundfish were abundant and sustainable relative to the size and effort of the fishing fleets9
(McFarland, 1911; McKenzie, 2011, 2012).
Following World War II, growth of both domestic and foreign fleets was rapid and steady
in productive areas on the offshore banks of New England10 (Murawski et al., 1997). This led to
the formation of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) in
1951 to coordinate offshore fishing for the region. This year also marks the beginning of
management support duties for the Fisheries Laboratory at Woods Hole, MA. In addition to its
function as a fishery research center for the North Atlantic area, it became the center of
American research activities in relation to ICNAF. In the 1960s, the Woods Hole laboratory

8

Three nautical miles is often claimed to be the distance a cannon could fire.
Both anecdotal accounts and officially documented histories have testified to the booms, busts, and general trends of
abundance.
10
In the Northwest Atlantic, foreign fleets' harvest of groundfish doubled between 1950 and 1965 (Murawski et al., 1997).
9
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(called the United States Commission of Fish and Fisheries, and commonly referred to as the
Fish Commission) focused on development of practical measures of management of marine
fisheries. Over the next decade, the Fish Commission was renamed the Bureau of Fisheries, and
then the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. In 1970, The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) was created within the U.S. Department of Commerce by Presidential
Executive Order. The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries was replaced with NOAA's National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, commonly referred to as NOAA Fisheries), and the Woods
Hole laboratory became the headquarters of the Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NFSC), the
research arm of NMFS in the region.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, ICNAF used net mesh size restrictions, reporting and
inspection requirements, and quota management to control foreign fleets. Ecosystem
considerations were included in ICNAF’s “two-tier” management strategy that set system-level
constraints based on estimates of biological productivity to set quota levels (Fogarty, 2014,
Fogarty, personal communication 11/30/17). During these decades, groundfish prices were rising
and fishermen were experiencing relative prosperity. As fleets grew and boat and landing gear
technology advanced, the fishery started to see significant reductions in groundfish catches. In
1977, the U.S. withdrew from ICNAF and declared its fishing management jurisdiction to 200
nautical miles (370 km), managing its coastal stocks under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (commonly called the Magnuson-Stevens Act, or MSA), the
new federal law governing marine fisheries management.1 1 The New England Fisheries
Management Council (NEFMC) was formed, along with eight other regional councils along the

11

Shortly after the U.S.'s withdrawal from the ICNAF, that international body was replaced by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Organization (NAFO) to coordinate the management of groundfish between countries as needed. The U.S. did not formally join
this international governance body until 1995, but its fisheries management was influenced by the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (1982).
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Atlantic and Pacific coastal shelves, by commission of the MSA to develop domestic fisheries
and manage the living marine resources “in the best interests of the nation.” Under MSA, the
Council serves as a recommendatory body, and the federal government, through NMFS, enacts
the regulations. The MSA stipulates that Fishery Management Plans (FMPs)1 2 produced by the
Councils must be approved by the Secretary of Commerce, and that enforcement of the
regulations based on the plans are enforced by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
with patrolling carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard. The MSA also created and increased
incentives for domestic fishermen to build and buy new boats and for new people to enter the
profession.13 Between 1977 and 1982, the total number of fishing vessels landing groundfish in
New England doubled (Groundfish Task Force, 2004).
After 1977, regional management of groundfish in New England was still largely based
on the ICNAF quota system, with quarterly allocations by vessel size class.14 The first attempt at
a regional management plan was hastily constructed, accepted and implemented by the New
England Fisheries Management Council who had to hit the ground running. In that first year of
regional management, Total Allowable Catches (TACs)1 5 under the quota system were met or
exceeded early, so the additional measure of trip limits1 6 was enacted to spread out the quota over
the year to try to avoid temporary closures or borrowing quota from future years. At that time,
12

From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Fishery Management Plan (FMP): Also referred to
as a "plan," this is a document that describes a fishery and establishes measures to manage it.
13
The Capital Construction Fund of 1970, Fisheries Obligation Guarantees Program of 1972, tax incentives, and low-interest
bank loans made a significant amount of money available to fishermen and industry. Only in 2004 did US Commission on Ocean
Policy call for Congress to repeal those financial assistance programs.
14
The groundfish fleet comprises fishing vessel size class categories of <30', 30' to <50' and 50' to <75', and >75'.
15
From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Total Allowable Catch (TAC): The amount (in
metric tons) of a stock that is permitted to be caught during a fishing year. In the Multispecies (groundfish) FMP, TACs can
either be "hard" (fishing ceases when the TAC is caught) or a "target" (the TAC is merely used as an indicator to monitor
effectiveness of management measures but does not trigger a closure of the fishery. This value is calculated by applying a target
fishing mortality rate to exploitable biomass.)
16
From 50 CFR 660.11 [Title 50. Wildlife and Fisheries; Chapter VI. Fishery Conservation and Management, National Oceanic
And Atmospheric Administration, Department Of Commerce; Part 660. Fisheries Off West Coast States; Subpart C. West Coast
Groundfish Fisheries], [Trip Limits] are ‘used in the commercial fishery to specify the maximum amount of a fish species or
species group that may legally be taken and retained, possessed, or landed, per vessel, per fishing trip, or cumulatively per unit
of time, or the number of landings that may be made from a vessel in a given period of time...’
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Figure 1.1 Atlantic Cod Landings from 1950-2018. Data from Atlantic Coastal Cooperative
Statistics Program.
fishermen were arguing that the groundfish stocks were plentiful and that the quotas were set
much too low.17 However, since the groundfish management plan had no other option for
exceeding quotas, NMFS completely closed the Gulf of Maine cod fishery for the year on July 7,
1977 and the groundfish fishery in Georges Bank on August 16th, completely halting the fishing
industry for the rest of that year. In response, over 180 fishermen attended a NEFMC meeting in
September 1977 to express their anger and frustration at what they saw as total failure in
fisheries management (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008).
Fishermen and managers alike had largely considered the MSA primarily as a means to
remove foreign fleets, but now that management of the local fleets became the focus of the
regional Council and required approval of NMFS, the Council's actions became complicated and

17

The argument that the fishermen see too many groundfish for the stock assessments to be correct was made in 1977 and
continues to be made today as the assessments indicate some stocks are near collapse.
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contested (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008). The complete shutdown ordered by NMFS under its
obligation to uphold the MSA worried the Council members who were responsible for the
economic impacts of their management. Options were proposed that ranged from 1) setting quota
quarterly so that any closures would be relatively short; to 2) lengthening stock rebuilding
schedules to allow for more fishing; to 3) limited entry18 to restrict the size of the fleet. Just
discussing limited entry in Council meetings led to a large increase in the number of license
applications to harvest groundfish. In the end, NMFS decided to go beyond the Council's
recommendations and increased bycatch1 9 limits for cod for the remainder of 1977 to prevent cod
from becoming a choke species2 0 that would halt fishing on other groundfish. NMFS also
increased quotas for haddock and yellowtail, increased bycatch discard allowances, and
increased quotas for recreational catches. Despite these allowances, NMFS was legally required
to close the fishery for the last ten days of the year. Tensions between NEFMC and NMFS about
their relative authority in management were rising along with mistrust between New England
fishermen and the management system.21
The groundfish management plan for the following year was delayed until after the first
quarter of the year, intensifying fishing effort by fishermen trying to secure their share of the
allowed catch before any closures were mandated and before any new boats entered the fleet.
The 1978 plan set quotas based on Optimum Yield (OY)22 determined by NMFS scientists to

18

From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Limited entry: A management system that limits the
number of participants in a fishery. Usually, qualification for this system is based on historic participation and the participants
remain constant over time (with the exception of attrition)
19
From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Bycatch: The capture of nontarget species in
directed fisheries which occurs because fishing gear and methods are not selective enough to catch only target
species...including economic discards and regulatory discards.
20
A "choke species" is a stock that has a very low catch limit and halts all fishing in a sector when the catch limit is reached even
if more abundant stocks are still below their catch limits.
21
See documentary Truth: Fishing Crisis or Government Mismanagement? (2009) for a vivid sense of these tensions. When I
bought the video on 9/25/15 at the Working Waterfront Festival in New Bedford, MA, a man in his 30s who was standing next to
me said, “I probably believe a lot of what it says, but there’s no way this is not really biased." A women in her 50s, at the register
said: “Of course it’s government mismanagement. What did they ever do right? I’m for conservation but…"
22
From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Optimum Yield: The amount of fish which A) will
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meet stock restoration requirements.23 The council worked on distributing the quota over the
different size classes of fishing vessels and more evenly over the course of the year. One
additional problem that the Council faced was that groundfish was, in practice, a directed fishery,
so bycatch allowances were used up quickly because fishermen were not directing efforts to
other fisheries because prices for groundfish were better than other stocks (Dewer, 1983: 160).
At this time, economists were finding that displaced fishing labor was not easy to redirect, and
that therefore OY should be more liberal to account for this economic condition, giving OY a
significant economic component.
Throughout 1978 and 1979, regulations changed rapidly which made them difficult to
follow and to enforce. The management regulations created a significant discard problem, with
more dead young fish being thrown overboard than making it to market. The Council tried to
solve some of the issues by regulating net mesh sizes in discrete areas, but this strategy did not
match the fishing patterns and led to wasted fuel on multiple discrete trips during the oil crisis of
the 1970s – and fishermen were figuring out ways to get around the mesh requirements
(Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008: 37). Inability of the Coast Guard to enforce the regulations further
undermined confidence in the Council's ability to manage the fishery. In July 1978, the Council
voted to "reset the clock" and re-establish the full quotas from that year with all of the
regulations made so far in place. It was becoming clear that the Council had almost no socio-

provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, particularly with respect to food production and recreational opportunities, and
taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems; B) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield
from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and C) in the case of an overfished fishery,
provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.
Overfishing occurs whenever fishing mortality exceeds a threshold that jeopardizes the reproductive capacity of a stock to
produce maximum sustainable yield.
From: FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, FAO, 2014: Maximum sustainable yield: The highest theoretical equilibrium
yield that can be continuously taken (on average) from a stock under existing (average) environmental conditions without
affecting significantly the reproduction process.
23
NMFS and NEFMC had tensions over the fundamental definition of Optimum Yield, and whether it was to be used as a
guideline or a mandated objective. This discussion continues today.
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economic information upon which to base the management, and only a limited amount of
biological information from the scientists which was highly contested by the fishermen. The
Council determined that, “In the absence (sic) of a revised picture of stock condition, the
Council deemed that the optimum yields and quotas were consistent with the management
system's overall objective: To generate over the period of the plan the greatest possible joint
economic and social net benefits from the harvesting and utilization of the groundfish resource,
ensuring that by the end of the period the relevant groundfish stocks shall be in conditions which
will produced enhanced and relatively stable yields from the groundfish fishery in future years."
(Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 1995).24
By July 1979, the NEFMC realized that it would take years to develop a comprehensive
groundfish Fisheries Management Plan. At that time, the Council struggled with managing the
day-to-day problems that came out of quota management but had no alternative management
options. In August 1979, NMFS further reduced trip limits to avoid complete closures, leading to
increases cod discards. NFSC stock assessments indicated that groundfish biomass trends were
reversing and increased by about 75% between 1975 and 1979. In response to the assessments,
NMFS made large increases to OY for cod, yellowtail, and haddock. However, the increased OY
levels were not implemented until 1981, just as the biomass estimates started to decline again. In
1982, assessments showed a steep decline, which was followed by more declines in the
following years.25

24

Supplement #3 to the Environmental Impact Statement and amendment to the Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for Atlantic
groundfish, 1979
25
In 1982, international fisheries codes were being established through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) which was created to address conflicting claims to rights and resources in the world's oceans (United Nations
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 1982). This convention had a major impact on the structure of global fisheries
through the establishment of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), formalizing the coastal jurisdiction of every country's fishing
grounds within 200 nautical miles. Responding to the degradation and collapse of many fisheries throughout the world in the
1980s as an increasing number of countries expanded their domestic seafood sectors in economic development of their EEZs, the
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) was developed in 1995 as a voluntary set of international standards for
fisheries management seeking to balance stock and ecosystem health with economic exploitation. (Food and Agriculture
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Between 1982 and 1985, New England's groundfish were managed by the Interim Plan
(IP) while the Atlantic Demersal Fisheries Plan (ADP) was being developed by the Council staff
and committees. Due to legal requirements and logistical constraints, the IP, first proposed in
1979, was not implemented until 1982. This time delay, and many of the time delays in enacting
changes through amendments before the IP was implemented, exacerbated the frustration of
fishermen with the Council, and the Council with NMFS. There were 100 changes made in the
regulations between 1977 and 1982. In 1981, a large fishing company sued the Council and
NMFS over the perceived ineffectiveness and discrimination of the plan, leading the Regional
administrator for NMFS to declare, "We have come to recognize that there may not be a solution
to the groundfish management situation" (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008: 54).
The Interim Plan abandoned quotas and trip limits, and primarily managed using net mesh
size restrictions, minimum fish sizes, and seasonal closed areas. Although some claim that
industry pressure caused the Council to abandon the quota system, others argue against this
accusation and cite media reports showing that many fishers expressed concern about this new
plan and that the council rightly justified it as a way to avoid the day-to-day crisis over quota
limits while management was being reconsidered (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008; Fordham, 1966;
Weber, 2002).
The 1986 Atlantic Demersal Fisheries Plan (renamed the Northeast Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan, and commonly called the Groundfish FMP) also focused on mesh sizes and
seasonal closures in the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank. NMFS did not accept the plan at its
first submission in March but did accept it with changes several months later in July 1986. By
1989, groundfish stocks were reported to be at very low numbers, and the FMP Amendments26

Organization of the United Nations, 1995, article 6.4).)
26
From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Amendment: A formal change to a fishery
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that followed started a shift to more direct controls on fishing effort. In 1994, NMFS reported in
a Special Advisory, as part of the 18th SAW stock assessment, that spawning stock biomass on
Georges Bank of cod, haddock, and yellowtail had collapsed (Northeast Fishery Science Center,
1994, pp. 53–54). In early December of 1994, three large areas on Georges Bank were officially
closed to groundfish fishing on an emergency basis, and most of the areas have remained closed.
Amendment 5, also implemented in 1994 in response to a lawsuit against the Department of
Commerce and NMFS by conservation groups,27 had a significant effect on the fundamental
position of the Groundfish FMP. It called for a moratorium on new vessel permits and
implementation of a limit on the Days-At-Sea (DAS)2 8 for individual vessels to achieve a 50%
reduction in groundfish fishing effort by 1999 (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008). By 1995, New
England was considered the "poster-child" of mismanagement for groundfish and the NEFMC
was viewed as incompetent.
During this time, the Technical Monitoring Group, made up of fisheries scientists,
concluded that the plan was not effective in part due to illegal and unenforced transgressions by
fishermen. Stringent regulations were enacted to reduce harvests of adults and protect juveniles,
and, for the first time, entry of new vessels was restricted. Amendments 5 and 7 were the first
serious efforts to control fishing mortality.29 They were quickly followed by several
Frameworks30 that placed restrictive management measures to reduce fishing mortality on

management plan (FMP). The Council prepares amendments and submits them to the Secretary of Commerce for review and
approval.
27
Conservation Law Foundation and Massachusetts Audubon Society
28
From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Days-at-sea (DAS): the total days, including
steaming time that a boat spends at sea to fish. Amendment 13 categorized DAS for the multispecies fishery into three categories,
based on each individual vessel's fishing history during the period fishing year 1996 through 2001. The three categories are:
Category A: can be used to target any groundfish stock; Category B: can only be used to target healthy stocks; Category C:
cannot be used until some point in the future. Category B DAS are further divided equally into Category B (regular) and
Category B (reserve).)
29
Enacted in 1996, Amendment 7 required regulations to support stock rebuilding by reducing fishing effort on cod, haddock,
and yellowtail by 80% from 1993 levels. This same year, the federal Sustainable Fisheries Act, an amendment to the 1976
MSFCMA, passed, giving NMFS new responsibilities for conservation.
30
From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Framework adjustments: adjustments within a range
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Atlantic cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder on Georges Bank by closing large areas yearround to all fishing gears that were capable of catching groundfish, including otter trawls,
gillnets, longlines, and scallop dredges (Neis, 2015). The Council faced a vocal backlash from
industry, state and federal legislators. Also during this time period, management began to see a
movement away from the guiding value of Optimal Yields towards Biological Reference Points
(BPSs)31 such as target fishing mortality rates, FMSY, or target stock biomass values, BMSY,32
based on maximum sustainable yield33 (Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008: 62). For example, the 1996
update to the MSA, called the Sustainable Fisheries Act, required that "management measures
prevent overfishing and achieve BMSY, the stock size that produces maximum yield, for the
purpose of achieving optimum yields" (Jon Brodziak, Cadrin, et al., 2008).
1.2.2 New England Groundfish Fishery in the 21st Century
Cod, yellowtail flounder, and haddock continue to be the three major targeted stocks by
groundfish fishermen. The Georges Bank (GB) haddock stock was critically overharvested by
foreign and domestic fleets in the 1960s, and by the early 1970s, its stock size and annual yield
had dropped to the lowest levels ever recorded. As haddock catches began to decline, fishing

of measures previously specified in a fishery management plan (FMP). A change usually can be made more quickly and easily by
a framework adjustment than through an amendment. For plans developed by the New England Council, the procedure requires
at least two Council meetings including at least one public hearing and an evaluation of environmental impacts not already
analyzed as part of the FMP.
31
From NOAA Fisheries Glossary (2006): Biological Reference Points: 1. A biological benchmark against which the
abundance of the stock or the fishing mortality rate can be measured in order to determine its status. These reference points can
be used as limits or targets, depending on their intended usage; 2. Specific values for the variables that describe the state of a
fishery system which are used to evaluate its status. Reference points are most often specified in terms of fishing mortality rate
and/or spawning stock biomass. These may indicate (a) a desired state of the fishery, such as a fishing mortality rate that will
achieve a high level of sustainable yield, or (b) a state of the fishery that should be avoided, such as a high fishing mortality rate
which risks a stock collapse and long-term loss of potential yield. The former are referred to as "target reference points," and the
latter are referred to as "limit reference points" or "thresholds."
32
From NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: BMSY: The stock biomass that would produce MSY when
fished at a fishing mortality rate equal to FMSY. For most stocks, BMSY is about 1⁄2 of the carrying capacity. The proposed
overfishing definition control rules call for action when biomass is below 1⁄4 or 1⁄2 BMSY, depending on the species.
33
From NOAA Fisheries Glossary (2006): Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) The largest average catch or yield that can
continuously be taken from a stock under existing environmental conditions. For species with fluctuating recruitment, the
maximum might be obtained by taking fewer fish in some years than in others. Also called: maximum equilibrium catch;
maximum sustained yield; sustainable catch.
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effort increasingly focused on cod. Haddock experienced a brief recovery in the late 1970s when
two strong year classes (YCs)3 4 (1975 and 1978) were produced. By the mid 1980s, however, the
stock had again declined dramatically. By the early 1990s, haddock was again at record-low
abundance and was considered to be collapsed3 5 (J. K. Brodziak et al., 2001; J. Brodziak & Link,
2002). Haddock rebounded in the early 2000s, reversing a period of significant decline (Jon
Brodziak, Traver, et al., 2008). Yellowtail flounder have also experienced seriously declining
trends, but the most contentious battles since 2000 have been over management of the cod
stocks. Gulf of Maine (GOM) cod has been the greatest concern, but Georges Bank (GB) cod
have also been assessed at precariously low levels.36

Table 1.1 Milestones in governance for American fisheries
Year
1609
1700s
1871
1900s
1952
1976-7
1996
2006
2015-2019

Change in Fisheries Governance
Mare Liberum, Freedom of the Seas
Local rights to 3 nautical miles from shore
First U.S. conservation agency dedicated to fisheries
Local rights to 12 nautical miles from shore
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF),
Woods Hole Fish Commission
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 1976, MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) 1977
The Sustainable Fisheries Act (an amendment to the MSA with new emphasis
on conservation, Maximum Sustainable Yield, Essential Fish Habitat)
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act
(new emphasis on ecosystems, Annual Catch Limits, Accountability Measures,
and Catch Shares)
Reauthorization bill in Congress: Strengthening Fishing Communities and
Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries Management Act (dubbed “The Empty
Oceans Act” by critics)

34

From NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Year class: Also called cohort. Fish that were spawned
in the same year. By convention, the "birth date" is set to January 1st and a fish must experience a summer before turning 1.
35
U.S. landings of Georges Bank haddock declined more than a hundred-fold in 30 years.
36
GOM cod and GB cod are considered separate stocks, each gets into own catch limit regulations.
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In an apparent reversal of downward groundfish stock assessment trends of the 1980s and
1990s, GARM I,37 the formal groundfish stock assessment through 2001, indicated better news
for 19 of the 20 groundfish stocks, including Gulf of Maine (GOM) and Georges Bank (GB) cod.
It seemed that management was making progress3 8 (Neis, 2015; Northeast Fisheries Science
Center, 2002). Over the next four years, the Council worked on Amendment 13, "a
comprehensive plan to end overfishing on all New England groundfish stocks."39 It established
new reference points and formal plans for a ten-year rebuilding program. This controversial
amendment took Days-At-Sea (DAS) away from fishermen. About 300 vessels lost all DAS and
many boats dropped out of fishery because of this. Rebuilding plans of Amendment 13 were
challenged by a several environmental organizations in court, but it was upheld as legally
sufficient.
The next formal assessment through 2004, GARM II, found stocks not rebuilding as
planned, with the mortality rates looking especially high for GOM and GB cod and yellowtail
flounder (Northeast Fisheries Science Center, 2005). The Council significantly reduced fishing
mortality targets with Framework 42 in late 2006. The federal MSA Reauthorization Act of 2006
was enacted and called for fishery management through the use of annual catch limits and catch
shares (Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006,
2007 Title 3, Section 303). Two mandates of the 2006 reauthorization and revision of the MSA
require managers to eliminate overfishing and to set total allowable catch levels for each stressed
population each year. It requires that management rebuild depleted stocks to biomasses
37

The Northeast Fisheries Science Center's Assessment of 20 Northeast Groundfish Stocks through 2001: A Report of the
Groundfish Assessment Review Meeting
38
Quote from Tom Neis's presentation at the 2015 Maine Fishermen's Forum: "The GOM cod stock was approaching levels not
seen in the 1980s. It is commonly said now that overfishing was never ended on GOM cod, but this is not what assessment said
back then. A letter from NMFS to the council said that GOM cod were not overfished, based on reference points approved by
agency. Those reference points changed very soon afterwards, and then the stock was considered overfished by those reference
points."
39
https://www.nefmc.org/library/amendment-13
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consistent with producing maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Amendment 16 created the first
annual catch limits adopted by the Council in 2010. The predominant management approach of
the NEFMC became single-species management where an Allowable Biological Catch (ABC) is
calculated based on factors such as estimated stock size, reproductive capacity, and distribution
range of the target fish.40 The current quota system in New England involves collective "sectors"
in which groups of fishing operations in a shared geographical area are allotted a sector quota
from the Annual Catch Limit (ACL) (also called the Total Allowable Catch (TAC)) to distribute
amongst individual members.
GARM III, the assessment through 2007, concluded that fishing mortality was too high for
most managed groundfish stocks, but considerably lower than mid 1990s. The assessment
showed that between 2005-2007, mortality rates for cod declined much less than the Council was
aiming for; this was because fishing mortality (F) in 2005 turned out to be higher than originally
thought when the measures were designed. However, GARM III evaluated that there was a rapid
increase in stock spawning biomass in GOM cod, and that they were no longer considered
overfished. The assessment was considered highly reliable in part because the retrospective
pattern41 in fishing mortality rates, a persistent modeling error artifact, was relatively minor, and
no corrective adjustment was made. Tom Neis, Executive Director of the NEFMC, described the
feeling at the time: "I was doing cartwheels, we all were so happy with the news. Now I say,
40

Based on information provided NOAA’s fisheries scientists, the regional fishery management council calculates the
overfishing limit (OFL), the catch level that corresponds to the stock’s maximum sustainable yield (MSY), for each stock. Catch
levels over the OFL would likely result in an overfished stock that could not maintain the capacity to produce MSY levels over
the long-term. Next, the regional council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee recommends the stock’s acceptable biological
catch (ABC), a reduction of the OFL catch level to account for scientific uncertainty. The Council then sets the stock’s Annual
Catch Limit (ACL), the amount of fish that can be caught by fishermen over a period of one year, at or below the ABC. Councils
may also set annual catch targets (ACTs) below the ACL to account for management uncertainty. (OFL>ABC>ACL>ACT) Once
ACLs or ACTs are set, the Council determines fishing regulations (e.g., gear restrictions, fish length limits, bag limits, seasons)
to achieve those catch levels. If the ACLs and ACTs are exceeded, then the Council defines accountability measures to reduce
catch.
41

From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Retrospective Pattern: a systematic under or overestimation of spawning stock biomass (SSB) and / or fishing mortality in modeled stock reconstructions.
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Figure 1.2 Overfishing Limit (OFL), Allowable Biological Catch (ABC), and Allowable Catch
Limits (ACL) set by the NEFMC for Gulf of Maine cod between 2010-2018. No OFL or ABC
values were set in 2011 and 2012 for GOM cod. Data from the Federal Register.

Figure 1.3 Overfishing Limit (OFL), Allowable Biological Catch (ABC), and Allowable Catch
Limits (ACL) set by the NEFMC for Georges Bank cod between 2010-2018. Data from the
Federal Register.
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'What was wrong with us? Why did we ever believe this [GOM cod Spawning Stock Biomass]
line going up so dramatically. But at the time, based on reassuring rhetoric in the report, no one
stood up and raised any serious flags about this assessment - not the review panel, the groundfish
plan development team42 or the Science and Statistical Committee (SSC) when quotas were
discussed later." (Neis, 2015). Many changes were made in Amendment 16 and Framework 44
which followed. The size of the sector program was dramatically expanded and the Annual
Catch Limits for GOM cod were set much lower creating a big buffer for what was thought
would be needed to rebuild by 2014. The stock was predicted to have a 75% chance of rebuilding
by 2012 and the consensus was that rebuilding was going to occur.
The following assessment through 201043 revealed that GARM III was "overly
optimistic," overestimating the GOM cod stock size in 2007 by about 62%, well outside 8%
confidence interval by GARM assessment. Recent assessments4 4 have continued to confirm that;
they show slight stock increases between 2006-2009 before declining steeply to 2013 (Murphy et
al., 2012). Additionally, the assessment began to show a significant historical retrospective
pattern, dramatically reducing stock size estimates from the previous assessment. Up through
GARM III, all the historical stock assessments lined up with each other, but none of the
subsequent assessments through 2014 match the GARM III assessment for 2005-2008.
The Council's management decisions are based on the information it has about individual
stocks to devise regulations to meet the mortality objectives. However, the regulations have not
worked to rebuild the stocks in many cases. Framework 53, completed in 2014, set 2015-2017
Allowable Biological Catch for GOM cod at 386 metric tonnes, "a 75-percent reduction

42

From the NEFMC Glossary of Fisheries Management and Science Terms: Plan Development Team (PDT): A group of
technical experts responsible for developing and analyzing management measures under the direction of the Council.
43
See: Assessment or Data Updates of 13 Northeast Groundfish Stocks through 2010.
44
See: 2012-2016: 53rd-62nd Northeast Regional Stock Assessment Workshops (SAW) Assessment Summary Reports.
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compared to 2014, which is in addition to the 80-percent reduction implemented for fishing years
2013–2014. In total, the GOM cod catch limit has been reduced by 95 percent over the last 5
years." (Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act Provisions; Fisheries of
the Northeastern United States; Northeast Groundfish Fishery; Framework Adjustment 53,
25109-25143 2015Framework 53: 50 CFR 648). Going forward the Council has initiatives to
address better accounting for uncertainties in the assessments, best practices for setting catch
advice, better accounting for the influence of environment on stock productivity and resolving
stock structure questions (Neis, 2015).

Table 1.2 Summary of major events that occurred related to New England’s groundfish crisis
Year
1977

Event in New England’s Groundfish Fishery
New England Fisheries Management Council hits the ground running: closed
groundfish fishery by the summer
Between 1977 and 1982:
• Total number of fishing vessels landing groundfish in New England doubled
• 100 changes made in the fisheries regulations
1989
Groundfish stocks at very low numbers
1994
Groundfish collapse
Amendment 5: to achieve a 50% reduction in groundfish fishing effort by 1999
December 1994 GB closed to groundfish fishing; remain closed
2001
GARM I: First major stock assessments optimistic that depletion trend was reversing
2004
GARM II: Stocks not rebuilding as planned
2007
GARM III: Surprisingly good news (GOM cod no longer overfished!)
2010
NEFSC Assessment: Surprisingly bad news
Present Managing the crisis
Framework 53: 2015-2017 ABC for GOM cod - 95% reduction from 2010
1.2.3 Emergence of A New Management Paradigm: Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management
Calls for fisheries management approaches that take ecosystems considerations into
account have been made on global and local levels for the past four decades. Sketches for a
definition of Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management (EBFM) can be found in major

22

international legal instruments such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS, Articles 61 and 119), the 1993 Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1995 UN
Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA), the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishers
(Schiffman, 2007). Various interpretations of EBFM have led to a wide variety of management
strategies for implementation. A common focus of these strategies is a multi-species
management approach that considers trophic and other community relationships based on
ecosystems models (Morishita, 2008). Examples of ecosystems objectives include targeting
reductions of bycatch, protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems, and addressing changes in the
fishery due to climate change effects. Ocean planning promotes more integrated ecosystems
management strategies that include other industry and community stakeholders in coastal and
marine uses including offshore energy projects, commercial shipping, ecotourism, and other
recreational uses. Many different approaches to incorporating human dimensions of ecosystems
in management exist that range from solely focusing on economic interests in relation to
ecological considerations to defining social objectives and prioritizing the engagement and
contributions of diverse stakeholders in setting goals and providing knowledge about the fishery
(Brewer, 2011; Olson, 2011).
In the US, The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 (SFA), an amendment to the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, called for the creation of a research
panel to “develop recommendations to expand the application of ecosystem principles in fishery
conservation and management activities.” In 1999, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS or NOAA Fisheries) released a report instructing the integration of ecosystem-based
management into regional fishery management (National Marine Fisheries Service, 1999).
Additionally, The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, created by the Oceans Act of 2000 (P.L.
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106-256), recommended EBFM practices for all U.S. fisheries management in its final report. In
late 2012, NOAA Fisheries created the position of Senior Scientist for Ecosystem Management
to coordinate the efforts of fisheries scientists to support the development and application of
effective ecosystem-based management. In July 2013, the National Ocean Council published the
Marine Planning Handbook mandating regional management councils to incorporate Ecosystembased Management in their plans.
Fisheries scientists have been building the foundations for EBFM for decades (Fogarty,
2014). Dr. Jason Link, NOAA’s first Senior Scientist for Ecosystem Management, contends that
ecosystem considerations in marine management have been extant for over a century beginning
with the original national marine fisheries laboratories that emphasized natural history, and took
an “inclusive, holistic, and observational approach.” He argues that starting in the early 1900s
fisheries science took a reductionist turn which has continued until the 1980s when we entered a
new era of “synthesis and integration that culminated in EBFM with the ideas for it crystallized
in (Peter Anthony) Larkin’s 1996 paper45” (Link, 2010). Dr. Michael Fogarty, the former head of
NOAA’s Northeast Fishery Science Center’s (NEFSC) Ecosystems Assessments and Dynamics
branch, cites scientists that have been researching and publishing about EBFM since the 1970s
and describes ecosystems approaches that were put in place by the International Commission for
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), the management body that regulated New England’s
waters before NEFMC was created (Fogarty, 2014). In 1992, following repeated collapse of New
England groundfish stocks, Fogarty’s group of scientists at the NEFSC initiated a large-scale
ecosystem study of Georges Bank.
Beginning in the early 2000s, the New England Fisheries Management Council began to
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Larkin. 1996. Concepts and issues in marine ecosystem management. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 6:139–164.
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explore moving away from management based primarily on single-stock assessments toward a
greater focus on ecosystem considerations in management. Other governmental councils, nongovernmental organizations, and academic and research institutions have been supporting the
New England Fisheries Management Council in making this management transition include
working groups of the Northeast Regional Planning Body (NRPB, called for by the National
Ocean Policy, established by Presidential Executive Order in 2010), the Ocean Planning
Committee of Northeast Regional Ocean Council (NROC, a state and federal partnership formed
in 2005 by the Governors of the New England states), and the Lenfest Fishery Ecosystem Task
Force (charged by the Lenfest Ocean Program which was established in 2004 by the Lenfest
Foundation and is managed by The Pew Charitable Trusts). In November 2016, NOAA Fisheries
released an EBFM Road Map to guide implementation of the EBFM Policy in regional fisheries
councils over the next five years. Also in November 2016, The Lenfest Fishery Ecosystem Task
Force released the publication Building Effective Fishery Ecosystem Plans, “a blueprint for
fisheries ecosystem plans (FEPs) to provide guidance to managers on implementing EBFM.”
These organizations work with and include members from the New England Fisheries
Management Council, particularly the scientists and economists on the Council’s oversight
committees, many whom work for the Northeast Fisheries Science Center, NOAA’s regional
research institution. However, it is the Council itself, and ultimately its 18-member voting body
that will determine how EBMF will manifest in New England, with approval from NMFS.
The NEFMC and fisheries community has been working toward this management goal
since the fall of 2005. In 2015, a draft document on policy alternatives for implementing EBFM
was distributed that led to discussion on developing what is being called an eFEP, or example
Fishery Ecosystem Plan, as a template for what an implemented plan could look like in order to
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get detailed descriptions to and feedback from stakeholders, determine what data would be
needed and what changes will have to be made in the National Standards and the MSA to
support EBFM. It was suggested that the eFEP might possibly run parallel to current
management processes to get a sense of the way that advice could be derived for management
and even possibly to simulate outcomes that might come from decisions made based on the eFEP
protocols. Work on this eFEP has occupied the EBFM committee's efforts since March 2015 and
is the focus of the chapter 5.

1.3 Theoretical Framework for Analysis: Employing Actor-Network Theory to Study a Socioecological Systems Intervention
This project is an investigation of how multi-scalar and interactive processes and
relationships constrain or facilitate ongoing and innovative efforts based in socio-ecological
systems (SES) theory to improve the functioning of the fishery as it grapples with groundfish
depletion and begins to develop plans for Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management (EBFM). It is
an examination of how the everyday practices of the heterogenous network of human, nonhumans, and inanimate objects and ideas co-produce the fishery. Examination of the processes of
knowledge formation in the early stages of development of the EBFM paradigm for New
England is critical for developing flexibility and adaptability in management of fisheries, as
called for in SES theory. To analyze how this is occurring, it is necessary to develop an approach
that more fully examines the integration of the social, ecological, and economic aspects of
fishery than any of the current approaches do alone. To this end, research and analysis for this
dissertation study employs Actor-Network methodology and analysis to understand how current
management issues are affecting how EBFM theory is being translated into the designs and plans
for implementation.
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A close examination of the fishery processes and practices makes one aware that
researchers are part of the knowledge formation, and therefore also involved in the construction
of the fishery. This study foregrounds the observation that scientists and managers constitute
what is perceived as reality even as they mediate and communicate that same reality. ActorNetwork Theory (ANT) analysis makes this explicit, as seen in the fisheries research of Law,
Holm, Johnson, Bavington, and others, and pays attention to the processes of making and
framing of reality that take place in institutions, methods, measuring techniques, and nature
itself. An ANT approach recognizes that the "best science" used to manage fisheries does not
form spontaneously, and analyzes the ways that it actually emerges out of the work, skills, and
habits of humans, employing scientific and decision making techniques that themselves interact
over time in the laboratory, in the field, and at the conference table.
Rather than conceptualizing the socio-ecological system of the fishery as a kind of
causative domain, ANT-inspired analysis observes the network as it continually emerges through
traces of associations between actants - human and non-human beings and inanimate objects and
ideas - that exercise power and produce actions through these associations (Latour, 2005). ANT
analysis engages ecology as part of the network by recognizing that "nature" - the nonhuman
biota and physical environment - plays as active a role in the world as people, community, and
institutions do. This perspective lets the actor-network "speak for itself" by scrutinizing
information from ongoing relationships without dogmatically applying societal forces to explain
causation. Actor-networks, as webs of actors and associations, get things done. For ANT, power,
or the capacity to produce effects, is understood to be a result of actor-network processes, not an
explanatory relationship.
To observe how specific actants and institutions function together as a dynamic and
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contingent network to negotiate environmental governance, I focused on processes that move
scientific and social scientific information into the policy domain. This analytical positioning
contributes a better understanding of environmental management interventions as emergent
constructions produced by active associations, and not strictly as policy prescriptions by experts
on ecology and socioeconomics. While fisheries scientists, economists, and managers must
understand and engage social scientific analysis in order to participate in this policy space,
limitations on time and training do not allow for in-depth assessments of how their own
epistemic biases and institutionalized practices affect their contributions to science-based policy.
My ethnographic research contributes this vantage point and grounded theory approach to their
efforts and understanding.

1.4 Research Design and Methodology
This study employs ethnographic research methodologies to investigate the emergence of
EBFM in the context of the depletion "crisis" that is escalating in its groundfish fishery in New
England. Through observing the practices and associations of fishermen, fisheries researchers,
industry and ENGO representatives, in coordination with managers at the regional Management
Council over 3 years between 2014 and 2017, I analyzed how the fishery produces and employs
knowledge for governance. The New England fishery actor-network is made up of more
practices and associations than are possible to observe in a three-year ethnographic study, and all
of the actants are connected in a web of relations that is tangled and intricate, but I have observed
patterns in traces of many relations that illuminate how the network is functioning as it
constantly rearranges and re-emerges though fluctuations of coherence and dissipation. To
follow these actor-network processes as they occur and watch New England’s EBFM science-
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management “paradigm shift” unfold, I primarily examined the actor-network through: 1)
participant observation at New England Fishery Management Council meetings and other related
meetings; 2) interviews with key sources of input into the fishery governance processes; and 3)
document analysis of working drafts of Council documents and completed, distributed, and
published papers.
Participant observation was conducted at NEFMC committee meetings, science labs, and
public events promoted by the fisheries stakeholders. Fishermen, scientists, economists, business
owners, conservationists, and management professionals, and politicians from Maine to
Connecticut interact with one another through periodic meetings of the NEFMC where I
observed the activities involved in the ongoing practices of defining research needs and
discussing scientific and social scientific input, and the creation of regulations, quotas, Fisheries
Management Plan Amendments and Frameworks. I attended meetings of the general New
England Fisheries Council, and the EBFM, Habitat Committees, Groundfish committees, and
several other committees, and listened remotely and read summaries of meetings over this
period. I also attended the EBFM and groundfish subcommittee meetings of Plan Development
Teams (PDT) which focus on the scientific and technical aspects and are primarily made up of
scientists and social scientists from the Northeast Fisheries Science Center and New England
universities.46
Research institutes, such as Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and university
departments, such as UMass-Dartmouth's School for Marine Science and Technology were focus
areas. Site visits included other institutions where council members are affiliated, such as fishing
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The Council assigns tasks to each of its committees to provide information, analysis, and advice for management actions.
PDTs, along with Advisory Panels (AP), make recommendations to the NEFMC committees who make recommendations to the
Council to act on. Advisory Panels (AP) primarily populated by representatives from industry, ENGOs, and scientists. The
Council submits recommendations for regulations for final approval by NOAA and the Department of Commerce.
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boat marinas, fishing industry and community non-profit organizations, ENGOs, auctions and
wholesale markets, and seafood distribution and processing plants in New England. Description
and analysis are also based in information about the New England groundfish fishery from the
discourse in popular media, institutional publications, journals, management meetings and plans,
and laws. Additionally, I analyzed documents, video, and audio created by the NEFMC (both
publicly available and internal) and its members and responses in industry and public media.
This study could not be accomplished with broad surveys of the people involved in the
fishery or through analyzing the Council’s actions from afar. Observing a relatively small group
of people, as representatives of larger communities, who are involved in the everyday processes
of New England’s fishery management, was necessary to capture the everyday discourse and
practices. To situate these processes, I also immersed myself in the social, cultural, ecological,
economic, and historical composition of these interactions by interacting with community
members and sea creatures in port towns and on seashores, reading and watching a continuous
stream of news media coverage and local documentaries, and attending industry and cultural
events in the region such as the International Seafood Expo, the Maine Fishermen’s Forum, and
New Bedford’s Working Waterfront Festival.
For this project, I emphasized local-scale science-management interactions, framing the
outcomes as a product of this particular relational network. This choice of scale warrants actornetwork approaches and is necessary to conceptualize the fishery policies and institutions and to
understand how they are practiced, in an effort to guide management to better outcomes.
However, this local network must also be considered in the context of larger scales of economic,
legal, and political institutions. While detailed ethnographic studies of the larger-scale processes
are outside the scope of this project, I applied insights gained from the GPN approach,
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institutional analysis, and neoliberal critiques to analyze how they are manifesting in the local
actor-network. Analogously, while the local ecology off the coast of New England is unique,
regional and global earth-systems processes such as runoff pollution and climate change affect
the local ecosystems. SES approaches are well-equipped to bring in information and insights
about these larger-scale ecosystem issues. Exploration of how the larger-scale ecological
processes play out in the New England groundfish fishery necessitated the use of insights from
some of the more category-based systems models of SES and institutional analysis.
Broadly, this dissertation study asks: how do regional and wide-scale ecological, cultural,
social, and economic processes and relationships, in conjunction with practices of fisheries
science, social science, and management, mediate and produce New England’s groundfish
fishery and its ongoing crisis status? To answer this question, I focus on and compare two types
of discourses about the groundfish crisis that are interconnected but that also play different roles
in governance. First, for actants participating in the everyday activities of the fishery, I compare
how they describe the current groundfish crisis, and where and how they see the problems and
conflicts within the operations and management of the fisheries from their perspectives. Second,
I explore how the social science academic research on the groundfish crisis networks with
national fisheries law, the regional management Council, fisheries scientists, and governmental
and non-governmental agencies as it tries to provide useful understandings of the problems of the
fishery and propose solutions. In both cases, I tracked how individual and group knowledge and
experience about the marine ecology and environmental and socio-economic issues and their
relationships to others within the network translates into how they view and contribute to the
successes and failures of the fishery.
I use a relational network approach based on insights from SES and ANT frameworks to
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organize and analyze these ethnographic observations of stakeholder and management and
academic practices and discourses about the fishery. Showing how people, marine ecological
communities, and structural forms function in relation to one another will help to identify and
evaluate how the institutional elements of the network such as norms, rules, habits, and power
relations enable and constrain economic and social behavior and ecological productivity. I
evaluate the "crisis" as an outcome as it relates to processes and practices within the network,
and also frame the crisis as resulting from the dynamic construction of the wider network, in
space and time - including the economic and non-economic acting humans, the ecology and
biophysical aspects of the marine ecosystem, and the institutional frameworks and governance
structures. Using detailed field notes and interview transcripts, I saw patterns and themes that
emerge in behavior, processes, relationships, and outcomes in this socio-ecological system.
Following analysis of the construction of the groundfish crisis, the focus shifts to the
emergence of Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management as a new science-management paradigm
to explore the question: how are ongoing groundfish governance processes affecting the New
England Fisheries Management Council’s efforts to construct the ecosystem as a category for
governance through Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management (EBFM)? To understand how
EBFM is emerging in the New England in the context of the groundfish management crisis, I
investigated how concepts of the ecosystem, biology, and the fishery are being constructed and
produced by the scientific standard models, methods, and tools. Through document and
ethnographic research, I tracked how scientists are addressing the challenges of the complexity
and uncertainty in modeling the ecosystem, including its social dimensions, in the effort to
develop a strategy to transition to Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management.
I used a contextualized discourse analysis to investigate documentation of the efforts of
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the NEFMC to address the international and national mandates to develop EBFM, which started
in earnest in 2005 with exploratory workshops and surveys. I attended meetings of the NEFMC
Ecosystems Based Management Committee and Science and Statistical Committee, and
reviewed real-time and recorded audio, presentation slides, and memos of meetings through
online broadcasts and public archives. Detailed observations of the research institutions, such as
the NOAA labs at Woods Hole, were made to monitor how scientists influence EBFM for New
England fisheries, choosing which indicators to use and monitor, and working to create
management plans that stop ecosystem decline and improve the status of the fishery. In-depth
interviews with relevant fisheries scientists who lead efforts to introduce EBFM to the managers
and fishermen and observation of EBFM Committee and subcommittee meetings form the
ethnographic of this part of this study. Following the NEFMC's debates over EBFM reveals how
the relationships delineated by my first research question affect the emergence of a new
management paradigm.
Finally, this research sought to address how this case study can inform environmental
governance and advance our understanding of EBFM concepts such as flexibility, adaptability,
and participatory co-management. It addresses the question: how can analysis of the New
England fishery as a dynamic and contingent network advance our understanding of natural
resource policy and management and yield insights into opportunities for more equitable and
successful governance strategies? Knowledge production about and for use by the fishery is
dependent on the roles and scripts of the actants in governance; where, when, how, and what
fishery contributors have fished and/or studied, and the institutional/disciplinary training, tools,
culture, and projects of those contributors. This analysis uses this insight, and observations about
the coherence and success of this actor-network, to offer ideas for the development of new
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strategies for governance that are specific to the New England fishery. Specifically, I envision a
possible socio-ecological future pathway that would embrace transdisciplinarity and
experimentation to address the difficult issues of uncertainty, risk, and tradeoffs in management
decisions.

1.5 Chapter Overviews
This dissertation proceeds in the following order:
Chapter 2 comprises a literature review of SES and ANT theory and their applications in
fisheries studies. It confirms the work of SES scholars who have argued that Actor-Network
Theory perspectives complement SES theory by introducing ways to integrate social science
with ecological science more thoroughly. Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of SES
contributions to current environmental governance theory. A review of institutional SES fisheries
literature demonstrates how many ideas that have been generated from SES studies are being
endorsed as useful ecosystem-focused governance strategies. A discussion of the ANT concepts
of performativity and translation follows, showing how ANT can provide ways to frame and
analyze complex networks like fisheries that involve entangled social, cultural, economic, and
ecological relationships. Next, several interrelated themes that emerge from ANT fisheries
studies are examined. This chapter concludes with a summary of insights from SES and ANT
studies on fisheries that are useful for identifying processes and interactions that may be
occurring in New England’s crisis and creation of EBFM as a policy intervention.
Chapter 3 addresses the contradictions of conceptualization of the fishery and fishing
crisis in science, management, industry, local community, and larger public spheres. The fishery
is simultaneously a marine ecosystem, livelihood, and seafood industry with different, but high,
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value for all stakeholders. This chapter begins with a general background on the many different
viewpoints that have tried to identify and rectify problems and failures in the New England
groundfish fishery. Next, narratives of blame that define the groundfish fishery "crisis" is
described with detailed analysis of six targets of criticism. The first five focus on other
stakeholders' “misunderstandings" of the problem and actions, and internal disagreement. The
actants that are criticized for their role in the crisis include the fishermen, the seafood market, the
fisheries managers, the environmental non-governmental organizations, and the fisheries
scientists. The last target of blame discussed is the "environment" which includes living and nonliving, human-influenced, and "natural cycle" contributions. These analyses and diagnoses of the
fisheries crisis are analyzed for relational power dynamics and themes of agreement and
contradiction that emerge in this web of competing narratives. From this space, a movement
toward Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management to address ostensible misunderstanding and
mismanagement is emerging. This chapter concludes with an analysis of how the groundfish
fishery actor-network is cohering and dissipating as it negotiates the crisis and looks toward
EBFM to resolve some of the problems.
Chapter 4 is an exploration of the role of fisheries social science research in the
performativity of the fishery network. This chapter explores how different epistemological
approaches focused on the groundfish crisis interact in academic literature and are negotiated in
NEFMC debates and decisions. It compares how scholars in resource economics and natural
resources management disciplines analyze the groundfish crisis to insights gained through
political ecology analysis. ANT awareness lets us see that those studying and commenting on the
problems and seeking solutions for the groundfish crisis also form and transform the network.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of how different analyses conclude that EBFM is what
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is needed, but each analysis is looking to EBFM for something different. This is apparent in the
differences between developing international, national, and local conceptualizations and
representations of socioeconomics and socio-ecology in EBFM.
Chapter 5 closely examines the regional fishery science and management processes and
practices during a period where the science paradigm is moving toward an ecosystem
conceptualization of the marine ecosystem, and efforts are being made to translate that into
fishery and industry conceptualizations by social scientists, economists, and managers. Fisheries
scientists are developing new quantitative methods to model the ecosystem as a complex
adaptive system. Concerned that ecosystems approaches will add greater complexity and
uncertainty to the point of making the fishery unmanageable, many managers are advocating a
slow, stepwise "evolutionary" pathway for transitioning to EBFM, rather than seeking
"revolutionary" changes to the current scientific modeling and management paradigms. This
chapter investigates how, through processes of classification and categorization, new ecosystem
models and conceptualizations emerge out of the work, skills, and habits of scientists interacting
over time in the laboratory and in the field, employing scientific techniques and equipment. It
maps the ways that the fisheries scientists interact with each other and social scientists and
economists within and beyond their own groups and organizations, and analyzes how individuals
and groups work to resolve conflict and build consensus to present the "best science" for EBFM
at the fisheries meetings.
Chapter 6 examines the possibilities of socio-ecological translations and transformations
with Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management. It calls for new knowledge and understanding of
uncertainty, risk, and tradeoffs in EBFM science and management in light of discoveries made
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through this ANT study. It considers socio-ecological future ideals for management for
complexity, flexibility, and adaptability.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review: Socio-ecological Systems Theory and Actor-Network
Theory Analysis of Environmental Governance of Fisheries
Science does not enter a chaotic society to put order into it anymore, to simplify its composition
and to put an end to its controversies. It does enter it, but to add new uncertain ingredients […]
to all the other ingredients that make-up the collective experiments. When scientists add their
grains of salt, they do not put an end to politics: they add new entities to the make-up of the
collective process.
Bruno Latour, Concepts and
Transformation, 1998

This chapter demonstrates how actor-network theory (ANT) perspectives allow for the
identification and elucidation of aspects of fisheries management for analysis that have been
overlooked, assumed, or incompletely theorized by more structural and/or deterministic research
on fisheries, including institutional socio-ecological systems theory. It begins with a discussion
of the contributions of socio-ecological systems theory (SES) to strategies for environmental
governance and, specifically for Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management, and shows how SES
researchers have been using ANT perspectives to complement their analysis as a means to
remove the misrepresentative separation of human and natural systems as objects of study and
governance. The next section reviews research employing different institutional SES approaches
to study fisheries management that propose 1) specific institutional arrangements that have a
record of serving socio-ecological systems more effectively and 2) improved management
strategies including co-management, adaptive management, and interactive governance. This
review of institutional SES fisheries literature demonstrates how many ideas that have been
generated from SES studies are being endorsed as useful ecosystem-focused governance
strategies.
The section of this chapter that follows explains the usefulness of ANT analytical
frameworks of performativity and translation that involve observing the continual forming of the
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fishery as a network of associations, thereby illuminating how the fishery is functioning in ways
that keep it coherent and way that are resulting in conflict and failure. Finally, several
interrelated themes that emerge from the literature on ANT fisheries studies are discussed. This
chapter concludes with a summary of insights from ANT studies on fisheries that are useful for
identifying processes and interactions that may be occurring in New England’s crisis and
creation of EBFM as a policy intervention.

2.1 Introduction: A Case for Strengthening Socio-ecological Systems Theory Management
Interventions with Actor-Network Theory
Environmental governance comprises the actors and organizational and institutional
relationships that interact across multiple scales to manage uses and conservation of "nature"
(Bridge & Perreault, 2009). Analysis of environmental governance of fisheries has provided
insights into how management actions have led to, or at least failed to prevent, fishery collapses
and provided strategies for reforming underperforming management practices. Diligent efforts
by managers to apply sophisticated biological, economic, and social theory to improve fisheries
management — especially in North America, Europe, and Australia where significant
government support funds research — have resulted in sustainable designations for many
fisheries. However, some once-abundant fisheries such as the New England groundfish fishery
continue to face rapid and continuous stock depletion and are notorious examples of
unsuccessful environmental governance.47 The large body of research and commentary on the
environmental governance of the New England groundfish fishery, with different foci and
analytical approaches, has led to both complementary and contradictory interpretations and
47

Every year, NOAA Fisheries produces a Report to Congress on the Status of the U.S. Fisheries. Some fisheries are listed in the
“Overfishing” or “Overfished” categories. In 2017, New England had several groundfish stocks in the “Overfished” category.
Proposed bills for the Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act have sought to stop using the term “Overfished” and to
replace it with the category of “Depleted” for stocks that are at a reduced level of abundance, to indicate that the onus for the low
stock populations is not solely on managers or fishermen.
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assessments of the efficacy of its management strategies, but has not, to date, resulted in any
interventions that have reversed the declining trend. However, Ecosystem-based Fishery
Management (EBFM) is being proposed by numerous researchers as a way to address the
different problems that plague the groundfish fishery (Ames, 2010; Apollonio & Dykstra, 2008;
Brewer, 2012a; J. Brodziak & Link, 2002; Collie et al., 2009; Eayrs et al., 2014; Hennessey &
Healey, 2000; Jin et al., 2012; Lucey & Fogarty, 2013; Olson, 2011; M. Sissenwine &
Murawski, 2004; M. P. Sissenwine & Mace, 2002; Stephenson et al., 2012).48
Many of the management objectives for EBFM, including flexibility and adaptability in
management, participatory problem solving and decision making, and broadened definitions of
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Over the past twenty years, many researchers have encouraged New England to adopt EBFM, commonly specifically
addressing the management failures in New England’s groundfish fishery. The following are several examples of the support for
EBFM : Hennessey & Healey (2000) suggest that “the integration of science, management, and harvesting sectors through
ecosystem-based management offers the best means of” addressing the collapse of the groundfish stocks off New England”
because other “[m]anagement regimes designed by the New England Fishery Management Council were ineffective in
constraining fishing effort.”; Sissenwine and Mace (2002) argue that, based on their experience in fisheries management,
including in the New England groundfish fishery, “responsible” management “means sustainable production of human benefits,
which are distributed “fairly,” without causing unacceptable changes in marine ecosystems.”; Brodziak & Link (2002)
demonstrate how their “approach to EBFM using the groundfish trawl fishery system in the Georges Bank region of the
northwest Atlantic” works to “[maintain] ecosystem quality and [sustain] associated benefits.”; Sissenwine & Murawski (2004)
argue that, based on their experience in fisheries management, including in the New England groundfish fishery, the “primary
benefit of an EAF is that it offers a more complete and integrated accounting of the full range benefits and costs to society
associated with developing sustainable approaches for living marine resources. They “believe that an EAF is one that is
geographically specified, adaptive, takes account of ecosystem knowledge and uncertainties, considers multiple external
influences, and strives to balance diverse societal objectives.”; Apollonio & Dykstra (2008) argue for an ecosystems approach to
fisheries management for New England groundfish, specifically advocating for the incorporation of the concept of guilds and
guild interactions; Collie et al. (2009) apply estimates of energy flux through the Georges Bank trophic web in an approach that
would be considered an ecosystem approach to management and find “that rebuilding the principal groundfish species to their
MSY levels requires restructuring of the fish community and repartitioning of energy within the food web.”; Ames (2010)
applies lessons from Maine’s lobster fishery to suggest an ecosystems management approach for New England groundfish; Olson
(2011) argues that EBFM must integrate people in EBFM in in other ways than “simply as external drivers of change.” She uses
information on New England fishing communities to “teas[es] apart the human dimensions of fishing embedded in predominant
notions such as fishing effort through more explicit consideration of spatially based resource dependencies and mutual
constitution of society-nature.”; Brewer (2012a) uses Maine groundfish management as an example of “how ecosystem
perspectives were made available to decision makers, but [were]underused. She advocates for spatial planning for “the provision
of information on human–environment links, ecosystem trade-offs, and institutional adaptiveness that is sorely missing in the
groundfish case.”; Stephenson et al. (2012) edited a book that includes chapters that review the management and policy tools
and approaches of Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management for the Gulf of Maine.; Jin et al. (2012) “develop an integrated
economic and ecological framework for evaluating the economic and distributional effects of implementing EBFM strategies in
New England.” They argue that “[e]ffective models can provide decision-makers and stakeholders with critical and relevant
information for making more effective and equitable decisions about restoring the productivity and value of marine ecosystems.”
Lucey & Fogarty (2013) argue that spatial management units are needed for EBFM that “take account of oceanographic,
biological, and socio-economic properties.” They use New England’s fisheries to “define operational fisheries for this region on
the basis of landings composition by gear type and the spatial and temporal dimensions associated with them.”
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benefits for humans and non-humans, are rooted in innovative environmental governance ideas
that have been put forward by research focusing on socio-ecological systems (SES). SES
approaches frame human-natural ecosystems such as a fisheries as "coupled, interdependent, and
co-evolutionary system(s)" and examine how social (economic, cultural, socio-political) and
ecological (biophysical) systems function together (Berkes, 2011). Separation of human and
natural systems for analytical purposes is seen as artificial and misleading. SES research in
fisheries encompasses a broad range of approaches that analyze relationships and feedbacks
between ecological dynamics and political, economic, and social factors which impact marine
ecology and fishing communities. To accomplish this, SES theory advocates interdisciplinarity
and transdisciplinarity49, attempting to integrate natural science, social science, and the
humanities perspectives on marine socio-ecological systems and reconcile traditional
disciplinary and epistemological divisions (Berkes, 2011).
SES scholarship has focused on the relations involved in the scientific and management
aspects of resource governance that prioritize ecological conservation, scientific knowledgebuilding, and participatory and adaptive policy goals. In fisheries research, SES approaches share
a strategy of replacing traditional output-oriented fishery objectives, such as maximum
sustainable yield and maximum economic yield, with objectives to maintain the health and
integrity of the socio-ecological system as a whole. Berkes defines three tenets of SES:
1) recognizing the significance and implications of the interconnected nature of
the social and ecological subsystems;
2) developing complex adaptive systems approaches to deal with these socialecological systems for a contextualized understanding of the drivers of change,
from local to global levels; and
3) integrating participatory methodologies at all levels for knowledge production,
49

Interdisciplinarity seeks to integrate methodologies and knowledge from different disciplines as cohesively as possible so that
multiple epistemologies are included in analysis. Transdisciplinarity tries to dissolve the boundaries between disciplinary
frameworks and examine the construction of meaning in everyday complex processes and phenomena.
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adaptive management, and social learning for the governance of marine
ecosystems. (Berkes, 2011).
Socio-ecological systems theory concepts are increasingly becoming embedded in the
fisheries management discourse in the United States. Management discussions and debates are
recognizing and addressing many relational and non-linear aspects of the fishery that are not
accounted for in the standard rational bio-economic representations of natural resource
paradigms. For example, SES theory highlights the importance of non-economic and nonrational processes occur between fishermen, their communities, local fish assemblages, and the
places where the fishermen fish and live to the success of the regional fishing industry and the
effectiveness of regulatory regimes. SES has also helped to identify problems with exclusive,
top-down governance strategies, privatization and enclosure processes for commons, and
ineffectual fixes for scientific and economic uncertainty. Explanations of socio-ecological
factors and feedbacks that are implicated in the problems in the New England’s fishery
management are leading many managers, researchers, and stakeholders to accept that a shift to a
SES perspective of the fishery with EBFM, may be what is needed to reverse depletion.
SES theory has largely focused on integrating biophysical aspects more thoroughly into
the understanding of socio-ecological systems such as human resource use, food systems,
environmental hazards, and city planning. It has been criticized for neglecting to adequately
“theorize and operationalize ‘the social’” and for privileging social factors that can be quantified
for analysis with input-output models (Stojanovic et al., 2016).50 Resilience studies, an area of
focus within SES, has recently grappled with finding richer ways of integrating social science
with ecological science. Several resilience scholars have proposed incorporating Actor-Network
Theory (ANT) perspectives into SES as a way to conceptualize and represent agency in socio-
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See Stojanovic et al. 2016 for a thorough review of the critiques in the academic literature.
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ecological systems as more than just human intentionality (Dwiartama & Rosin, 2014;
Stojanovic et al., 2016; Stone-Jovicich, 2015). ANT rejects the human-nature dualism through its
emphasis on the role of non-human beings - and other material and semiotic elements - in
shaping what is considered “social life” (Stone-Jovicich, 2015). ANT’s investigation of the
coherence of heterogenous networks corresponds to resilience research’s focus on socioecological systems’ capacity to “retain functions and support its components.”
Political ecology approaches to socio-ecological systems such as Dianne Rocheleau’s
“rooted networks” concept also embrace complexity and the integration of social and biophysical
processes and interactions, critiquing relations of power in the formation of policy. Rather than
unpacking or untangling how institutions (“formal organizational structures and recognizable
movements”) are embedded in socio-ecological networks, Rocheleau’s political ecology involves
“weaving ‘chains of explanation’ into webs of relation and situated science” across multiple
scales (D. Rocheleau, 2011). Rocheleau bases her rooted network approach on ideas generated
by several different network theoretical constructs including Deleuze and Guattari’s sociological
rhizome metaphor, ecological network flow models, neural-network models, and the governance
organizational frameworks of SES institutional analysis, and employs the research methodology
of Actor-Network Theory51 (D. Rocheleau, 2011; D. E. Rocheleau, 2008; D. Rocheleau & Roth,
2007).
In Politics of Nature, Bruno Latour calls for political ecology to respond to the crises that
arise from modern society’s two house representation of politics and nature by admitting that we
cannot study “objective” natures because “the risk-free objects, the smooth objects to which we
had been accustomed up to now, are giving way to risky attachments, tangled objects” (Latour,
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Rocheleau also acknowledges contributions from Escobar’s meshworks, Castells’ network society, Massey’s relational places,
and complexity theory.
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2005). Rocheleau echoes this: “We also need a prism that reflects the combined light and
patterns of ‘social’ and ‘biotic’ life, in a way that helps us to get beyond the nature/culture
binaries that suffuse our thinking.” (D. Rocheleau, 2011). In her research on the Rural People’s
Federation of Zambrana-Chacuey in the Dominican Republic, Rocheleau’s employs an ANT
perspective while also rooting the network and its relational webs in specific locations,
foregrounding the ecological diversity of the positions and perspectives of the actors, and
networking the material and social in its analysis of the patterns and processes of connection (D.
Rocheleau, 2011).
Analysis of an actor-network reveals complexities and contingencies that are often
overlooked in SES studies. The ANT research methodology proposed in Latour’s Reassembling
the Social (2005) for studying heterogenous networks requires immersion into the everyday
workings of the actor-network over time to “trace” associations between elements, or actants, in
the network to reveal how these associations are continually forming and transforming the
network. While it may not be possible to observe all of the associations that form the network
through ethnographic fieldwork and document analysis, ANT’s usefulness is not limited by the
analyst’s lack of omniscience. Pragmatically, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) can be
complementary to other more normative, explanatory theoretical frameworks, including SES, by
finding previously unidentified or assumed aspects of the network for analysis (Castree, 2002).52
The following sections in this chapter examine how socioecological systems theory
(SES) approaches are used to analyze problems in fisheries around the world, and how, in
concert with an Actor-Network Theory analytical lens, SES can be used to address many of the
difficult questions that remain about managing successfully functioning socio-ecological
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There is an ongoing discussion in the literature on whether a synthesis of ANT and Marxism is effective for political ecology.
See Castree, 2002; Fine, 2005; Gareau, 2005; Holifield, 2009; Perkins, 2007

44

resource systems such as fisheries. To conceptualize and analyze the fishery as a socioecological system, emphasis in the studies discussed here is placed on examining the
relationships that occur between the actors, institutions, processes, and everyday practices that
exist in a dynamic network of connections in the fishery. SES frameworks using ANT
perspectives recognize the effective agency of the ecosystems and resources themselves, the
marine habitats and fish in this case, and the dominant scientific paradigms and technologies that
affect the processes and practices that form relationships in the network constituting the
governance of the fishery. This chapter concludes with a summary of insights from SES and
ANT studies on fisheries that are useful for identifying processes and interactions that are
occurring in New England’s crisis and creation of EBFM as a policy intervention.

2.2 Institutional Socio-ecological Systems Theory in Fisheries Research
Socio-ecological Systems (SES) approaches have been fruitful for rethinking fisheries
governance, emphasizing a systems representation of a fishery and stressing the importance of
analyzing the multi-scalar processes and relationships. Issues of national and global politics and
economics and intra- and inter-institutional dynamics affect how the governance strategies
proposed are conceptualized and operationalized (Bocking, 2004). Several different
methodological and analytical approaches are used in empirical socio-ecological systems studies.
One SES approach that has been used to examine fisheries management successes and
failures is based in institutional theories, proposing institutional arrangements that serve socioecological systems more effectively. This approach is inspired by political economist Elinor
Ostrom’s work in New Institutional Economics (NIE)53 and its connections to SES theory
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through her focus on Common Pool Resource management. Institutions, defined broadly as
structural forms such as regulations, norms, and beliefs that are relatively stable and have the
capacity to shape people's social behavior, have been the focus of analysis of fisheries
governance efforts for several decades. NIE approaches emphasize the ways in which
oversimplifications and assumptions of neoclassical economics models largely ignore social,
network, and territorial relationships (Bridge & Perreault, 2009). They examine governance in a
relational way employing theories of embeddedness,54 considering issues of value and power in
socially and spatially embedded economic processes of production. This work organizes
complex webs of institutional interactions and relationships and examines how they affect the
decisions and outcomes in a networked system.55
A highly influential institutional SES approach to fisheries governance based on
Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and Common Pool Resource
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Another direction of NIE approaches that deserves mention here, because it is influential on both socio-ecological tracks
discussed, is the Global Commodity Chain (GCC)/Global Value Chain (GVC)/Global Production Network (GPN) analytical
frameworks. GPN analysis replaced linear chains of connections used in GCC and GVC analyses with a web of relationships,
conceiving of economic production in a network of social relations. The nature of relationships between actors is viewed as
dynamic and analyzed taking into account the exercise of power and the intentionality of all actors including the social actors
who coordinate economic activity. Power is viewed as a practice, or means of acting, rather than as a position within a network.
Power relationships between actors are seen as frequently changing and network relationships can "sum" power when
relationships work constructively. Conceptualizing economies as practices of production, exchange, and consumption
necessitates understanding of flows of capital, commodities, information, and people occurring in time and through both material
and constructed spaces. Therefore, analyzing what an economy is and how it works requires examination of the dynamic and
heterogeneous ways that economic actions are embedded in (or disembedded from) society, culture, politics, and territories (R.
Hudson, 2004).
A GPN representation facilitates assessment of the variety of organizational forms as well as the interconnections
between multiple scales of social and economic relations. Economic processes can be seen to actively construct and transform
scale; this can be explored as an outcome itself, but also lead to an analysis of how scale enables and constrains strategies and
practices of actors (Bridge, 2002). GPN analysis calls attention to "spaces for interaction" that emerge for actors to engage other
actors, processes, and ecologies of the network in productive relationships (Biles et al., 2007). It can be used to analyze the
historical and ongoing relationships and power dynamics between the actors, processes, and products.
Although the GPN approach has been applied to natural resources such as fresh fruit and vegetables and oil and natural
gas (Bridge, 2008), it has not yet been used extensively in the fisheries sector. Wilkinson (Wilkinson, 2006) made this comment
after examining fisheries with a Global Value Chain analysis: "Perhaps more than any other food product, the fish chain has
mobilised (sic) an array of public and private actors spanning nations and centuries and, far from adjusting to strategic
governance, whether of supply or demand, conforms more to Giddens' (1991) image of a juggernaut out of control."
In many GPN studies, the emphasis is on economic processes as they are constrained or strengthened by non-economic
aspects of the network. Using GPN analysis for fisheries or forestry would necessitate an elaboration of a theory of "ecological"
embeddedness to illuminate important contradictions that exist when a living population within a complex ecosystem is also
produced as an economic commodity. Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD) begins to do this.
55
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work is the development of a classificatory system that can be used as a "comparative diagnostic
framework" to evaluate the likelihood that a fishery could be managed in a way that protects the
resources (Basurto & Nenadovic, 2012; Ostrom & Basurto, 2011). Ostrom’s Common Pool
Resource work offers a viable and comprehensive critique of and response to the frequently
cited, explanation of overfishing as "a tragedy of the commons," where any incentive to avoid
overfishing is absent because, as public resources in a shared environment, they are freely
accessible for all to exploit (Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968). The predominant discourse in
fisheries public policy (from regional councils to state administrations to the World Bank),
scientific literature, and popular media frames overfishing as a product of individual rationality,
where profit is always maximized requiring some form of ownership rights for access to the
resource. As Ostrom has argued, this explanation does not consider successful examples of
fishery commons management, the political and economic context of fisheries in economic
development, and the many factors and interests that affect fisheries decisions. To analyze why
some commons are successfully managed and others end in "tragedy," Ostrom, Basurto, and
others offer a comparative diagnostic framework that assesses the potentially large set of
variables relevant to specific studies, seeking commonalities across cases that can be the
foundation of theoretical analysis and explanations56 (Basurto & Nenadovic, 2012; Ostrom &
Basurto, 2011). These site-specific and comparative frameworks are designed to be used as
predictive tools for policy analysis rather than serve as only abstract models that generalize
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The first “tier” of this framework identifies four highest-level input variables: the resource system, the resource units, the
social, economic, and political setting, and the related ecosystems (see Basurto and Ostrom 2009 and Basurto and Nenadovic
2012) . The interactions of these variables generate diverse outcomes such as continuation of current resource management
practices, or efforts to reduce harvesting on short- or long-term timescales. These patterns of outcomes also involve patterns of
interaction among different Users and Governance Systems. A second tier of variables that fit under each of the first-tier
categories are then used to diagnose causal patterns that affect outcomes. More embedded tiers of variables can be added to these
variables as needed to gain a better understanding of how these variables are related to each other. Once these relationships are
modeled, the likelihood of outcomes can be predicted by determining how they affect the incentives for users to change and
adopt new rules for managing the commons if the resource is being overexploited.
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patterns of social phenomenon from empirical studies. This framework allows for the detailed
ecological and social data produced from case studies to be used with theory to find patterned
structures among cases to illuminate and diagnose problems and suggest changes. Through
organizing relationships among the variables, the framework can be used to see how factors are
situated or embedded within the system and hypothesize how they are causally related among
themselves and across scales, and how the system is linked to larger systems (Basurto & Ostrom,
2009).
Numerous case studies using this approach have led to a consensus about characteristics of
resource systems and users that increase the likelihood that a self-governing system could
manage the commons in a way that protects the resources57 (J. M. Acheson, 2006; Basurto et al.,
2013; Basurto & Coleman, 2010; Basurto & Nenadovic, 2012; Basurto & Ostrom, 2009). The
classification system provides a way to organize the complexity of the fishery to make the
relationships and feedbacks between factors at multiple scales more manageable. It serves to
disentangle some of the relationships to get a closer look, but also to take a more holistic systems
approach where trends in the inputs and outputs, and their feedbacks with one another can
provide meaningful understanding about how the parts of the system interact and the system
functions as a whole. This approach is useful for identifying patterns in the evolution of the rules
and norms of the fisheries institutions which can lead locally specific strategies for fisheries
management. However, these studies are susceptible to modeling social relations incompletely,
missing or only partially representing significant processes and relationships (Agrawal, 2001;
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For example, in comparative studies of small-scale Mexican fisheries in the Gulf of California, Basurto and others identified
several key factors for success. Resource systems that are more predictable in terms of availability of the resources tend to have a
greater potential for successful management when other key variables are also support successful outcomes (Basurto and
Nenadovic 2012). At the output end, under the User’s variable, success is more likely for systems whose users share trust and
reciprocity, a local understanding of the system, and have high dependence on the resource. For the Governance Systems
variable, presence of cross-scale linkages with higher levels of governance are necessary for a self-organized community-based
management system to withstand external pressures to overexploit such as competition from poaching outsiders.
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Clement, 2013).
Another institutional approach to SES that focuses on environmental governance applies a
more constructivist and relational understanding of a fishery network. This work examines the
political ecology of the network as it is constantly emerging and proposes governance
alternatives based on iterative learning from thoughtful experimentation with new management
ideas. Jentoft and Chuenpagdee sum up this category of SES literature on the challenges in
fisheries and coastal governance by describing the problems as “inherently ‘wicked,’” or not
solvable by rational or technical solutions, but instead requiring interactive stakeholder
negotiations and experimentation in management (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2009). Changes to
traditional priorities and organizational concepts of fisheries institutions are needed to address
commonly diagnosed “wicked” problems.58 They call for a greater emphasis on shared
responsibility and authority for management and inclusion of a broader set of knowledge streams
that includes evaluations of ethical and cultural issues (Bundy, 2008; Chuenpagdee & Song,
2012; Jentoft et al., 2010; Ommer et al., 2012). Institutional SES concepts for improved
governance strategies include co-management, adaptive management, and interactive
governance.
The objective of adaptive management approaches is to diversify and improve the
response capacities of fisheries to cope with consequences of environmental change (e.g. climate
variability, habitat degradation), and globalization dynamics (e.g. market price shifts, labor
issues, neoliberal government adjustments in policies for economic development) over a range of

58

Bundy et al. 2008 call for a new conceptual governance model placing corporate responsibility, social justice, and ethics at the
crux of EBFM governance; Jentoft et al. 2010 call for new images of governance (roses and inverted pyramids that represent
more cooperative management) that replace the pyramid governance image that represents top-down decision making;
Chuenpagdee and Song 2012 call for a broader perspective of institutions that addresses “social, cultural, and historical aspects of
fisheries, including meanings and values, trust, and norms.”; Ommer et al. 2012 call for the expansion of fisheries objectives
beyond conservation of fish stocks and habitats to address equity and justice and ethical issues that require information from
sources and disciplines beyond science.
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spatial and temporal scales59 (Charles, 2012; Holling, 1978; Perry et al., 2011, 2012; Walters,
1986). Additionally, adaptation strategies take into account the feedbacks between the responses
to and drivers of the problems (Berkes, 2009).
Interactive governance theory proposes that these feedbacks between the “governing
system” and “system to be governed” can only be addressed if participants in fisheries
institutions learn together as management actions interact with the coupled system and have the
flexibility to make timely changes to management when consequences are not desirable (Bavinck
et al., 2005; Jentoft, 2007; Kooiman et al., 2005). Interactive governance theory promotes comanagement of the fishery by stakeholders, government agencies, and research institutions,
replacing top-down decision making and centralized authority over resource use (Jentoft, 1989;
Jentoft et al., 1998; McCay & Jentoft, 1996; Pinkerton, 1989).
As co-management has been embraced by management institutions, the paradigm’s
emphasis has expanded to include participatory knowledge generation initiatives like cooperative
research projects between government and university scientists with fishermen, the fishing
industry, and other stakeholders and incorporation of local ecological knowledge (LEK).
Adaptive co-management, incorporating the principles and objectives of adaptive management
and interactive governance, has become the endorsed governance strategy for emerging
ecosystem-based management efforts (Armitage et al., 2009; Berkes, 2009; D. C. Wilson et al.,
2003).
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By focusing on ways in which local ecosystems and communities are or are not resilient to variability and changes on various
scales, this type of analysis can be used to develop new strategies that are catered to the specific combination of circumstances
that each community faces. At the same time, comparative case studies can help to identify common factors, relationships, and
feedbacks that can help in the analysis of the local system.
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2.3 Useful Perspectives of Actor-Network Theory
Like SES theory, Actor-network theory (ANT) does not separate human and natural
systems for analytical purposes. ANT views nature and society as “mutually inclusive and
constitutive,” recognizing that nature - the nonhuman biota and physical environment - plays as
active a role in the world as people, community, and institutions do (Gareau, 2012). Actornetwork theory (ANT) emerged out of work by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law in
Science and Technology studies in the 1980s.60 While some openly question whether ANT should
be called a social theory, the founders of the methodology themselves call it more of an approach
or sensibility (Latour, 2005). Actor-network theory assists the analysis of socio-ecological
systems analysis by facilitating the removal of the analytical boundary between humans and
nature. Employing “network” as both a form (noun) and a process (verb) connects the human,
non-human, non-living and semiotic relations in a way that does not set humans apart or assume
independent constructs of “nature” that ignore the networking that is actually taking place
(Cressman, 2009). Nature-society is investigated through close examinations of multidimensional connections between humans and everything that they affect and are affected by.
ANT’s investigation of associations does not involve maps of who is connected to whom,
and how, why, and to what end to explain causal relationships in social networks. Instead, each
element in an actor-network occupies as many dimensions as it has connections. In ANT
analysis, the network elements, or actants, can be material or semiotic and include people, other
non-human beings, places, ideas, legal instruments, scientific paradigms, practical technologies,
and more. The term actant, is used rather than actor, because using the same language for all
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Latour, Callon, and Law’s Actor-Network Theory builds on the ideas of John Dewey, Alfred North Whitehead, Gabriel Tarde,
Harold Garfinkel, Algirdas Greimas, Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Michel Foucault. In Reassembling
the Social (2005), Latour discusses the intellectual lineage of ANT.
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elements in the network means that no actant receives a bias or prejudice in terms of their role in
the functioning of the network. For example, Callon (1986) described how scallops "voted" to
leave the fishery, in the same terms as describing how the managers vote to emphasize their
equivalent importance in the resulting network dynamics. The activities of the scallops in
association with other actants in the network result in a corresponding effect to managers’
activity of voting in association with other actants and the network as a whole. For ANT, power,
or the capacity to produce effects, is understood to be the result of actor-network processes and
not a defined relationship that will automatically provide an explanation.
ANT analysis forgoes assumptions about what counts in a given situation and avoids
predetermined conceptions of forces at work behind the scenes of the real world. This
methodology aims to give the actants and their associations some room to express and define
themselves. Rather than conceptualizing society as a kind of domain that can provide social
explanation for a set of circumstances, ANT suggests that the nature-society is assembled
through traces of associations between actants, human and non-human, who exercise agency and
produce actions through these associations (Latour 2005). The web of actants and associations and not subjects or objects in isolation - get things done.
ANT research methodology involves closely observing the constant making, unmaking,
remaking of associations between actants that form a contingent network. Therefore, the analysis
of an actor-network does not place its focus on the agency of individual actors or the institutional
arrangements that limit or prescribe the actor’s ability to act. Instead, by turning the lens on how
associations are formed in a network between actants - people, objects, environments, and
concepts - rather than trying to explain why the associations form, the ANT analyst can identify
where there are controversies about the network formation and resistance to coherence.
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2.3.1 Performativity of an actor-network
An actor-network theory perspective on fisheries postulates that science, economics,
social science, and management processes and practices not only describe and measure the
seafood industry, fishermen, fish, and their environments but also actively form and shape the
existence of the fishery that they are part of. Michel Callon (2006) poses the question, “How can
a discourse be outside of the reality that it describes and simultaneously participate in the
construction of that reality as an object by acting on it?” His answer to this question - the
concept of performativity - provides ways to observe this description-construction happening and
suggests ways to use this understanding to support a cohering and “success”-ful network.61
Performativity is actually a co-performation of the network by all its material and semiotic
actants as they transform each other and the network as a whole.
To grasp performativity’s conception that a discourse “contributes to the construction of
the reality it describes,” we can employ Callon’s definition of an actor-network as “a
combination of heterogenous elements that have been carefully adjusted to one another” (Callon,
2006). Callon uses Deleuze and Guattari’s (1998) term “agencements” to describe the
arrangements or assemblages of elements in an actor-network because it does not connote a
separation between an arranger or assembler and objects that are arranged or assembled.
Agencements have agency and act in ways that are dependent on their configurations. This
conceptualization indicates that there is nothing “outside” the agencements that explains the
network. To understand the network, an ANT analysis needs only to look at the agencements
and how they construct what the network is and means. The agencement includes the
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Callon’s use of performativity integrates semiotics theory and ANT with philosopher of language John L. Austin’s ideas about
speech acts, or language’s ability to “act” and effect change (see Austin 1962 and 1970). Callon’s works describe the
performativity of economic markets.
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measurements and descriptions of the agencement elements because they are part of what makes
the network exist and function.
Observing the performation of fishery management has several analytical advantages.
First, analysis of performativity of a network avoids the trap of determinism by foregrounding
the understanding that institutions and rules are co-constructed with the subjects and objects they
interact with. Institutions and rules themselves change as they change the system which they are
acting on. While there are occurrences of “stability” or consistency and repetition of an
institutional arrangement or rule mechanism that functions to maintain the coherence of the
network, there are many more active rearrangements that transform the actants and their
network. Second, performativity does not see those whose objects of study are elements of the
network (e.g. biologists, economists, or social scientists who measure and describe, or determine
causes and effects, of aspects of a fishery network) as outside of the network which they are
affecting and are affected by. Instead, the researcher is seen to be active in the constant
transformations happening in the network. Third, awareness of the performativity of a network
offers ways for the researcher (and those who see the way things are happening through this lens)
to effect changes that bring equity (and less uneven distribution of positive impacts) and, ideally,
a successful network.62
Additionally, a performativity analysis allows “success” or “failure” of the network to
stand in for the concepts of truth or non-truth in assessing how well we can understand and
manage our socio-ecological fishery. For example, in his work on the performativity of economic
markets, MacKenzie shows that an economic formula can be said to be a correct representation
or description of a market phenomenon at some point in time, in some place. But rather than
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Awareness of performativity of a management network can work in similar ways to how awareness of Marxist labor relations
shows that changes in (social) relations can be made that produce greater equity in the network.
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assessing the “truth” of the formula, its correctness lies in its success - or “truth as fulfilled
conditions of felicity.” (Mackenzie, 2006). However, he argues, since the formula remains
performative, it continues to act on the market, and it is possible that it can become incorrect in
the future. This can lead the economic theory to undergo adjustments to match the new
conditions and the preformation continues.
Saying that fisheries science, social science, and economics are performative says that
they “do things” rather than simply measuring and describing the external reality of the fishery
that is being managed. This is not to say that the science and management determines how the
fishery behaves or that the fishery takes on the quantitative and qualitative models demonstrating
predicted behaviors when the models are correct. Even after some regularity and repetition with
the “correct” science and economics - and management - being performed, the agencement might
produce events that contradict the operating models. Popper identified this as “refutation,” but
Callon uses the term “overflowing” in the case of an actor-network to indicate that the
agencement is no longer disciplining or framing the entities that constitute it, but it is not actually
necessary to say that the science or economics upon which the management is based is no longer
“true” (Callon, 1998). This overflowing leads to new arrangements of the agencement or
transformations. This constantly unfolding process of performation avoids separating
researchers from their objects of study and shows how they are enacted together in an
agencement.
Observing fisheries management over time shows that in some situations the actornetwork is cooperating, cohering, converging, and succeeding and that in other conditions,
dissipative forces manifest in the form of controversies and failures. Something that works in
some other place or at some other time may be correct for that situation, but it might be “de-
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realized” for the agencement at this times and place. Observing the overflowings of the fishery
management shows that the opposing visions, conflicts, power struggles, and crises that act to
dissipate the fishery network, and against its coherence, are incorporated into the governance of
the fishery. This means that it may not be necessary to ask if the stock assessments and
bioeconomic models that use them are true, or if the new ecosystem and economic portfolio
models of EBFM will better represent the realities of the ecosystems and socio-economic
conditions. The successes and failures of the models and the management mechanisms that are
developed using their information depend upon the co-performation of the fishery between the
science, economics, social science, management, laws, industry, fishermen, fish, environments,
and many other elements of the agencement.
The success or failure of scientific and economic models and the management
mechanisms that use their information can only be determined by seeing how the network
cooperates together or how the network develops contradictions, oppositions, and controversies.
When a fishery management network is failing, a lot of work is done to rearrange the
agencements, “correct” the models, modify the management mechanisms. This work is a new
experiment to try to get the network to converge. This is a different idea than negotiation for
consensus, although the management consensus process is part of the performation of the fishery.
The conflicts between the best science and management is a struggle between the agencement
itself. It is not the socio-ecological system that determines what paradigms and institutions and
regulations work well, get circulated, and survive; it is the science and management that specifies
the socio-ecological system required for their acceptance and perpetuation.
2.3.2 Translation of an actor-network
To analyze the performation of the fishery, it is necessary to describe the processes of
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translation in the network. In actor-network theory, translations are defined as how network
elements transform other elements in the network through their interaction. Translation is seen
both as a process of transporting transformations in the network and as an effect of this
transformation. Latour (2005) defines the network as the “traces” of these processes of
transformation that can be detected. Describing these traces illuminates how the network forms
and functions, negotiating to overcome dissipative forces to maintain coherence. For example, in
Johnson’s (2013) ANT exploration of fisheries governance systems, he sees the process of
translation occurring through “all the actions taken to create an order out of chaos, by limiting,
defining, and conceptualizing processes and entities into objects that can be transported into
specific frames of knowledge.” In other words, translation processes are happening in a way to
make the fishery governable.
ANT scholars have focused on ways in which networks organize and stabilize through
mobilization of actants to achieve that alignment. To maintain stability in the network, actants
must align the network with their interests. Power, like “society,” in the processes of translation
is seen as the result of associations rather than a causative force. Power is not a “reservoir or
capital” that a network actant has or wields independently of other actants. This perspective
allows us to see the agency of non-humans, and how that agency is distributed and comes in the
form of an outcome of the assemblage of the heterogenous elements. Analyzing power with an
ANT perspective lets you see how actions arise from “negotiations” between actants. Rather than
depending on the explanation of an actant’s power as the cause an action, ANT analysis observes
how the strength and endurance of an association results in an action that serves to align interests
and allow for convergence of the network. Power comes with more entrenched actants and their
associations to keep the network in the way they want it (or their competing vision of it is), but
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they are also transformed by what they impose on the network themselves.
Network convergence does not indicate an elimination of difference, but rather the
development of compatibilities that keep the network functioning. Tracing the translations and
processes of transformations, ANT scholars have focused on several types of work that networks
do through translations including: organizing the network, stabilizing the network, “enrolling”
actants to invest in or follow a particular vision or program, establishing “durability” to keep
actants from going their own way away from the network, “scripting roles” for actants by
supplying them with motivations and qualities, simplifying the network so that it is efficient and
transportable, and making the network an “obligatory point of passage” or functionally
indispensable (Callon, 1984; Latour, 1990; Law & Callon, 1988). This networking requires a lot
of continuous effort and it is constantly being done by the assemblage of actants through their
associations. As Cressman clarifies, “…we should not be so quick to delineate between process
and form. In some instances, networking precedes and shapes form and in other instances form
shapes process. In short, networking and network should be understood as co-constitutive,
inseparable dimensions of the same phenomenon.” (Cressman 2009).
In the New England fishery network, fish, technologies (bioeconomic models & theories,
fishing equipment), climate (water temperatures), bottom topography, permits, legal documents
(with the Magnuson-Stevens Act serving as a constitution) are all actants. The power and agency
in the network can be seen as it is enacted and performed in the associations of non-human
elements with the human fishermen, scientists, managers, stakeholders, politicians, ENGO
representatives and other concerned human parties. Positive change for this fishery is an absence
of the constant crisis for the fish, the fishermen, the seafood market, the lawmakers and the laws,
the scientists, and the ecosystems. By describing how the New England fisheries network gets
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created and transformed through its associations, we gain insight into how the "crisis" takes form
and is perpetuated and how the network reorganizes to try to resolve it. Additionally, we can
analyze the emergence of new management paradigms in terms of their successes and failures at
maintaining and strengthening the network. We can do this by observing how the ideas
developed by socio-ecological theory such as adaptive management, co-management,
incorporation of non-capitalist relations, and biodiversity for ecosystem resilience are emerging
in the fishery network and how they are being translated into scientific studies, management
mechanisms, and other actions — or in many cases, how they are meeting resistance and may
disappear.

2.4 Uses of Actor-Network Theory for Fisheries Governance
A creative and provocative ANT perspective on commercial fishing in New England is
offered in the 2012 documentary film “Leviathan” by Paravel and Castaing-Taylor from the
Sensory Ethnography Lab at Harvard University. The documentary is filmed aboard a fishing
vessel from New Bedford, MA over the two weeks that it is out at sea. There is no overdubbed
narrative; only the sounds of the constant humming of the engines and fishing gear, the sloshing
of the ocean, the shrieks of the birds overhead, and the occasional fragment uttered by the
fishermen can be heard. Special water-resistant cameras were placed into the nets and bins, so
that the viewers could sense the experience from the perspective of the fish. These cameras were
covered in blood and guts, being thrown around with bloated fish tongues, bulging eyes, worms
and parasites, and other broken animal parts. The cameras went overboard with the bycatch and
floated amongst the crushed starfish and sand dollars. The scenes from the perspectives of the
fishermen are similarly unromantic and viewer is haunted by the nightmarish visions of the
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interactions between fish and humans and rusted machines with the potential to maim or kill. The
closing credits of the film list the actors as the Latin fish names intermingled with the names of
the fishermen in the film – with a “thanks” to ANT co-founder Bruno Latour. The filmmakers’
view of the dystopic nature of commercial fishing for both the fish and the fishermen is
articulated through their choice of title, use of gothic fonts, and horror-movie edits. It is difficult
to miss the point that the ontological lived experience of commercial fishing at sea is about more
than fishermen catching fish – it is an assemblage of the fish and the fishermen, the fishing gear
and boat technology, the fishing practices and regulations, ocean environments and ecology all
being enacted together. “Leviathan” emphasizes the multiplicity of the fish63 and the continual
becoming of the fishery through its associations and translations. The fish that are caught are not
simply, or singly, resources and commodities; they are also simultaneously captured victims,
prey, waste, and biological creatures with life histories and communities. The fishermen’s
existence is as entangled in fishing nets as the fish.
Although ethnographic methodology employed for ANT studies allows researchers to
attend to the specificities of case studies, ANT analysis also illuminates types of associations that
exist and function similarly in multiple actor-networks. Researchers have used actor-network
perspectives to examine the dynamic relationship between fishing, science, and management
through investigating the development and implementation of regulations and other management
instruments. These studies have sought to understand the attempt of managers, scientists, and
fishermen to "translate the unmanageable into the manageable" through the creation and
application of rules and technologies (Sinclair, et al., 2009, Bavington 2010). Several common
and linked themes are found in the literature on the performativity and translation of fisheries
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Multiplicity in the sense that the fish are actually different things at once, as described in (Mol, 2002).
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management networks and processes are identified which compromise opportunities for
successful management. Interrelated themes of fisheries studies employing ANT theory and
methodology discussed below include 1) the governability of fisheries; 2) the "cyborgization"64
of fisheries; 3) ideological managerialism and mistaking representation for reality; and 4)
knowledge production in fisheries.
2.4.1 The Governability of Fisheries
Michel Foucault’s work on government and governability forms the inspiration for a
body of work on the governability of social-ecological systems including natural resource
governance, the management of watersheds and wildlife conservation, rural and urban planning,
and other “human-nature” entanglements that involve administrative efforts (Kooiman, 2003,
2008). The evolving conceptualization of governability of socio-ecological systems
acknowledges that state-dominated “command-and-control” governance is not capable of
responding to complex issues of socio-ecological systems (Song et al., 2018).65 Governability
considers the capabilities and efficacy of formal and informal governing instruments (data and
technologies, laws and regulations) and processes (idea generation, debates and negotiations,
implementation strategies and tactics, voting and approving options) as they interact with and
affect the dynamics of the system. Assessments of governability encompass more than
evaluating a governing body’s ability to address self-stated concerns and achieve self-prescribed
goals. Governability of socio-ecological systems is concerned with how responses and feedback
within the governance system affect the system’s functioning and lead to changes in the system
as a whole (Berkes et al., 2008; Folke et al., 2005; Kooiman et al., 2008).
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Cyborgs have been a long-running emphasis of ANT studies, which focuses less on the ecological aspects of the network and
more on the relationship between humans and technology.
65
See Song et al. 2018 for a discussion of the evolution of the concept of governability of socio-ecological systems.
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Drawing on the theory of performativity, Johnsen (2013) argues that much of what has
been written about governability in the institutional SES literature completely misses awareness
that governance is a product of how the “governing system” and “system-to-be-governed” are
co-constructed and “configured together.” He argues that it is wrong to assume that governability
depends solely on the properties of the natural system-to-be-governed and the ability to produce
desired responses from governance informed by those properties. The associations and
translations of those who are governed - the fishermen, fish, ocean environments, port towns, and
communities - are equally important in understanding governability. Although it may appear that
a governing system can measure independent and predictable properties of the fishery for
management, ANT studies show that what governors are really doing is translating “fish,
processes, people, and practices” into constructed objects that are representations for nature and
society so that that can be managed (Holm 1996). These translation processes continually
transform the network and all of its actants (Jentoft & Johnsen, 2015; Jahn Petter Johnsen, 2017;
M. Knol, 2011; Maaike Knol, 2013). This work emphasizes that it is important to evaluate the
network and networking itself, paying close attention to how networks are performed and not
just evaluating inputs and outputs.
2.4.2 Cyborgization of Fisheries
ANT research on modern cybernetic organization of fisheries focuses on how the
development and implementation of governance instrumentation, defined as the techniques,
methods of operation, and devices used, co-produces science, politics, and nature together. The
chosen and enacted practices of science, fishing, and management working together lead to
outcomes that depend on how the practices co-construct the governance and how the governance
changes the practices. For fisheries to provide answers demanded by government-mandated
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modern science and resource economics, exclusive roles are made for governance
instrumentation that can deliver results that offer quantification, prediction, and control. The
epistemological approaches and types of practices such as quantitative modeling that claim to
provide accurate information of this specific type set the conditions for negotiating tradeoffs and
making consensus-based decisions (Bavington 2010). The cybernetic network defines, if not
requires, appropriate actions for science, management and fishing (Jahn Petter Johnsen, 2005).
Holm and Nielsen (2004, 2007) describe the modernization of fisheries in the North
Atlantic since the 1970s as a process of cyborgization that resulted in what they call the “TAC
machine” which led to the propagation of the market-based, property rights management
interventions like Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) (Schwach et al., 2007). The TAC
machine refers to all of the practices and processes that go into creating and enacting the modern
system of determining Total Allow Catch (TAC) values for a fishery which are used to set quota
distributions for fishermen. These processes include fish population surveys, stock assessment
modeling and interpretations, and neoclassical economic theory and modeling, that have led to
the adoption of “closure mechanisms that render the right to fish exclusive” creating a market for
tradeable quota, along with many other “ingredients” that go into the making of management
mechanisms like “ITQ stew”66 (Holm and Nielsen 2007). In several ANT studies in the North
and Northeast Atlantic, transformations are identified in the fishery network that are occurring
due to cyborgization processes of changing technologies for economics, science, fishing, and
compliance and system-health indicator monitoring.
Cyborgization processes change the relations in the network through the representation of
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Holm and Nielsen (2007) compare the processes of creating a market for tradable fish quota to making a stew. They determine
what it takes for the recipe for ITQs (Individual Transferable Quotas) - who are the cooks and what are the skills needed, what are
the ingredients and cooking instruments used, carrying the metaphor even further to consider the kitchen environment, the
preparation methods, the heat from the ovens, the accumulation of dirty dishes, and pressure from hungry customers (Holm and
Nielsen 2007).
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fish and people as quantitative demographic and economic values, the development of
governance instruments like quotas that stabilize and control the relations of the mechanistic
organizations, and the increasing reliance upon highly technical and globally manufactured
scientific and fishing and processing equipment (Jahn Petter Johnsen, 2005). By scrutinizing the
historical processes of the science, economics, and governance involved in constructing ITQs in
the coastal cod fishery of Norway, Nielsen and Holm describe how the resource economists,
trained in neoclassical economic theory, devised a property rights system to overcome
overfishing and overcapacity (Nielsen & Holm, 2007). The creation of economists’ “script” to
explain how the ITQ system was performing validated it as theory, giving it a powerful role in
framing and formatting the quota market. The role of the fish was also transformed: “un-caught
fish […] become private property in a socially-binding way” (Holm & Nielsen, 2007). The
processes that are co-creating the fishery as a cybernetic organization make management less
flexible and adaptable than it has been in the past, and many argue needs to be now, to address
escalating groundfish crises (Jahn Petter Johnsen et al., 2009). Schwach et al. (2007) describes
how the science-management TAC machine performs poorly in depleted fisheries, the situation
when conservation is most needed, yet, the processes and technologies of this management
intervention continue to absorb the time and effort of the scientists and managers “year after
year” (Schwach et al., 2007).
Sinclair et al. (2009) consider fisheries management as a failing modernist project because
the associations created by a mechanically-organized fishery fail to produce the power necessary
for stabilizing the relationships between managers, fishers, technology, and fish needed to
produce sustainability (Sinclair et al. 2009). They show how scientists and managers become
incapable of effecting positive change because they are constantly responding to short-term
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challenges that require a new rationality for their decisions. In their case study of Canada’s
Atlantic cod fishery, the uncertainly of the VPA (Virtual Population Analysis) model results for
stock assessments were handled differently by different scientists with different educational
backgrounds and experiences. This led to a lack of consensus about how to interpret the stock
assessment models for quota setting when scientific consensus is an expectation of management.
Knol (2013) found similar difficulties with the processes of choosing Ecosystem-based
Fisheries Management indicators and subsequently establishing and monitoring reference values
and threshold levels for EBFM in the Barents Sea. She concluded that EBFM practices rely
heavily on trying to integrate what was already being measured due to financial, logistical, and
coordination constraints and institutional momentum. Even when scientific and management
deem an EBFM plan or framework “good” and win the support of stakeholders, this hard-won
consensus does not directly translate into “governability” (Maaike Knol, 2013). In both of these
cases, consensus and decision-making was driven more by the power enacted in the cybernetic
associations in the network than by active debate and reasoning of a “grand design” (Holm &
Nielsen, 2007).
2.4.3 Ideological Managerialism and Representation in Fisheries
Another theme found in the ANT fisheries literature addresses the way fisheries are
managed as a predictable resource. Bavington’s investigation of the collapse of Newfoundland’s
cod fishery is a case study of what happens when governance is understood and practiced as
control-oriented management of the interactions between socio-economic and “natural” systems
primarily based on scientific and quantitative measurements (Bavington, 2010). He defines this
understanding of governability as ecological managerialism – an ideological viewpoint based on
the assumption that any system can be managed and that managed systems are “better” than ones
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that are not managed. Instead of viewing management as a tool, it becomes a “central value,” an
ideal. There is faith that “certain types of human beings applying certain types of human
knowledge to be able to control and steward or husband the world” (Bavington, 2011).
This ideological stance leads to managers insisting that complex environmental
management problems can be solved by exerting more effort to model the complexity to predict
future values (Bavington, 2010). Despite abundant evidence that uncertainty and complexity in
linked socioecological systems are poorly addressed by solutions that require controllable and
predictable objects for management, managerialism is still the standard. The classical economics
and neoliberal theory at the core of fisheries bioeconomic models include assumptions that a
stable, rationalized flow of fish resources can be managed to produce economic value. These
assumptions are considered beyond reproach despite explicit statements by fisheries scientists
that we have little control over fish abundance and stability. Acknowledgement of complexity
and uncertainty in biophysical systems has been accompanied by simplistic approaches to
managing those who are fishing based on the concept that sustainability of an industry means
maintenance of economic growth in a globally competitive market.
Laws mandating the primacy of scientific and quantitative knowledge permits managers
to believe that this information allows them to predictably control the productivity of fish
populations and the economic returns by regulating fishing. A management network that designs
regulations to satisfy federal law under assumptions of outcome controllability keeps
management processes moving along at a steady clip, but it does not allow for uncertainties,
problems, or failures of scientific research and knowledge production to be interpreted as an
indication that management may need to be reimagined (Bavington, 2010). Commitment to
legally-mandated science-based management co-opts meaningful opportunities for serious
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deliberation among the fishing communities and concerned citizens to “define, judge, and cocreate the common good” (Bavington 2010). Ecological managerialism may be obscuring the
opportunity to reflect on what it would mean for modern fisheries management daily practices if
the complex ontological reality is not able to be simulated in ways that gives us the ability to
control ecological or economic outcomes.
When the ability to command and control, or even steward “nature” breaks down, the
governance systems goes into crisis mode (Nielsen & Holm, 2007). Objectives start to turn into
what you don't want the fish stock or socio-economic situation to be rather than a vision of a
positive outcome or goal. These negative objectives are difficult to evaluate because the real
goals are implicit and not transparent. After analyzing three proposed management reform
systems to address fisheries crisis, rights-based, co-management, and EBFM, Nielsen and Holm
(2007) conclude that none of them represent "comprehensive evaluation frameworks nor full
resource management programmes (sic),” and all have managerialism biases. Bavington
concludes that ontological complexity might mean that it is time to “renounce the search for the
holy grail of manageability” as Grey suggested in 1996 and accept that the complexity of socioecological systems might demand a change in how we live and how we make policy decisions
(Grey 1996). These ANT analyses suggest that governability may be more along the lines of
management in the sense of coping and adapting, rather than controlling.
Nielsen and Holm explore links between representations and interventions in fisheries
management, showing why it is important to notice the processes of network formations
involved in achieving and assessing success or crisis (Nielsen & Holm, 2007). They emphasize
that when you conceptualize a fishery, you are forming it into what you are conceptualizing it as
- not actually seeing what it is. They argue that managers want to include feedback mechanisms
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in management strategies like adaptive management, but the current management systems
involve highly organized and institutionalized processes and the control is external, not with the
fishermen themselves, making timely responses and changes difficult, and in many cases,
impossible. Modern fisheries governance relies on representational systems (e.g. modeling the
fish populations, socioeconomic aspects, the ecosystem) that get linked to practices. The links
between the representations and the practices must correspond in a successful way for this to
succeed. However, this formal management system requires simplified representations and
practices that are not necessarily accurate or flexible enough to allow for that adaptive learning.
Reasons for management failure could be due to inaccuracies in the representation, but
failure could also lie in the poor correspondence between the representation and the linked
practice. It could be due to the assumptions made when constructing and implementing both or in
the accuracy of the information going into the representation. Taking into consideration the noncompliance of fishermen, difficulties in monitoring and enforcing regulations, climate change
responses where fish and the ocean are not doing what they have done before, it becomes
obvious that there are opportunities for biases in setting up the governance system, making the
representation, interpreting and linking the representation to practices. It can be forgotten that the
symbolic representation is not the actual thing -- and that the "thing" is really a dynamic process
that is the network. There is no "thingness" there to model and control (Nielsen & Holm, 2007).
Bavington argues that the “tragedy” ecological managerialism is founded on the confusion
between the map and the territory and taking the map for the territory (Bavington, 2011).
2.4.4 Knowledge Production in Fisheries
A fourth theme in ANT fisheries studies focuses on how knowledge claims operate in
fisheries actor-networks. As scientific and economic language emerges in fisheries discourse,
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managers and stakeholders are trained and “disciplined” to conceptualize the fishery in the ways
used to communicate complex modeling concepts (J. Johnsen et al., 2004). The management
frameworks privileging quantitative data and modeling for both “understanding nature and
determining appropriate conduct” (Bavington, 2010). The formalization of fishing, research, and
management institutions and their instrumentation and practices has scripted new roles and
created new associations for fishermen, defining their fishing practices and limiting their
flexibility (J. Johnsen et al., 2004). This institutional and procedural formality excludes serious
deliberation of qualitative contextual and historical interconnections of humans and non-humans
in fishing communities. As a dominantly scientific and neoclassical economics construct,
fisheries management is muscling out meaningful contributions from research and experience
that are based in other epistemologies (Bavington, 2010). Although there are stated management
objectives and designated practices to include the knowledge and experiences of fishermen and
other community members in fisheries management, participatory objectives are nonetheless
“compromised”. Current participatory management practices put fishing communities to work by
training them to turn their experiences into testable hypotheses and reducing their knowledge and
practices to quantitative data that fits within the scientific analytical framework (Holm, 2003).
Additionally, fishermen are increasingly expected to help fund and participate in scientific data
gathering, monitoring, and management activities without a practicable way for them to
deliberate and debate their ethics, knowledge, histories, and experiences as a part of the
conceptualization and co-creation of the socio-ecological system that includes their livelihoods
(Bavington, 2010).
In Policy and Knowledge in Fisheries Management (KKFM): A Policy Brief, Schwach et
al. summarize the findings of a research on the North Sea cod fishery through the exploration of
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performativity and translation processes in knowledge production in European fisheries
(Schwach et al., 2007). One focus of the project was the persistence of conflict over knowledge
claims that works against cohesion of the network. One analysis discussed in the brief examined
the process of “buck-passing,”67 or blaming and transferring responsibility for problems to other
actants at the expense of cooperating to find ways to address the problems and improve the
functioning of the fishery. Based on this work, the policy brief emphasized three claims:
i) knowledge regarding fisheries has to be understood as politicized and positioned; ii) in
democratic societies, the idea exists of a separation between knowledge and opinion,
leaving a close linkage between “being right” and “having a right”; and iii) the
combination of i) and ii) leads to repeated conflicts between fishers and authorities,
because everyone believes him/herself to be right (Schwach et al., 2007)
Through exploration of buck-passing, Christensen observed that the conflicts over the
“facts” and interpretations of the fishery status are not simply based in differences in
perspectives, ideology, or epistemology (Christensen, 2009). Instead, she found that the objects
of phenomena of conflict are actually multiple – they are ontologically different things to
different people who participate in different daily practices in relation to the fishery.68 Based on
Mol’s (2002) concept of multiplicity, Christensen describes how fishermen’s, managers’,
scientists’, and others’ “enactment” of the fishery produces what they understand the reality of
this fishery to be. Enactment includes acting and interacting in the fishery, as well as being
shaped by everyday practices in the sense of performativity. As each group defends their own
understanding, they reject the others’ “knowledge articulations” (Christensen, 2009). Conceding
to others’ explanations means giving up the right to decide how the problem can best be solved.
Christensen argues that actors need to be aware of the multiplicities and attempt to construct a
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Based on Herzfeld’s conceptualization of buck-passing as described in (Herzfeld, 1993)
Christensen uses Mol’s (2002) concept of multiplicity without the characteristic language of ANT analysis, but this study and
analysis clearly demonstrates ANT “sensibilities.” John Law’s (2012) Notes on Fish, Ponds, and Theory is an example of
applying ANT terminology to describe multiplicity of salmon aquaculture in a similar way (Law, 2012).
68
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common object of conflict rather than simply sharing perspectives.
2.5 Insights from and Questions Raised by Actor-Network Theory for the Investigation of New
England’s Groundfish Crisis and Development of Ecosystems-Based Fishery Management
ANT studies of fisheries governance have paid attention to the processes of making and
framing of reality that take place in institutions, methods, measuring techniques, and the socialecological itself (Sinclair et al. 2009). These studies have examined the dynamic relationship
between science and management practices by questioning the social and ecological model
variables, assessment indicators, and management paradigms developed and employed by
scientists and economists. Themes emerge from this approach that apply to both specific
circumstances and to similar circumstances in other actor-networks. These themes are useful for
understanding how to make sense of extremely complex phenomena without reducing systems to
generalized categories and relationships. Table 2.1 shows the insights gained from examining
these themes through tracing the associations of fisheries actor-networks.
ANT research shows that the “best” science used to manage fisheries does not form
spontaneously, but emerges out of the work, skills, and habits of humans and are made of
scientific equipment and techniques that interact over time in the laboratory and in the field. It
looks at the back and forth relationship between practices of governance and knowledge-making
(epistemic) practices. It also seeks to analyze how “nature is constructed through processes of
classification and categorization and how these practices feed into governance” (Knol 2011). In
scientific management, “truth becomes a matter of its success” in the sense that with all of the
uncertainty that abounds, it is what works that gets deemed the best knowledge and the best
policy (Callon 2007). Not only do the scientific management paradigms describe the fishery, but
in the “performance” of the paradigm, the fishery network itself - it’s physical objects and their
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representations and relationships - is transformed.
Table 2.1 Summary of thematic conclusions from ANT fisheries research
Governability
• The governing system and the system-to-be-governed (STBG) are co-constructed and
configured together.
• Governors need to be aware that they are transforming the network and being
transformed by the network.
• Governance needs to be evaluated with this understanding; you cannot just measure
and evaluate inputs and outputs of the STBG and produce desired responses from that
information alone.
Cyborgization
• Governance instrumentation that can deliver control through quantification and
prediction sets the conditions for negotiating tradeoffs and making decisions in
fisheries management.
• The behavior of the network is “scripted” with bioeconomic theory.
• This cybernetic organization makes the network less flexible and adaptable.
• The associations for a cybernetically organized network fail to produce a stabilized
network needed for “success” or sustainability.
Ecological Managerialism and Mistaking Representation for Reality
• Ecological Managerialism is the ideological viewpoint that a system can be and is its
best when managed for economic growth and all that is needed is more information
about the system to control and predict outcomes.
• This viewpoint causes scientists, managers, and others to start (mis)taking the map for
the territory, losing a sense that the simplified representations are not the ontological
reality.
• This viewpoint leads to formal, rigid processes and practices that coopt the opportunity
for other epistemic contributions and turns the management into crisis reaction rather
than visioning for a thriving socio-ecological system.
Knowledge Production
• Insistence on the privileging of some types of knowledge excludes context, history, and
meaningful participatory practices.
• Some of the conflicts and contradictions of privileged types of science and other
epistemologies are due to the rejecting of others experiences as invalid. Therefore, it is
important to focus on the object of conflict to see this and why the conflict is
happening.

Using an ANT lens to examine SES research contributions to fisheries management is useful
for understanding how the network is functioning as it experiences crisis while seeking processes
and practices that work to maintain coherence of the network and qualify as a success. SES
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theory has provided some goals for developing “sustainable” management processes and
practices to escape crisis and achieve success. The gap between these theoretical goals for
governance, which are not entirely uncontested by actants, and the design of implementable
management plans is vast and is filled with network translations. To examine the translations in
this space, I first analyze how the “fishery in crisis” is affecting the formation and transformation
of the network in its “pre-EBFM” mode (Chapters 3 and 4). After getting a sense of the network
dynamics through a focus on how the crisis is being conceptualized and enacted, I look at how
EBFM strategies and plans are emerging in this context and how SES concepts and ideas about
their implementation in management are transforming and being transformed as they are
negotiated by the network (Chapter 5).
The institutional SES work on fisheries of researchers such as Kooiman, Jentoft,
Chuenpagdee, Johnsen, Song, Ommer, Bavinck, Bundy, and others explores the governability of
fisheries as social-ecological systems. This governance literature forms the basis for the
discourse about several interrelated paradigms for governance under consideration by U.S
regional fisheries councils developing strategies and implementation plans for Ecosystems-based
Fisheries Management, including the New England Fisheries Management Council. Interactive
governance, integrated management, co-management, adaptive management, creative
governance, and their combined iterations such as adaptive co-management have been developed
through understanding gained the SES theory. Several scholars have analyzed the challenges of
operationalizing and implementing SES management strategies such as adaptive co-management
practices (Biggs et al., 2015; Gelcich et al., 2010; Partelow, 2015; Partelow & Boda, 2015; R.
Plummer et al., 2012, 2017). Effective implementation must account for the complexity of the
socio-ecological system and avoid presumptions of homogenous shared interests in conservation
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and social well-being in decisions about management.
Through my research on the New England fishery, I recognized corresponding translations to
the ones observed in ANT research on European North Sea and Canadian Northeast Atlantic
fisheries. Reviewing these ANT studies opened the door to many questions that ANT is wellsuited to investigate and provide insight into. Questions explored in the following chapters
include: How can we use ANT awareness to better understand relationships between the fish and
their associated people (their managers, their scientists, their fishermen, their traders, their
consumers), places (their habitats and environments), and things (their regulations, their
economic value) as constitutive and transformative the network of management? If everyone
really wants the same overarching idea of a successful fishery, why is there so much conflict
through all of the processes of goal formation to strategy building to implementation, and why is
cooperation so difficult? Who is developing and “controlling” the EBFM narrative in its early
stages and how are they doing it? How is that affecting how the fisheries network dealing with
uncertainty and how is that changing? What can this SES-ANT perspective tell us about the
conceptualization and management of risks and tradeoffs? What rearrangements of the network
would allow for flexibility and adaptability in management?

2.6 Conclusions
To summarize, this chapter reviewed several of the significant contributions that socioecological theory has made to the goals and objectives for Ecosystems-Based Fisheries
Management that, theoretically, chart a path out of crisis toward sustainability. Following this
review, a demonstration was provided of how an actor-network theory perspective on the
application of SES theory illuminates that the gap between these theoretical goals for governance
of a socio-ecological system and the development of an implementable management plan is vast
74

and is filled with translations of everyday practices, processes, and relationships into fisheries
management measures. Through observations of the performativity of the network and the
translations that are occurring in the network’s associations, fisheries researchers using an ANT
sensibilities have identified several important aspects of fisheries management discussed above
related to 1) the governability of socio-ecological systems, 2) the "cyborgization" of fisheries, 3)
“ideological managerialism” and 4) hegemonic knowledge production for management decisions
discussed above. In the next chapter, an actor-network analysis of New England’s groundfish
fishery “crisis” traces the formation and transformation of the network to describe how the crisis
is being conceptualized and enacted and how this is resulting in both coherence and dissipation
in the network. This understanding serves to show how the performance of crisis affects the
translations of EBFM as it is emerging in New England, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
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Chapter 3 - Performation of the Groundfish Fishery Crisis in New England: Popular
Discourses Transforming an Actor-Network
“Yeah, you’ve got greedy fishermen, ineffective regulators, and uncertain science. They’ve been
indicted in New England’s fishery problems for 40 years – longer - but that doesn’t answer the
question. The question is: What is our collective responsibility?”
Quote from “a member of the informed
public,” 2016
Chapter 3 presents a description and analysis of the formations and transformations of
New England’s groundfish fishery “crisis” through an examination of how it is conceptualized
and enacted. The chapter begins with descriptions of many narratives of blame that define the
groundfish fishery "crisis," detailing six targets of criticism. The first five categories for critique
- the fishermen, the seafood market, the fisheries managers, the environmental nongovernmental organizations, and the fisheries scientists - see blame placed on other
stakeholders' “misunderstandings" of the problem and actions, and internal disagreement; the
sixth category of blame discussed - the "environment" - includes perceived contributions to the
crisis by actants that are considered external to the current regulatory regime such as climate
change, non-target species, and other coastal industries. The ANT analysis of this web of blame
for the crisis that follows focuses on three aspects of the crisis performance: 1) the multiplicity of
crisis ontologies; 2) dynamic power distributions that stabilize and destabilize the fishery; and 3)
dissipation and coherence of the fishery network throughout the crisis. The chapter concludes
with specific insights from this analysis on what sources of conflict and contradiction that feed
into the crisis will need to be addressed with Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management for it to
have a change at being a successful management intervention for the crisis.

3.1 Introduction: A Network of Collective Responsibilities
If you ask those who are directly or indirectly impacted by the groundfish crisis in New
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England about what they believe is creating the problems for the fishery, you will get an earful of
passionate analysis. Whether or not there is actually a real crisis, and the scale and extent of it is
also up for debate. Some claim overfishing (whether state-sanctioned or illicit) has depleted
groundfish, especially Atlantic cod at this time, to unrecoverable levels and others claim that
inaccurate scientific assessments misrepresent the actual abundance of the fishery. The blame for
the groundfish crisis is spread around and the interpretations of the fishery’s problems are often
highly specific and nuanced. This chapter examines the construction and maintenance of the
crisis by listening to what the actants (institutions, individuals, ecological and biological
processes) in the network have to say about it. Specifically, I describe how different actors
(through their relationships, practices, and processes) are viewed, in the everyday discourse of
the crisis, as the cause of the groundfish fishery’s problems by other actors in the network. To do
this, I focus on what is being discussed, publicly and privately – about who or what is to blame.
Actor-network theory analysis of this discourse of blame helps us see how the "crisis" forms and
is perpetuated, and also how the network reorganizes to try to resolve it. As this network
continually forms and reforms itself, the developing international, national, and local narratives
about EBFM are emerging, promising to resolve this tangled mess of a fisheries crisis.
I explore how feedbacks between the groundfish fishery issues and the reactions to these
issues have co-constructed a "crisis" made up of many acute emergencies and chronic
complications and obstacles to a successful fishery. Descriptions of this network of blame based
on participant observation at fisheries-related meetings and events, informal interviews and
conversations with participants in the fishery, media articles and radio broadcasts, and popular
documentaries and television series. While not every nuance is discussed in the descriptions
below, the categories represent major debates that are being played out publicly and privately by
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those who have a stake in the fishery. The stakes are different for different individuals and
groups and depend on how they define a healthy, functioning fishery. This lack of common
vision on what success entails is a defining feature of this management conflict, and the
multitude of visions becomes clear when the finger-pointing is described. This chapter is not an
explanation of causes or persuasive argument to identify who or what the greatest contributors to
the crisis are, but a description of the discourse of blame to trace the associations in order to
understand how the crisis emerges and changes and re-emerges throughout time and space.
For this ANT study, it is not necessary, even if it were possible, to weigh or rank the
relative importance or relevance of these inter-network critiques. In fact, the need to agree or
disagree on what the exact problems are has led to relationship-destroying personal accusations
(the other stakeholder or expert is "greedy", "clueless", "elite", etc.) and unresolved arguments
that make it difficult to move forward. A potentially more productive approach is to analyze how
these "causes" interact and feedback, how epistemological approaches to understanding the
causes can work together or in parallel, and how and why reactions to these identified causes
(and belief in them) have led many to propose EBFM as an intervention. With a focus on the
relationships between human and non-human actors, between humans and environment, between
processes and practices of science, policy, politics, economics, and culture, we can analyze the
successes and failures of fishery network and how the network goes about knowing and applying
knowledge.
Organizing the explanations for the fisheries problems in a way that is useful for analysis
of network interactions and feedbacks is a messy process because 1) identification of groups that
are non-homogenous and are not always internally cohesive groups in agreement (e.g. fishermen
include boat owners - from one to forty boats, part and full time labor crews, and permit/quota
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holders) and the groups of actors overlap (e.g. some fishermen are managers, some are scientists,
some are involved in the seafood industry post-catch ; and 2) the "problems" are often
interrelated and have many dimensions. However, the representation that follows is one that is
useful for developing a sense of the network of actants, and relationships, processes, and
practices that influence each other and produce the fishery and the fishery "crisis" as a whole.
For the sake of clarity and organization, I have divided the actants “at fault” for the cod
crisis into six categories: the fishermen, the global seafood market, fisheries management
institutions, fisheries science institutions, environmental non-governmental organizations, and
environmental conditions. Within each of these categories are several actants and roles of these
actants that are being framed by others as the culprit for the groundfish fishery crisis. As active
participants in the fishery actor-network, these actants are entangled in associations with one
another and the tensions and blame can serve as a dispersive force on the network. However,
through the processes of translation, the network transforms and still manages to cohere. The
following descriptions of where blame is being placed within the network can help us see how
those translations are taking place and changing the network. The arguments presented below are
not my own; they are all part of the fisheries discourse in New England that I observed through
participant observation, interviews, conversations, and printed media.

3.2 Fishermen and their Associations: Tales of Greed, Ignorance and Political Privilege
Fishermen is an aggregated category which is problematic when it comes to analysis of
the group as a whole. Sometimes, the quota permit holders and vessel owners are also the
skippers who go out with their crews to fish the seas and maintain the boats. Sometimes,
individuals own many vessels but do not participate in the actual fishing efforts. Fishing crews
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often are paid in pre-arranged shares of the profit of the trips. Fishermen-led organizations like
the Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance argue that small and medium scale community-based
fishermen should be distinguished from larger operations and oppose privatization of fishing
rights and consolidation of the fishing industry through neoliberal markets. Yet, despite this
diversity, when it comes to representing stakeholders in popular fisheries discourse, fishermen
are most often talked about as an aggregate category. In this section describing the network of

Table 3.1 Dimensions of variation in the category of “fishermen”
Dimensions of Variation in the Category of
“Fishermen”
Role in Fishing Community

Gear Type and Variability

Geographic distribution
Vessel size
Number of Vessels
Permit holder

Number of permits
Level of participation

Descriptions of range of variation
“Fisherman” may be one or more of the
following: vessel owner, permit owner, vessel
captain, vessel crew, seafood auction house,
fish dealer, seafood processing plant, seafood
distribution brand, other fishing community
support businesses (baiters, boat repairers)
Primarily bottom trawling for groundfish, a
few long liners; some vessels may have
variety of types of gear and permits allowing
for different catch
Homeport state, Landing port, Area fished,
Inshore (small vessels)/offshore (large
vessels)
Smallest (less than 30’), Small (30-50’),
Medium (50-75’), Large (over 75’)
Single-vessel owner-operators to large fishing
firms such as Carlos Rafael’s who owned
11scallop and 15-20 groundfish vessels
Individuals, non-profit permit banks offering
below-market permit leases, pre-limited entry
(1982-1993) and post limited-entry (1994);
seafood processors, “armchair fishermen” or
“fishery landlords” who lease permits or hold
on to them as investments
Carlos Rafael controlled a quarter of the quota
allotted for groundfishing in New England
Part-time, seasonal, or full-time
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blame that constructs the fisheries crisis, I also use this aggregate category, but, when necessary,
I distinguish which depiction of “fishermen” is being deployed. However, in most cases, the
mixed-up category is not distinguishable in everyday communications.
In this section, three roles of the fishermen are examined in terms of the blame they have
been assigned for causing the groundfish crisis. The first role examined here is the greedy
economic actor who overfish despite regulatory controls. The second role assigned to fishermen
is the undereducated and willfully ignorant laborers who does not understand the scientific
assessments and regulations are for their own good. The third assigned role of the fishermen
discussed here is the representative of the working class who some argue have undeserved
bipartisan political influence, getting politicians to work in their favor over conservation causes.
3.2.1 Greedy fishermen
While fishermen, as individuals, are often simplistically represented in popular print
essays, TV series, and documentaries as strong, weather-worn men and women committed to a
carrying on the tradition of a life at sea and family vocation despite the safety and economic
risks69, they are also contrarily depicted as cut-throat economic actors gaming the system to
survive under modern capitalism and industrialization. A prevalent Tragedy of the Commons
narrative about the New England groundfish crisis asserts that the reason why there are few cod
left in the waters off New England is that “greedy fishermen" are taking too many fish without
giving the stocks the opportunity to replenish.70 Fishermen are accused of as finding all possible
ways to take every last fish that they are able to catch, from lying to the regional council (as
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Reality TV series with New England fishermen include Fighting Tuna, Wicked Tuna, Lobsterman: Jeopardy at Sea, Lobster
Wars, Swords: Life on the Line. Although the popular show Deadliest Catch is about crab fishermen in Alaska, several news
articles have pointed out that groundfishing in New England is actually the most deadly fishing enterprise (e.g “New England
Fish Are Real 'Deadliest Catch' In America” by Curt Nickisch August 22, 2012, WBUR News; “Deadliest Catch, Found in
Unlikely Waters” by Nicholas Bakalar Sept 13, 2010, New York Times)
70
In Reuter’s article “’Deadliest Catch: seamen say fishermen not greedy” (Christine Kearney, July 28, 2009), several fishing
vessel captains argue that, “we are only fishing what they tell us we can fish.” [emphasis added]
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Council members themselves or as public commenters) to using illegal fishing methods
(improper net sizes, fishing in restricted areas) and failing to report their catches accurately.
These representation of "the greedy fishermen" are sometimes referring to individual vessel
owners and crews, and sometimes the blame is more generalized to faceless and soulless group
of industrialists who have the capital to squeeze maximum profit out of their business ventures.
Similar to images of vast flocks of passenger pigeons darkening the skies before hunters caused
their extinction, cod abundance stories include fishermen during the eighteenth century, hoisting
baskets full of cod from the sea without even using bait or walking across the water like Jesus on
the backs of swarming cod fish. But in the 20th century, the fishermen in New England are
blamed for overharvesting to the point that the fishery is no longer commercially viable, just as
occurred in the Canadian fisheries off the coast of Newfoundland by the 1980s. The fishermen
and industry representatives who are on the NEFMC are “foxes guarding the henhouse.”71
The demise of cod stocks is attributed to the overharvesting that came with new
technologies such as large gas-powered motors, radar fish finders, automated net machines that
allowed for huge nets to be cast and net trawls to be dragged across the ocean floor, and GSP
navigation. These technologies not only allowed boats to haul up exponentially more fish, but
also led to larger, consolidated fishing boat operators who had the capital to get the competitive
edge with these new, expensive technologies. Fishermen are regularly accused of using illegal
mesh net sizes and fishing in areas that are closed and claiming that they were just traveling
across that region to get to the other side. This reinforces the prejudiced judgements against all
fishermen that if there were no government regulations and no enforcement, greed would allow
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McCay (1994) discusses this image’s long-standing use in fisheries discourse, and it continues to be used today. It also can be
found in the Boyce’s (2010) dynamic common agency model analysis which concludes, “The regulator is more likely to place
significant weight on the welfare of harvesters than that of conservationists, since conservationists’ support of regulation is
unconditional, whereas harvesters’ support of regulation is conditional.”
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some fishermen to just take all of the fish now and not leave any for others or for the future,
destroying the resource for immediate profit. The National Coast Guard is responsible for
enforcing fishing regulations, but it is very difficult to actually catch fishermen breaking the law.
No one represents the characterization of fishermen as creators of their own crisis better
than Carlos Rafael, aka the "Cod Father." Mr. Rafael is the epitome of this contradictory
depiction of a fisherman as noble, hardworking adventurous man following the traditional
American dream of successful entrepreneurship. Mr. Rafael is a first-generation immigrant from
Portugal who came to New Bedford by himself in 1968, before finishing high school, fearing if
he stayed, he would get drafted to fight in Angola (McDonald, 2013). He worked his way up
from fish cutter to foreman of a seafood distribution company. By 1981, he bought his first boat.
Since then, he built his own seafood processing and distribution plant and developed a fleet of
over 40 boats.
Rafael is a local celebrity in New Bedford because he is the largest boat owner in the
highest-grossing port in America. On a boat tour I took around the New Bedford harbor during
the Working Waterfront Festival in 2016, the tour guide pointed out all of his green and white
boats that bore his logo. Along with murmurs of admiration for his success, some hushed disdain
was also expressed by local tour participants when his name was mentioned. He is a
controversial character, in-part, because he looms larger-than-life and many local businesses rely
heavily on his contracts for equipment and services. Rafael speaks colloquially and his rants are
full of profanities. In the 2013 Vice Media interview, he was very flippant about the nonconsolidation action that was being created in the NEFMC, Amendment 18 to the Multispecies
(groundfish) FMP, as one of the largest, if not the largest permit holders. "They are like
mosquitoes on the balls of an elephant," he says of the smaller operations in the port. "Biting,
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biting, biting, until finally [the government] is going to say fuck off, we got to do something."
(McDonald, 2013).
In March 2017, Rafael was found guilty of falsifying catch records to evade fishing
quotas, selling the fish to a business in New York City in exchange for bags of cash, and
smuggling some of the cash through Boston’s Logan International Airport to Portugal. This is not
the first time that he has been in trouble for illegal business dealings or the first time he has gone
to jail for it. He is such a significant part of the New Bedford economy and workforce, that the
town became very nervous about maintaining its recent economic upturn and New Bedford’s
mayor Jon Mitchell released several calming press releases to keep the panic at bay. He
continuously recited that this is "one bad egg" and that it does not represent fishermen in general.
Many people were worried that his permits (groundfish and scallops) would be bought by
ENGOs and removed from the sector markets for fishing. On September 25, 2017 he was
sentenced to 46 months in federal prison.72
3.2.2 Willfully-ignorant fisherman
Another aspect to the arguments that find fault with the fishermen are based in the
perception of fishermen as poorly-educated and therefore unable to understand and accept the
science that shows that they are overfishing. While there is no written criticism of the fishermen
by the NOAA scientists or non-industry NEFMC managers, there is palpable frustration in
private conversations among scientists and conservationists that the fishermen seem to be in
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NOAA wanted to punish Rafael’s sector for allowing this to happen under their watch by removing the permits from the area,
and fishermen from other ports hoped the permits would be transferred their areas, but New Bedford’s mayor and Senator
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) advocated to keep the permits locally. After some legal wrangling with the owners of the New
Bedford’s seafood auction house Buyers and Sellers Exchange (BASE) who planned to buy the majority of Rafael’s permits and
resell the fishing vessels to individual owners in the local sector, in February 2020, 12 of Rafael’s vessels and 27 of his fishing
permits were acquired by a Blue Harvest Fisheries, a New Bedford-based fishing fleet and seafood processing and retail
company, backed by New York City-based private equity Bregal Partners. Blue Harvest already owns groundfish permits for
millions of pounds of groundfish quota, 5 groundfish vessels, and 15 scallopers, so local fishermen in the sector are not happy
about continued trend of consolidation they see as an effect of the catch-share system (Huffman, 2020)

84

denial of the decline of the cod stocks in the face of extensive scientific research. While it is
acknowledged that fishermen would not want to drive themselves out of business by destroying
the fishery through overfishing, fishermen are accused of not having the ability to see the
problem as a long-term issue or seeing regulation and conservation efforts in a way that protects
their interests. One popularly cited example is the concept of “shifting baselines” where younger
generation fishermen (and scientists)73 do not acknowledge that the fishery is doing as declining
as dramatically as the scientific assessments and management reports indicate.
Many fishermen, including the high-profile former Council member and groundfish boat
captain David Goethal, make the case that the government scientists and many managers do not
have any idea what they are doing because they do not understand fishing.74 Scientists and
conservationists argue that this viewpoint is short-sighted and represents a defensive, willful
ignorance. They argue that fishermen ignore the system-wide problems because they are unable
to see the larger scale of the marine ecosystem and will only recognize local abundances.
Fishermen counter that NOAA scientists’ survey methods for assessing stock populations do not
adequately identify fish stocks in the right places at the right times, and therefore their estimates
are always too low. As a result of this repeated claim, in 2016, the state of Massachusetts’
Division of Marine Fisheries (DMF) conducted a separate Industry-Based Survey for Gulf of
Maine (GOM) cod (Cod IBS)75 taking many of the fishermen's suggestions into account and,
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Daniel Pauly's discussion of "shifting baselines" (Daniel Pauly, 1995) claims that fisheries scientists themselves exacerbate this
problem because "each generation of fisheries scientists accepts as a baseline the stock size and species compositions that
occurred at the beginning of their careers, and uses this to evaluate changes. The result obviously is a gradual shift of baseline, a
gradual accommodation of the creeping disappearance of resource species, and inappropriate reference points for evaluation
economic losses resulting from overfishing, or for identifying target for rehabilitation measures.” In the documentary End of the
Line (2009, based on a 2004 book by Charles Clover), photos, catch records, and interviews with retired fishermen demonstrate
that no more large swordfish are being caught like there were in the 1950s, but the new generation asserts that they are still
catching big ones and claims that the concern is manufactured by environmentalists.
74
In New Hampshire Public Television’s documentary “Saving New England Fisheries,” Mr. Goethel argues with NOAA
regional administrator John K. Bullard stating, “I think our problems are with what we call ‘cubicle ecologists.’ They spend all
their time in an office somewhere and don’t get out on the water and see what we’re seeing.”
75
This is not the first IBS for GOM cod, but the express purpose was to address that “fishermen believe that the cod status is
better than currently assessed.”. https://www.mass.gov/service-details/industry-based-survey-for-gulf-of-maine-cod
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while the survey is still ongoing, the scientist who oversaw the DMF survey indicated that they
are finding an 80% decrease in the cod population in the last ten years and low abundances of
juvenile and larger cod needed for rebound in accordance with the NOAA surveys.76 Fishermen,
led by Vito Giacalone, a commercial fisherman, executive director of the Gloucester Fishing
Community Preservation Fund77, and Chair of Governmental Affairs of the Northeast Seafood
Coalition, have rejected this assessment, too, because they say that they are finding too many cod
that they have to discard many of them, and that, “The state survey literally does zero to improve
our confidence. You can’t just sample anywhere. You have to go to where the cod are supposed
to be.” (David, 2017). However, NEFSC scientists counter that in times of stock stress, fish tend
to aggregate in one area and that the fishermen, with their fish-finding technologies are finding
these last pockets of fish.
Before they begin to comment at NEFMC meetings, most fishermen who come to the
microphone from the audience state that they are uncomfortable speaking publicly and feel
intimidated by the scientific presentations which they find difficult to understand.78 Scientists’
response to this is to have internal workshops and discussion about "communicating" science
more clearly and running workshops for fishermen that teach them about how the science is
done. This tension tends to focus the discussion on the veracity and competency of the science
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“A milestone in the war over the true state of cod” by David Abel, Boston Globe, April 3, 2017.
In another layer of complication in the designation of “fisherman”, a category of non-profit, such as this fund or bank, exists
that buys fishing permits and then leases them to local fishermen, increasing the amount of fish they can land and keeping
permits from leaving the Gloucester community. The Gloucester Fishing Preservation Community Fund was started in 2007 to
mitigate the loss of fishing grounds due to a new liquefied natural gas terminal on the coast. These non-profits, including this one,
are not universally seen as positive and trustworthy entities by all local fishermen and I have heard fishermen complain about
them including Cape Cod Fishermen's Alliance. See accusations against Giacalone: “Gloucester fishermen’s leader cleared, but
shocked by allegations,” Sarah Shemkus, Boston.com, February 6, 2013. To “promote fleet diversity and in the groundfish
fishery, prevent the acquisition of excessive shares of permits, and enhance sector management,” Amendment 18 to the Northeast
Multispecies (groundfish) Fishery Management Plan (May 2017) created permit accumulation limits on “individuals, permit
banks, and other entities.”
78
Even with a strong science education and teaching background, I find it difficult to comprehend the too-fast, sometimes overly
technical (and sometimes overly simplified), not always clearly presented information presented by fisheries scientists at long,
tightly-scheduled NEFMC meetings.
77
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while subduing the conversation about how fishermen fear losing their livelihoods or, at least,
their level of income. The chorus is repeated that no scientific evidence or assessments will get
the fishermen on board with making regulations that work against their ability to make a living
by fishing.
3.2.3 Politically-privileged fisherman
This characterization of fishermen as greedy, uncooperative, dishonest, and willfully
ignorant is in stark contrast to the image of fishermen being portrayed by local, regional, and
national politicians79 who are fighting for larger quotas and fewer regulations to make the fishing
industry a thriving economic sector. This bi-partisan support of the fishing industry sometimes
puts politicians at odds with government scientific and regulatory agencies and sometimes does
not always align with their environmental conservation platforms, however their support for
domestic jobs is a winning political stance. When the fishermen's voice is heard at Council
meetings, in the local media, or through inclusion in documentaries, it is often unapologetically
anti-government interference, anti-regulation, anti-environmentalist (and anti-(most) scientists)
and pro-economic growth of the industry.80 This has led many to ask why so much political
support and federal money and effort, through disaster funds, research funds, funds for
workshops, monitoring, etc. is being spent to support the groundfish industry. They argue that
although the scallop fishery makes New Bedford, MA, the highest grossing fishing port in the
United States, why are we bothering to save the groundfish industry that is not able to compete
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Bi-partisan support of fishermen and the fishing industry is prevalent amongst every level of government in New England.
Throughout my attendance at NEMC meetings in 2014-2017, mayors, state legislators, governors, senators, and congress
members dropped in at NEFMC meetings to state their commitments and also compose letters, speak at public events, sponsor
bills supporting fishermen such as the Young Fishermen's Development Act of 2017, and sometimes challenging the work of
NOAA and NEFSC. For example, Senators Markey (D-MA) and Warren (D-MA) addressed a letter to The Honorable Kathryn
Sullivan who was the Administrator of NOAA on January 5, 2015 challenging whether it’s decision-making was actually based
on the best scientific information available in light of the “serious economic repercussions for fishing communities…”
80
The byline for the 2012 documentary Truth: Fishing Crisis or Government Mismanagement?: “The true story of the American
Fisherman. Fighting against the sea, the weather, tough economic times and most importantly the United States Government in
an attempt to protect his family, his home, his heritage and his dignity.”
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globally?81 Others ask if a first world country really needs New England’s groundfish as a local
source of protein and if it only benefits an elite group of New Englanders and tourists who can
afford to pay the higher costs for local specialties? And with the prices of local fish so volatile,
and often very low, much of the economic gains are made abroad where the added value comes
with processing and distribution. Even while groundfish advocates argue that the fishing industry
supports many other businesses throughout New England including boat and gear manufacturers
and retailers, welders, fuel and ice suppliers, packaging and shipping companies, markets and
restaurants, others point to the vulnerability of whole towns such as Portland, ME and
Gloucester, MA, to specific species, such as lobsters or cod, or individuals such as Carlos Rafael,
that it is not a diversified and sustainable economy based on the fisheries in the long run.
It is also argued that the actual work of the fishermen on the boats is romanticized in the
media and that it is a truly a miserable job that politicians are trying to save. The crews who
operate the nets, sort the fish, sometimes minimally process them and unload them, take on the
risks of catch-dependent income and have physically exhausting, tedious, and dangerous jobs.
Heroin use by fishing crews has come into the spotlight recently as a byproduct of the monotony
and low wages of this job, but this problem (as well as a related local AIDS epidemic) has been
well-documented for decades.82 The Leviathan, an experimental documentary from the Harvard
81

The lawsuit Lovgren v. Locke, 11-1952 was brought against NOAA by the mayors of New Bedford and Gloucester NOAA over
Amendment 16 on behalf of their fishing constituents, arguing that the socio-economic effects of quotas were not being
adequately considered to meet the MSA. This case was unsuccessful, showing that having the support of local politicians does
not always translate into political power in the fishery. A similar case challenging Frameworks 48 and 50 (Massachusetts v.
Pritzker, 13-11301-RGS) was brought against the Department of Commerce and NOAA by the states of Massachusetts and New
Hampshire in 2014. It was also unsuccessful. Both case discussions pointed out that National Standard 8 makes it clear that
adverse economic consequences should be compared only when different options can achieve the same conservation
requirements.
82
“Fishing’s deadly dark side” Ric Oliveira, Southcoast Today, July 14, 1996; “By the Sea, the Specter of Drugs and AIDS” Sara
Rimer, NYTimes, March 24, 1997; “Eight arrested in drug raids from six New Bedford fishing boats” by Mike Lawrence, South
Coast Today, March 16, 2016; “Trapped by heroin: Lobster industry struggles with its deadly secret” Penelope Overton, Portland
Press Herald, April 2, 2017; “State’s fishing fleet confronts an opioid problem” Brian MacQuarrie, Boston Globe, April 17, 2017.
In “Drugs on deck in New England” (National Fishermen, May 17, 2017), Jerry Fraser argues that the increase in heroin use by
fishermen is part of the larger scourge in New England, but writes: “Fishing has always held an attraction for people who seek
employment on an ad hoc basis. The money can be good and you can get off the boat, spend it, and get on another boat. In
addition, the workplace accommodates free spirits attracted by life among the elements or who don’t want to commit to “a real
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Sensory Ethnography lab gives an outsider’s perspective on a day on a fishing boat by portraying
a fishing trip as a horror movie using only actual footage and soundscapes from the trip itself.
The following quotes are just a few examples of how actors in the fishery network see the
fishermen’s role in the crisis:
A1: I think New England just continues to be a poster child for really poor fishery
management… I think it’s primarily composed of fishermen that have a vested interest. Most
of them really probably have to recuse themselves on a huge number of decisions at this
point. It’s the fox guarding the henhouse. I have to think that the Council system as intended
is not functioning correctly in New England.
A2: I think that part of the problem is that the relationship…in large part, people came from
Europe to North America as resources were depleted over there. And fish was a big one. It
wasn’t the only one but that was a huge driver. Before there was even a settlement at
Plymouth or down in VA, there were people coming and spending fishing seasons on the
Maine islands and so there is this history of hundreds and hundreds of years of people
coming and exploiting what in those early days were vast resources that nobody ever
dreamed could be overexploited. There was no regulation for generation after generation
after generation. So I think there is this sort of culture here…New Englanders, myself
included, tend to be very independent, they don’t like to be managed, they don’t like to be
told what to do, and when the government creates a NOAA, and a fisheries service, and start
making laws governing fisheries resources, there’s a lot of resentment. It’s like, ‘my
ancestors have been fishing these waters for generations and go away, we don’t want to be
bothered, we can take care of this ourselves.’ So I think a lot of it comes from that - it’s the
history… and yeah, no, it doesn’t really work very well if you kill a lot of fish, and dump that
at sea, that no one ever really gets, that are never really reported to anybody, and that just
doesn’t work. But here, that’s just part of life.
A3: Well, they like to say that they are 2nd or 3rd or 4th generation fishermen; I mean I
appreciate all that, I mean tradition is an important issue, but again, you gotta have fish.
Nobody gave my mom a card when I was born that said [A2] gets to be a scientist all his
life…When my aunt was losing her delicatessen, nobody came rushing in saying selling
kosher tube meats is a long important tradition, let’s bail her out, throw a bunch of money at
it and not let anybody go out of business…you know, it’s a business.”
A4: She [Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)] is being advised by a guy named Bruno [Bruno
Freitas, Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Development] who was Barney Frank’s fisheries
advisor. And so she hasn’t figured out that she is backing the wrong horse on this…There’s
an old trope in NE fisheries history going back to 1866, that the fishermen can do no wrong,
that they’re sacred cows, the most virtuous people on the planet, they never lie, they never
job.” And often, the pay is out of sight of the tax man, child support and other obligations. In years past the money was steady
enough to weed out underachievers on deck. Today many vessel operators are not in a position to be as selective as they once
were.”
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cheat, they never steal. I’m not saying the opposite; I’m saying they are humans. And
probably the ratio of liars and cheaters there is the same as the rest of human society. But
conventional wisdom is that if you back fishermen, and give them what they want, you can
present yourself a part of the working man, backing working families. So that’s Warren’s
thinking, because she is an advocate for Working Families. The problem is her advisor hasn’t
informed her on really what that means right now.
Finally, fishermen in different fisheries also point the finger at one another in this network
of blame. Arguments are made that the regulatory system sets them at odd against one another.
At Council meetings, groundfish fishermen place some blame for their declining catches on the
unfair advantages that other fisheries are given by the NEFMC. For example, the herring fishery
is frequently the object of complaints by groundfish fishermen and the tuna fishermen who want
to decrease herring quotas since groundfish and tuna rely on herring as a significant source of
forage. While it is difficult to quantify the effect of herring removals on groundfish stocks,
groundfish fishermen are wary of the expansion of the herring fishery in recent years. The
herring fishermen have argued that they are reducing cod egg predation by herring while not
removing enough to affect the adult cod’s access to herring prey. Groundfish fishermen have also
claimed that scallop and clam dredges cause damage to groundfish habitat and harm the
groundfish themselves.83 While groundfish otter trawls and gillnets can also damage the sea
bottom, there are rock-hopping technologies that reduce this damage. Clammers often argue that
they only fish where the bottom is sandy, not where it is rockier and the groundfish like to spawn
and nurseries develop. They say rocks destroy their nets, so they do not need to be kept out of
susceptible habitat areas by regulations.
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The scallop fishery’s interaction with the groundfish fishery is handled through a sub-ACL, or an assigned portion of the
overall allowable catch limit, which gives limited access scallop vessels with a valid groundfish permit the right to keep limited
amounts of groundfish caught in Sea Scallop Access Areas. Scallops are maintaining a healthy abundance in New England and
have managed to retain steady prices, and are the reason that New Bedford is the highest grossing port in the U.S.
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3.3 The Global Seafood Market and its Associations: The Failings of International Competition
and Seafood Sustainability Guidance
Another category of actants that are accused of causing and exacerbating the crisis are
economic market forces. First, international competition in the seafood market is very difficult
for New England’s groundfish fishery. Without consistent availability, the national and global
market for New England cod has nearly dried up. Second, although, several consumer seafood
guides that address conservation issues, and, in theory, provide marketing for well-managed
stocks, they are serving to further drive the demand for, and therefore the prices of, groundfish
down despite the adherence of the fishermen to the fisheries regulations for conservation.
3.3.1 Insurmountable International Competition
New England fishermen have a tough time maintaining a high price and stable buyers for
cod. Overall, less than 10% of the seafood eaten in the US is domestic. Some imported fish eaten
in the U.S. comes from coastal waters in countries where there is little or no environmental or
labor regulation. Issues of slavery, ecosystem destruction, and theft of local subsistence due to
industrial fishing operations regularly make headlines. Even seafood caught in the US is often
sent abroad to other countries like China, where processing is much cheaper and is then
reimported to the U.S. value-added product. Competition from Icelandic and Alaskan cod drives
prices regional prices down, leaving New England groundfish fishery without a competitive edge
in the global seafood trade. Supermarkets and restaurant chains tend to buy from large
international corporations that can provide consistency and bulk, which is not possible with the
current scale and instability of groundfish fishing in New England.
At a presentation on “GOM Seafood in a Global Market: Opportunities and Challenges” at
the Maine Fishermen’s Forum on May 7, 2015, panelists and participants explained several of
the problems New England’s groundfish fishery faces in the international market:
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Vito Giacalone, in his role as Chair of Governmental Affairs of the Northeast Seafood
Coalition: “We can't wait around for fickle regulations. You have to be light on your feet.
We need regulatory flexibility to shift to different species. Price stability is important.
Regulations and legal constraint are the problems, not a resource constraint. We are seeing
the same cycles as 37 years ago, yes, there are changes, but still …we could catch more
fish. We should take what mother nature gives us and stop trying to manipulate
everything…We are embracing fishery collapse and spending resources to do that instead
of supporting communities with renewable resources. We need to be producing again; not
same as the ‘70s, but could do three times what we are doing. The high quality stuff here
is treated as small market. Export wants large quantity. The price market not a big enough
difference between high and low quality catch sold. We need to have higher volume so
differentiates and forces better handling practices from everybody. You have to understand
that consumer decisions often based on lack of knowledge.”
John Norton, Cozy Harbor Seafood at presentation on GOM Seafood in a Global Market:
“The environmental community has said it is so bad to harvest wild fish. That has had
impact… [New England] fish [are] world class. When it gets to the processing plant, it
can’t compete because of volume. It is part of [local] cultural; a large population from
Boston that will take in fresh fish. But our industry has been deconstructed, ripped apart,
thrown away. The survivors left, strong boats, strong people, but they don’t have longterm investment in industry to make it possible to compete on worldwide market. It’s hard
to find people who see future in commercial fishing and processing…The variability of
supply, we used to have continuity of supply by day boats and trip boats - still, combined,
daily flow of fish. But now, holes in the supply, regulations have taken that away. Nobody
has faith in system anymore, science and regulatory system; before the boat is built, the
regulations will change.”
Woman in audience: “ The federal government says eat more seafood, but there is
infighting, competition, confusion - MSC [Marine Stewardship Council], ASC
[Aquaculture Stewardship Council], GAA [Global Aquaculture Alliance], SSF [Small
Scale Fisheries] are all infusing selves and promoting one as better than the other.

3.3.2 Unhelpful Seafood Sustainability Guidance
Many seafood consumers in industrialized countries like the U.S. have indicated that they
would like to make seafood choices to prevent the global decline in fish stocks, while also being
able to eat seafood regularly for health, protein variety and taste, while also expecting a low
price. This often leads people to choose imported seafood with some indication, such as a
certification, that the fish came from a “sustainable fishery” without slave labor or issues of
bycatch of large sea mammals. Table 3 lists major seafood guidance programs used for U.S.
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consumption. Popular ranking systems use the Monterey Bay Aquarium's Seafood Watch84
which provides information that is often confusing about fish in general, but especially for New
England groundfish, and it is often hard to get enough information from retailers to be able to
apply information to purchases.85 Certification systems like the Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC) approval stickers are another high-profile fish sustainability consumer campaign that
results in confusion about the sustainability of cod. Of all of the 34 geographically-distinct cod
stocks listed in their certification system (most in Northwest Atlantic region, FAO Area 27 that
includes Iceland and the North Sea), fifteen fisheries are MSC certified, three are “certified with
component(s) in assessment”, four are “in assessment”, three are suspended (including
Canada/Newfoundland 3Ps cod in FAO area 21, which includes New England), and nine are
“withdrawn” from certification.” While MSC is promoted by some conservationists as a solution
to declining fish stocks, others are concerned that it does more harm than good86 (Christian et al.,
2013; Jacquet et al., 2010). Similar to arguments about what happened when the federal
government took over the organic certification in the U.S., the MSC system is criticized for
“promoting the certification of ever-larger capital-intensive operations” due to “incentives of the
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These include the Environmental Defense Fund’s Seafood Selector, The Safina Center’s Healthy Ocean’s Seafood guide, and
Whole Foods’ ranking systems.
85
See Natalie Jacewicz’s article on NPR’s The Salt: https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2017/03/15/520023117/i-want-to-eatfish-responsibly-but-the-seafood-guides-are-so-confusing. Also MSC press release on North Sea cod:
https://www.msc.org/media-centre/press-releases/uk-consumers-confused-about-advice-on-cod.
Monterey Bay aquarium is too complex for people to use accurately. They cannot get all the information they need make a
decision. Even if they know they country of origin, which is rare, they can't get it down to the stock and the fishing technique
used. An example would be that I told someone New England scallops are a good choice. But this person bought Peruvian
scallops because they were cheaper and felt good about making a sustainable decision. It gets more complicated: Although
Peruvian Scallops are hand-harvested by divers in Chili and Peru, which should result in little to no habitat damage and no
bycatch, The Monterey Bay Aquarium Seafood Watch® specifically says not to eat Peruvian Scallops from Sechura Bay, Peru
because there is a lack of assessment and management. But, the point here is that people do not make the "correct" or intended
decisions because they use incomplete information. This often ends up being the case because they cannot afford it or just do not
want to pay the high price of the local or sustainable option.
86
MSC certifications, for species such as Antarctic Chilean Seabass and krill, have been challenged for fisheries that are showing
signs of overfishing, negative impacts on ecosystems, and ineffective management. Of 19 challenges, only one was not certified.
Critics argue that the “certification system creates a potential financial conflict of interest, because certifiers that leniently
interpret existing criteria might expect to receive more work and profit from ongoing annual audits.” (Christian et al., 2013)
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Table 3.2 Seafood sustainability guidance programs for consumers
Sustainable Seafood Advice

Organization(s)

Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC)

Scientific Certification
Systems (SCS)

Fair Trade Certified Seafood

Fair Trade USA

Seafood Watch

Monterey Bay Aquarium

Ocean Wise

Vancouver Aquarium

FishWatch

NOAA Fisheries

Good Fish Guide

Marine Conservation Society
(UK)

Seafood Selector

Environmental Defense Fund
(in collaboration with
Monterey Bay Aquarium)
Conservation Alliance
(founded by REI, Patagonia,
The North Face, and Kelty)

FishChoice

Gulf of Maine (GOM)
Responsibly Harvested®
Brand

Gulf of Maine Research
Institute
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Type of program and
description
Third party certification
program and ecolabel;
product meets MSC standards
for sustainable fishing for
wild capture fisheries
Third party certification
program and ecolabel;
product meets Fair Trade
Capture Fisheries Standard
Seafood sustainability
recommendations for
consumers (The Safina
Center’s (formerly Blue
Ocean) and Oceana’s seafood
ratings programs no longer
operate and now refer
consumers to Seafood
Watch.)
Seafood sustainability
recommendations for
consumers and ecolabel
Seafood sustainability
recommendations for
consumers based on Fish
Stock Sustainability Index
(FSSI) incorporating fisheries
management components
Seafood sustainability
recommendations for
consumers
Seafood sustainability
recommendations for
consumers
Information aggregator
platform for businesses with
popular seafood sustainability
programs and certifications
Ecolabel for regional grocery
stores and dining halls

Sustainable Seafood Advice

Organization(s)

Type of program and
description
NAMA Who Fishes Matters
Northwest Atlantic Marine
7 principles for choosing
Seafood Card
Alliance
seafood from small and
medium scale communitybased fisheries
Seafood Solutions (formerly
Chef’s Collaborative
Industry workshops on
Green Chefs/Blue Ocean with
sustainable seafood options
Blue Ocean Institute)
for food industry
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) WWF (in collaboration with
Seafood sustainability
Sustainable Seafood Guides
the North Sea Foundation and recommendations by country
the Good Fish Foundation)
for consumers
Seafood Red List
Greenpeace
List of 22 marine species to
avoid for consumers
FisheryProgress
FishChoice and Conservation Promotion of consumer
Alliance for Seafood
awareness of Fishery
Solutions
Improvement Projects (FIPs)
to achieve MSC standards
SeaWeb Seafood Champion
Ocean Foundation
Promotion of consumer
Awards, SeaWeb Seafood
awareness of sustainable
Summit, and SeaWeb
fisheries through conferring
Speaking of Seafood
awards, hosting a major
conference on seafood
sustainability, and
communicating successful
fisheries stories
market” (Jacquet et al., 2010). McDonald’s, Walmart, Tesco supermarkets and other large
retailers are primary supporters of MSC certified fisheries.
Regional non-profits also offer seafood advice that does not encourage Gulf of Maine
(GOM) or Georges Bank (GB) Atlantic cod consumption while the stock is legally caught under
the quota management system but still depleted. The Gulf of Maine Research Institute, a regional
non-profit that provides research for and advice to the NEFMC, administers the Gulf of Maine
Responsibly Harvested® brand that certifies twelve species managed by the NEFMC, but
Atlantic cod is not one. That system actually certifies specific stocks, such as differentiating
between Georges Bank haddock and Atlantic haddock as a whole, but neither GOM or GB cod
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make the cut. Their stamp of certification can be seen on fish in local grocery stores and they
have some institutional arrangements with restaurants, educational and medical institutions who
serve only GOM Responsibly Harvested® species. The New England Aquarium's Ocean
Friendly Seafood Program formerly provided sustainable seafood advice to some of the world’s
largest seafood retailers, restaurant chains and suppliers using the non-profit FishChoice’s
collated fishery and fish suppliers’ ratings from several sources including NOAA’s Fish Stock
Sustainability Index (FSSI). GOM and GB cod did not fare well on any of their lists.
The non-governmental certification systems are not designed to function with the U.S.
regional management councils as a way of encouraging an emphasis on marine conservation in
domestic fisheries. However, two NOAA Fisheries’ initiatives, the U.S. Seafood Import
Monitoring Program and the sustainable seafood database FishWatch have been aimed at
supporting domestic seafood by emphasizing the well-monitored and regulated fisheries of the
U.S. NOAA’s U.S. Seafood Import Monitoring Program targets seafood imports that are
vulnerable to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and seafood fraud; Atlantic cod is
one of the twelve major categories included. As of January 1, 2018, importers are responsible
under U.S. Customs regulations to have an International Fisheries Trade Permit (IFTP) issued by
NOAA Fisheries and submit harvesting and chain of custody documentation. NOAA Fisheries’
FishWatch (FishWatch.gov) lists and recommends all U.S. wild-caught and farmed fish and
shellfish that are being “sustainably managed and responsibly harvested under U.S. regulations.”
For species that are commonly identified as overexploited or threatened by conservation
organizations, such as Atlantic cod, red snapper, and Pacific bluefin tuna, the site still
recommends them as a smart seafood choice “because it is sustainably managed under rebuilding
plans that allow limited harvest by U.S. fishermen.”

96

3.4 Fisheries management institutions and their associations: Complaints about the Law, Federal
Agencies, and the NEFMC
Fisheries management institutions that are blamed for the groundfish crisis include the
national laws concerning fisheries that are enacted by Congress and maintained by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association. Specifically, managers express frustration that sometimes
the federal fisheries laws are too vague and other times too restrictive. Blame is placed on
regional management councils, too, who are directly responsible for developing the regionspecific fishery management plans and regulations. The New England Fisheries Management
Council faces criticism for taking too long to amend FMPs, predetermining votes on regulations
so that Council debates appear futile and hostile, hedging their responsibility to define clear
goals, and making ineffective regulations that do not work for the actual practices of fishing and
cause more harm than good. Both the depletion of cod and the loss of jobs and revenue falls
under the umbrella term “mismanagement”. Some would argue that the whole government
system of fisheries regulations needs to be radically changed, but specific areas of management
have been the targets of blame since the beginning of national fisheries management in the
1970s.
3.4.1 Vague and/or Restrictive Federal Laws
When the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MagnusonStevens Act or MSA) became law in 1976, the focus was on development of the seemingly
limitless seafood industry potential for the United States now that the foreign fleets were
forbidden in New England. Under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, it was seen
as an industry with room for greater exploitation and therefore eligible for a generous amount of
capital for fishing businesses to upgrade their boats and equipment. There are 10 National
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Standards, “principles that promote sustainable fisheries management,” in Title 3. Section 301 of
the MSA. NOAA fisheries provides guidelines and updates to the National Standards as
mandated by the Act. The last complete federal reauthorization of the MSA was passed in 2006.
H.R.200 - Strengthening Fishing Communities and Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries
Management Act, Representative Don Young’s (R-AK) MSA reauthorization bill (through
FY2022) was narrowly passed by The House of Representatives on July 11, 2018, after removing
a controversial passage stating the MSA is the top federal statutory authority over the
management of the fisheries, giving it power over the Antiquities Act, National Marine
Sanctuaries Act, the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.
Young’s reauthorization bill was dubbed “the empty oceans act” by Rep. Jared Huffman (D-CA),
the ranking member of the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Water, Power, and
Oceans. Support for the bill was split with many fishing and fishing-related industries for the
bill, while some commercial fishing groups, chefs, aquariums, and environmental groups
strongly oppose it. The bill did not make it to a Senate vote in 2018.87
The currently-operating 2006 version of the MSA is critiqued as 1) being too vague and
open to interpretation and 2) introducing a contradiction that is nearly impossible to reconcile in
some cases: conservation must be balanced with economic benefit to the nation. National
Standard 1 specifically deals with the concept of Optimal Yield (OY) which is related to, but not
the same as Maximum Sustainable yield. Industry often leans more heavily on the economic
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Another version of this reauthorization bill (H.R. 1335) passed the House in 2015, but did not make it through the Senate.
Although the House vote on H.R. 200 was somewhat split along partisan lines, this is not a completely partisan issue. Quote from
a SeafoodSource article: “One thing that may help the seafood industry is that many Democrats represent coastal communities
reliant on fishing, according to Bob Vanasse, executive director of Saving Seafood, which conducts media and public outreach on
behalf of the seafood industry. Vanasse told SeafoodSource that his group will work with Democrats to vote for the interests of
their constituents. He urged them to follow in the path of former U.S. Rep. Barney Frank, a Massachusetts Democrat who worked
to support fishermen, many of whom were middle-class small business owners. “One can be a good liberal and also represent
your fishing constituents,” Vanasse said. “One would think that would be a natural fit.”” (“House flips in US elections, impact
likely on MSA reauthorization”, SeafoodSource.com, Steve Bittenbender, November 7, 2018;
https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/supply-trade/house-flips-in-us-elections-impact-likely-on-msa-reauthorization)
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development aspects of NS1, while scientists and conservation groups call upon the conservation
aspects. This tends to be the primary area of contestation of Council alternatives; everybody
claims they are upholding the MSA and NS1. National Standard 1 was updated in 2016 in an
effort to provide more clarity to the regional management bodies about how to apply Annual
Catch Limits and Accountability Measures to achieve OY.88
3.4.2 Glacial Pace of the Amendment Process for Regional Management Plans
The procedures for the regional councils’ development of Fisheries Management Plans
(FMP) and making changes to them are laid out in the MSA. Writing an initial FMP is a
monumental task and takes several years. In order for this FMP to adapt to changes in the
economy (workforce, markets) and ecology (environment, populations), changes are made
through Amendments and Frameworks that have to be requested, researched and developed,
debated, decided upon, and approved and the changes do no stop until the amendments and
frameworks are done. This puts management into reaction mode all the time. With the effects of
climate change occurring so quickly, the mechanisms set up in the MSA cannot functioning
effectively. The more controversial amendments like the Omnibus Habitat Amendment (OHA2,
2004-2017) and the anti-consolidation Groundfish Amendment 18 (2014-2017), the longer it can
take. The changes in priorities by the Council necessitates changes in NEFSC work plans, too. At
many meetings, the Council committees, GARFO, and the NEFSC all say that it is difficult to
move economic and labor resources around too quickly to handle a new priority. Sometimes the
work just cannot be done on the timetable that is needed for it to be an effective response.
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The 2016 update for NS1 guidelines allow Councils to use an aggregate approach to estimating the OY at “stock, stock
complex, or fishery level” which would facilitate Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management measures to take into account multispecies interactions. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2016/10/18/2016-24500/magnuson-stevens-act-provisionsnational-standard-guidelines

99

3.4.3 Governmental Bureaucracy
National Standard 7, updated in 2016, states that there should not be redundancy in the work
or research for the fisheries; that the management should be efficient. This can be very difficult
when there are overlapping and interacting jurisdictions, agendas, and interests of several major
government organizations that directly or indirectly affect fisheries management. The basic
organization of regional fisheries management involves several levels of administration. NOAA
Fisheries, also called the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), is a branch of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Department of Commerce. NMFS
works with Regional Fishery Management Councils on stock assessments, catch limits, other
regulations, changes to FMPS, and other concerns like bycatch reduction. The Greater Atlantic
Regional Fisheries Office (GARFO) is a division of the NMFS that is responsible for making
sure that all New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) regulations and actions
comply with The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347)
and other laws/executive orders that require environmental, social, and economic analyses.
NEPA requires that, "[f]ederal agencies consider the environmental effects of their actions as
well as involve and inform the public in the decision-making process” through the creation of
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) or Environmental Assessments. Other laws that GARFO
must consider when assessing NEFMC actions include The Endangered Species Act, The Marine
Mammal Protection Act, The Regulatory Flexibility Act, and The Administrative Procedure Act.
The Northeast Fisheries Science Center is the research arm of GARFO under NMFS. In addition
to the NEFMC, GARFO serves other regional regulatory bodies including the Mid-Atlantic
Fisheries Management Council and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission which acts
as a "deliberative body of the Atlantic coastal states, coordinating the conservation and
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management of 27 nearshore fish species” through the Interstate Fisheries Management Program.
Some of the groundfish stocks are also shared with Canada and their quotas must be divided up
in the Gulf of Maine.
Ocean Planning seeks to coordinate and manage interacting coastal uses and industry
sectors, including fisheries. Since 2005, regional ocean planning activities have been managed
by the Northeast Regional Ocean Council (NROC), a Regional Ocean Partnership founded by
New England governors. The 2010 National Ocean Policy created by Executive Order of
President Obama developed the National Ocean Plan, forming the Northeast Regional Planning
Body (RPB)89 which wrote the Northeast Ocean Plan, certified in December 2016. The RPB
convened an Ecosystem-Based Management Working Group to provide information and advice
for the inclusion ecosystem-based management in the Northeast Ocean Plan. NROC expanded to
include federal agency members and continued to have a significant role in coordination of
efforts and information gathering for all of the sectors. NROC created the Northeast Ocean Data
portal which provided data and maps for the Northeast Ocean Plan and continues to be a major
source of data, maps, and tools for decision making, including a series of maps of commercial
fishing vessel activity in the Northeast based on Vessel Monitoring System data.90 In June 2018,
the Trump Administration issued an Executive Order which established a new ocean policy and
federal Ocean Policy Committee, effectively disbanding the RBP. However, NROC’s Ocean
Planning Committee continues to coordinate issues related to ocean planning in New England, as
well as with the federal Ocean Policy Committee, and the Northeast Ocean Plan “continues to be
an important documentation of regional ocean management priorities and activities.”
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The 2010 National Ocean Policy created nine regionally focused RPBs, including the Northeast’s.
A case study with data and maps in this portal, Balancing Deep-Sea Coral Protection and Commercial Fisheries, is an example
of how the New England Fisheries Management Council’s Habitat Committee incorporated from and provided to the portal.
90
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In meetings and other public forums, NEFMC members and regional fishing and seafood
industry stakeholders in the audience have expressed irritation over federal intervention in what
they view as their purview in regional fisheries management. At an NEFMC Executive
Committee meeting, members questioned the RPB’s expeditious work on the Northeast Ocean
Plan and were worried that they were not given enough time to meet as a Council to compose
comments on it. In another example, as a federal agency, NOAA supported the Obama
Administration’s use of the Antiquities Act to create a National Marine Monument in an area of
seamounts and canyons off southern New England, but several high-ranking Council members
and industry stakeholders stated their opposition in letters and at Town Hall meetings, claiming it
was an “end-run” around the existing fisheries management system.
Sometimes there are tensions between the NEFMC and NMFS, and its regional arms,
because they do not always see eye to eye on what the research priorities should be (not
everyone in the NEFMC is convinced that EBFM should be prioritized), or whether the
Council’s regulation recommendations meet requirements of federal conservation acts. Some
managers, fishing industry representatives, and even scientists from other institutions, have
claimed that NOAA fisheries scientists and social scientists are ideological environmental
scientists who hobble the work of the NEFMC with biased scientific information and
interpretations.
3.4.4 Ineffective NEFMC
Pre-determined Votes
A major complaint that is reiterated by managers and stakeholders is that the way the
NEFMC voting procedure works, decisions are already made before the council deliberations
begin. Negotiations between mangers and stakeholders are carried out outside of the meetings
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which result in traded votes (voting for what helps another industry if they will vote for you) and
promises of voting alliances. Whichever "voting bloc" has the majority in the committee wins the
vote. When a motion is voted on, true negotiation is limited during the Council meeting
discussion periods that leads to successful compromises of industry with conservation-leaning
members. The NEFMC has been accused of over-stocking its voting committee membership
with too many “industry giants” who ignore science in favor of money and political favor.
Committee members are required to disclose their holdings on the NEFMC website and they do
represent stakeholders in the fishery, so they, by management logic, should have a seat at the
table. But NGO representatives have argued that industry members should more often recuse
themselves due to the amount of equity directly and indirectly owned in the fishery that is being
voted on. Some of the university scientist members on the Council lean more toward the
conservation side and other university scientist members prioritize access to fishing unless the
risk is too great that it would lead to bad consequences with management being blamed. One
Council member who was frustrated with the gridlock in the negotiations requested roll calls
during the final votes on the Omnibus Habitat Amendment from the committee to show that the
preferred options were being dominated by the industry voting bloc.
Goals versus Common Sense Principles
Animosity exists between some committee members and some who are more vocal and
better at persuasive arguments affect the dynamic of the negotiations. Industry members more
often move for expediency, whereas the conservationists tend to slow it down with deliberation.
In EBFM Committee deliberations, one Council member said that the approach should be to
define the problem that you are trying to fix and to apply "common-sense principles" to
addressing it, rather than focusing on goals and objectives for the actions. An ENGO
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representative indicated that they had observed a trend of steering the discussion away from
working from goals and objectives to focusing on immediate problems and saw this as a way of
avoiding a commitment to conservation goals. This “common-sense principles” framing trend
persisted until the Council started to directly task the committees with drafting objectives and
goals.
The Regulations
Many fishermen state that regulations that come out of the bureaucratic process of the
Council are dismissive of the daily activities of the fishermen and believe they cause or intensify
problems such as increased safety risks, discarded dead fish, consolidation of the fleet into fewer,
larger operations, and unnecessary loss of livelihoods.91 They complain that it is prohibitively
expensive to meet all the unnecessary regulations that are reducing access to plentiful fish.
Several of the management efforts that fishermen point to as harmful include regulations related
to bycatch and choke species, seasonal closings, at-sea monitoring, and catch shares and sectors.
For decades, fishermen have been protesting regulations on how bycatch is dealt with and
whether it counts against quotas or leads to discards of dead fish that could have sold on the
market and are now dead anyway. Stocks with low quotas become “choke species.” When quota
is reached and fishing stops for a choke species, fishermen whose gear type is capable of
catching the choke species must also stop fishing. This is particularly frustrating for groundfish
fishermen because otter trawls collect many different groundfish together and if you cannot catch
anymore cod, you cannot go after your yellowtail quota.
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These are arguments made by fishermen at every Council meeting and in public comments. Some media stories covering these
critiques of the management system include: Documentary: Truth: Fishing Crisis or Government Mismanagement?;
Massachusetts fishermen fear new rules smothering industry, SEAN HORGAN, Gloucester Times | 01.17.16 | 3:52 PM;
Fishermen walk out of Fisheries Management Council meeting, Frank Mand, October 06. 2015 3:06PM; Cost of Outdated
Rules? Millions of Dead Fish, Editorial, Hartford Courant, September 20, 2014; New Bedford fishermen face 'devastating' cod
cut, Mike Lawrence, Mar 22, 2016 at 7:24 PM
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The regulatory mechanism of designating Closed Areas (to fishing) is also critiqued for being
disconnected from the realities of fishing. Some claim that the seasonal closings do not always
match the correct timing of spawning or nursery periods, so they do not protect the young and
limit fishermen to the wrong times for optimal harvest. Spawning and nursery times may change
from year to year or long term with climate change. Also, fishermen have had to go very far to
traverse the closed areas to get to other fishing grounds, wasting gas and time and putting the
fishermen’s safety at risk. Conservations have argued that Closed Areas are hard to enforce and
therefore, there tends to be abundant poaching in these areas. 92
Cost of Monitoring
Another contentious issue related to sector management is the level of observation and
monitoring that is needed to enforce a quota system. Regulations that are not enforceable due to
cost plague management bodies. Without at-sea monitoring, regulations based on equipment
modifications like mesh sizes and adjustments like turtle releasers are hard to enforce and require
operations by the Coast Guard. Onboard scientific observers and technicians are expensive, and
although the federal government has funded the program, the at-sea-monitoring expense was
almost shifted to the fishermen in 2017 before NOAA secured funds to continue covering the
cost. It is estimated that is costs about $700 a day for fishermen to pay for at-sea observers and
they argue that would put them out of business.93 Pilot programs are testing a move to electronic
monitoring to replace observers and reduce costs, but the "big brother" feel has made many
fishermen uncomfortable and they have argued that the process will cost them time and labor.
The monitoring regulations are also seen as a huge financial and time burden on the fishermen
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Three individuals whom I spoke with who dive in New England waters said that they have seen recently destroyed coral in
closed areas with their own eyes.
93
When NOAA first announced that they would no longer fund the monitoring, the fishermen erupted. In the documentary
Sacred Cod, fishermen David Geothel says that he believes NOAA lies about not having the money to pay for monitoring. He
suggests that NOAA fire some scientists so the fishermen can keep their jobs.
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who claim that they are not necessary and could be replaced by dockside monitoring. The
NEFSC researchers counter that observer bias occurs if you don't observe every boat trip, that
misses illegal fishing going on during the trips that don't have an observer. There is a complex
calculus to figure out the needed amount of monitor coverage, and discussions at NOAA and
NEFMC have occurred to see if it could be reduced while still statistically doing what it needs to
do, but there are environmental groups who say there needs to be 100% coverage, not less.
Sector Catch Shares and Consolidation and Exclusion
The NEFMC is critiqued for how it handles sector quotas that have led to consolidation
through privileging larger operations. The mandate for a catch share system was introduced in
the 2006 MSA reauthorization and sector catch share program was implemented in New England
in 2012, replacing a Days at Sea management. It is an "enclosure" or privatization mechanism
meant to address the tragedy of the commons situation of overfishing. There is a difference in
input controls (control fishing effort not fish mortality) and output controls (like TACs). Input
controls lead to race to fish and overcapitalization of gear and technology, but output controls
can, too, in order for fishermen to get their largest share of the fish before TAC is reached and
fishery closes. Both can actually cause market gluts and lead to reduced prices and revenue. In
theory, property-rights based fishing were designed to address these problems.94
Sector management is based on Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQ) that were implemented in
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Sector management, while a type of catch share program, is differentiated from individually transferable quota (ITQ) systems
and has more of a community-based management connotation. Sector management is referred to as a harvest cooperative. Catch
quotas are still set by the process of interaction between the NMFS and the Science and Statistical Committee of the NEFMC, but
the means for distributing the quota is in the hands of groups of fishermen who choose to join together to form a sector based on
their target species, or gear type, or port, or fishing locations. Each person who joins the sector brings a certain number of permits
into the sector pool based on their historical catches. The sector agrees how the pool of permits will be divvied up; in many cases,
fishermen get the number of permits they brought to the sector in the first place. However, the fishermen in the sector can trade
between each other and, sometimes sectors can trade permits between each other. The idea is that there is more independence and
responsibility in the hands of the fishermen themselves to decide how to distribute the quota. The voluntary nature of joining a
sector is overstated because the only other option is to be part of a common pool group that receives very reduced quota limits
and still has to be distributed between everyone that is not in a sector. Therefore, almost all groundfish fishermen in New
England are in a sector.
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the Pacific Northwest which were notably successful in addressing "the race to fish" caused by a
Days-at-Sea management fiasco for halibut.95 Although this success story encouraged many that
the bioeconomic theory of market-based catch share management schemes like IFQs were good
for reversing declining fish stocks,96 there was actually a federal moratorium on these types of
systems in the early 2000s because they were shown to reduce fleet sizes and consolidate permits
and fishing in the hands of bigger operations with more capital. However, the NEFMC was
desperate to come up with a new management strategy as they were watching the rapid decline in
groundfish stocks through the 1990s and into the 2000s. Amendment 13, the Council's response
to the Conservation Law Foundation lawsuit claiming that not enough was being done to protect
and rebuild groundfish stocks, set the stage for a movement from Days-at-Sea (DAS), which
encouraged a race to fish, concentrated inshore fishing, and led to a nightmare of discarding huge
amounts of dead groundfish overboard when the daily limit was reached. It was the MagnusonStevens Reauthorization Act of 2006 that encouraged catch shares as a conservation measure.
The NEFMC's Amendment 16 is what laid out the structure for the groundfish sector
management program. It was approved in January of 2012 and the sector program began.
New England’s catch system by sector forms another level of bureaucracy where sector
leaders and meetings and permits have to be distributed, rented, leased, resold. Groundfish FMP
Amendment 18, in effect in 2018, attempts to address the consolidation by regulating how many
permits individual owners can own because this system seems to benefit abundant capital and
access, even though complaints against the amendment say that it redistributes historical family
holdings. Consolidation has been a hot topic and “greedy fisherman” Carlos Rafael was a good
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There are other examples (usually given from the Northwest Pacific fisheries region) where Individual Fishing Quota programs
(IFQs) and catch shares are successful. The Pacific Whiting and Pollack cooperatives served as a successful case-study used to
support this cooperative harvesting scheme.
96
See (Costello et al., 2008)
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example of this happening. The need for capital is still a big difficulty despite the reduction of
the problem of the race to fish. One issue is the ability to buy up permits and/or to lease them out
to others, making a profit because you were able to provide the capital in the first place. A recent
statistical analysis found that groundfish fleet diversity did not diminish during the post-2012
period of the sector management (Thunberg & Correia, 2015). However, a more comprehensive
review of the sector catch share system began in 2019.
Large-scale surveys of fishermen indicate that their experiences and responses are very
mixed with this system. Some claim to be better off than with days at sea while others worse off.
Some feel they had absolutely no choice in this and regret being told that it puts management
into their own hands.97 Some accuse the NMFS director at the time, Jane Lubchenco, with
advancing the viewpoint of ENGOs like Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 98 and PEW
Charitable Trusts and plotting to shut down fishing and put fishermen out of business. Local,
State and Federal politicians for New England tend to side against sector management because it
is linked to job losses.

3.5 The Scientists and their Associations: Institutionalized Incompetency and Political Agendas
Blame for the groundfish crisis is assigned to issues of institutionalized incompetency at
the governmental science centers under NOAA’s purview, Northeast Fisheries Science Center
(NEFSC) and the Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office (GARFO). Other areas that are
criticized under the larger umbrella of “bad science” include 1) the perception of scientists as
97

The Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance (NAMA) is an organization that seeks a larger voice in management for communitybased fishermen as distinct from "factory fishing operations," privatization of the ocean, and government-led fisheries
management. In October 2015, they organized a protest against consolidation caused by catch shares at a fisheries management
meeting, complete with bright orange "Who Fishes Matters" tee shirts and an ex-football star for press. Their press release
warned that the New England catch share program "is teetering toward a corporate model where fish quota – similar to Wall
Street stocks – can be bought, sold and traded at high value." They argued that since the sector catch share system was initiated,
larger ships have moved closer to shore, "where their scale exceeds the capacity of local ocean ecosystems."
98
Lubchenco previously worked at EDF.
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out-of-touch for setting research agendas that do not address the issues that the fishermen need,
2) infighting between factions of scientists who describe and analyze the fishery in very different
ways and disagree on the fundamental status of the fishery, and 3) barriers within the
governmental fisheries science organizations that prevent the population dynamics, ecosystem,
and social science branches from working on problems together.
3.5.1 Stock Assessment Problems
The stock assessments that are used to set quotas are challenged by managers, fishermen, and
industry representatives as inaccurate due to problematic sampling methods, contested statistical
tests, and corrections applied to the modeled output due to a retrospective error. Some argue that
the "crisis" is a product of scientific inaccuracies and uncertainties, not overfishing and degraded
environments. Many claim that scientific errors in the stock assessments underrepresent the
actual fish stock populations.
One frequently repeated critique is that the NEFSC surveys use poor sampling methodology
and are therefore incorrect; the stock assessment modeling is based on “garbage” and therefore
the results are “garbage.” Additionally, recent modeling results have a significant retrospective
error that the scientists must use mathematical corrections for. Fishermen and industry
representatives argue that this shows that the model results are also bad, making the stock
assessments and everything that is based on them, wrong. Fisherman are asked about their
knowledge of the state of the stocks to address some of the uncertainty, but they feel that their
information is undervalued or completely ignored. Industry cooperative research is aimed at
addressing this issue, but some argue that it still makes the fishermen do studies in ways that
scientists’ design them without including the ideas, experiences, and observations in the way the
fishermen want them included. For example, when fishermen insist that they are catching large
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numbers of cod, this information is ignored in the assessment of the stock size because it does
not follow survey methodology.99
Many conservation scientists and ENGO representatives argue the scientists are modeling
with too much uncertainty and are using underdetermined data to understand the stocks and their
ecosystem relationships. Arguments emphasizing the underrepresentation of the ecological
component contend that the single-species stock assessment system does not include information
about how the populations are affected by their environment, how populations interact with other
species in their ecosystems, or the feedbacks that occur. Even trophic relationships are only
investigated when they bring the different fisheries in conflict with one another such as herring,
tuna, and cod interactions where two fisheries a decreased harvest of herring to ensure that the
tuna and cod have enough prey.
3.5.2 Political “Natural Science”
Some claim that the scientific contribution to fisheries management is highly biased against
the fishing industry and that too many political agendas are driving the research. The most heated
accusations include that fisheries scientists report worst-case scenarios to ensure their stable,
high-paying jobs, or that they are radical environmentalists who would like to see the cessation
of the fishing industry, or that they are ideological liberals who support authoritarian government
regulation. The government scientists are depicted in opposition to freedom-loving, blue-collar,
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In 2015, Captain Terry Alexander, a Maine fisherman and NEFMC Council Member, took NOAA Regional Administrator
John Bullard out fishing for groundfish off the port of Provincetown off Cape Cod, to demonstrate the availability of cod despite
the low stock assessments. Bullard described this experience at the NEFMC meeting on September 29, 2015: [Captain] Terry
Alexander put 1,000 pounds on my shoes, his quota was 750. He had to lease rest; He paid $450, and he would earn $250. He
said he had hoped not to get so much. But in 45 minutes, he got more than his year’s share of allocation in one tow.” Bullard was
emotional during his presentation and said that he “learned there are a lot of cod, and that fishermen are experts who know how
to find them.” He lamented that he “was really sad [when] it was over and wouldn’t see [the fishermen he bonded with during the
trip] anymore.” While Bullard’s photographs of heaping piles of cod caught certainly gave credence to the existence of localized
abundance, this experience does not negate the interpretations or conclusions of NOAA’s stock assessments and therefore was
not considered valid data for determination of regional stock population abundance.
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family businessmen who challenge their elite privilege and worldviews. They are ridiculed for
only knowing about fisheries from what they read in books and or learn in their environmentally
biased educational institutions, and not through experience. The scientists are said to have all the
power and are ruining it for the average local guy, whom they look down on for being less
educated and choosing an outmoded way of life.
The media and public record are full of examples of people saying that NOAA and
NEFSC are not doing a good enough job and have hidden ideologies at work that are keeping
them from doing a better job. Political leaders who are outspoken about questioning the validity
of science and NOAA's concern for the fishing communities include Massachusetts U.S.
Senators Warren and Markey,100 who wrote a scathing letter to NOAA in January 2015, and
Governor Charlie Baker of Massachusetts, who champions alternative stock assessment
methodology developed by non-government scientists.
Several prominent fisheries scientists publicly challenge what they see as NOAA’s large role
in creating misleading narratives of overfishing. Although scientists’ disagreements generally
take a respectful and professional tone at meetings and in personal communication, there is an
undercurrent of tension that is amplified by fishermen who align themselves with scientists who
find fault in NOAA’s domination of the fisheries science contribution and the groundfish crisis
narrative. Dr. Doug Butterworth (Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town) was deeply
involved in a conflict with population dynamics scientists at the NEFSC around 2012 when, as a
scientist representing industry perspectives,101 he promoted his alternative stock assessment
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Sens. Warren and Markey wrote a letter to NOAA Administrator Kathryn Sullivan dated January 5, 2015, that challenged the
science behind the cod stock assessments. Governor Charlie Barker criticized NOAA for not using SMAST’s alternative stock
assessment methods and initiated a separate survey run by Massachusetts. The survey found the same depleted stocks as the
NEFSC.
101
He participated in the science discussions for management on behalf of the Northeast Seafood Coalition and the Associated
Fisheries of Maine.
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model employing dome-shaped selectivity which assumes that the large, reproductive-aged cod
evade capture by fishermen, and factors their presumptive existence into the models for stock
size estimates. His model, which increased stock estimates by nearly 40%, did not override
NOAA’s assessments, but he did get the attention of numerous politicians and sow the seeds of
doubt over the validity of the Science Center’s models.102
Locally, several scientists at the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth in the School of
Marine Science and Technology (SMAST) are viewed by fishermen and industry as providing
superior scientific information to the NEFMC that fishermen believe is ignored or overridden in
favor of research and interpretations by NOAA scientists. Dr. Kevin Stokesbury, named the 2018
SouthCoast Man of the Year103 by the newspaper SouthCoast Today, is another respected and
prolific fisheries researcher from SMAST who developed alternative groundfish surveys that
fishermen argue NOAA resists because they do not want to accept that their surveys are missing
significant population numbers. Dr. Stokesbury developed a camera system to survey scallops on
the ocean bottom that found the populations to be healthy and set the stage for the economic
boom in the scallop fishery; many fishermen hope his alternative (to NOAA’s) methodology for
the groundfish survey will result in the same trajectory for groundfish. Several ecologists
explained to me that while Dr. Stokesbury’s work meets scientific standards for research and
provides valuable insight, they argue that he neglects more inclusive and integrated ways of
observing the ecosystem which gives him a different, more narrow perspective and that they
cannot support his more sweeping interpretations.104 In 2012, an online petition circulated by
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Dr. Butterworth was an early proponent of the “management procedure approach” to address uncertainties in fisheries
management which has evolved into the concept of Management Strategy Evaluation, which is making its way into
implementation strategies for Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management.
103
Dr. Butterworth was given the award for his work developing the new technique for scallop surveys. The 2018 SouthCoast
Woman of the Year was awarded to Cassie Canastra of BASE Seafood auction, for playing “an integral role in ending NOAA’s
groundfishing ban [on boats associated with non-jailed Carlos Rafael].”
104
In 2017, Dr. Stokesbury published a research report testifying that the illegal fishing activity of Carlos Rafael was not
significant enough to affect the groundfish stock assessment models.
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fishermen to have him replace Dr. Jane Lubechenco105 who was stepping down as the
Administrator of NOAA.
Dr. Brian Rothschild, who was inducted into the Boston Seafood Hall of Fame in 2015, is
retired from his active role at SMAST, but still continues to be a central figure in this
“opposition.” In 2012, Dr. Rothschild was removed as co-chair of the Marine Fisheries Institute
he founded at U Mass Dartmouth and many saw this as political retaliation for outspokenness106.
He was a strong critic of the NEFMC’s implementation of catch shares, and in 2011 and 2015, he
published editorials about what he saw as changes need to the MSA reauthorization to prevent
NOAA from interpreting the law in ways that he suggested created unnecessary obstacles to
optimal fishing. Dr. Rothschild was the former president and CEO of, and is now a board
member of, the Center for Sustainable Fisheries (http://centerforsustainablefisheries.org). The
organization’s website publishes many articles criticizing the science at the NEFSC and serves as
an outlet for industry perspectives that challenge government-led fisheries science.
3.5.3 Barriers to interdisciplinary workflow within NOAA
NOAA fisheries is a behemoth and even the regional Northeast Atlantic division is a
complicated scientific bureaucracy. There are many departments that are run in, what some
consider, isolated towers with their own leaders, budgets, research plans, and internal dynamics.
This can lead to intradepartmental competition for money, staffing, status, and even research
assignments. It can also lead to lack of communication between groups that are working on
aspects of the same problem. I have heard both in management meetings and in my interviews
that when management makes requests for data from NEFSC, there is sometimes no budget for a
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Dr. Lubchenco was considered (negatively) to be an overreaching environmentalist by some fishermen. In blogs and online
comments, she was pejoratively called names like Calamity Jane and Lube Job Jane by those who disapproved of her tenure.
106
Fisherynation Editorial – The Political Purging of Dr. Brian Rothschild. What is the Real Reason?, December 17, 2012
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new undertaking or no labor time available to do it.107 This means that resources and labor have
to be redistributed sometimes which can be very disruptive if it is even possible. If it can be
done, there is not a quick means to make these changes. Inter-departmental collaborations are
usually the spearheaded by individuals who take the initiative to expand their primary work and
need the expertise of others, if they are lucky to have the time.
The social sciences departments are the NEFSC are housed about ten-minute drive away
from the population biologists and ecosystems groups, and it was suggested to me by both
scientists and social scientists that they do not have much opportunity to interact and learn from
one another. The social scientists and economists who contribute information to bioeconomic
models can offer quantitative data that can be paired with the quantitative biological and
ecological data. But, although there are a couple anthropologists a the NEFSC, it is difficult to
bring their qualitative understanding to the management arena were their more quantitative
sociological data based on surveys and economic analysis is what is requested.
3.6 Environmental organizations and activists and their Associations: Tales of Elitist,
Uninformed Utopianism and Media Attention
Environmental or conservation non-governmental organizations democratically engage the
fisheries science and management in New England as representatives of the local, national, and
international concerned public. Employees of these organizations serve on the NEFMC Council
and on Advisory Panels of the Council’s fishery sub-committees. They also have a significant
presence at all of the Council and committee meetings and, at the Council meetings are often the
non-Council members in attendance who come to the microphone when they are permitted to
speak. The big national ENGOs that regularly attend the NEFMC meetings include Oceana,
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For example, population biologists say that they have no time to work with ecosystems modelers.
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Earth Justice, Environmental Defense Fund108, The Nature Conservancy, and Pew Charitable
Trust. These representatives are skilled at closely recording the proceedings at the meetings,
writing blogs and press releases, speaking at the meetings, and in some cases, prosecuting cases
against NOAA and the NEFMC when it is determined that they have legal recourse for a
decision that they feel is not meeting conservation mandates. Their organizations also provide
scientific and other types of information to the Council through research publications, written
correspondence, and meeting with PDT members. Their collective agenda is to prioritize that
conservation of fishing habitats and biodiversity, and are regularly described by stakeholders and
the media as proposing restrictive regulations that address conservation and stock rehabilitation
with no consideration for adverse economic impacts.
Some accuse the ENGO’s of being ignorant utopianists, commenting that they do not actually
represent the public at-large, but are instead elitists with an overly romanticized view of "nature.”
The ENGO representatives argue that they are deeply involved in observing the fisheries
management processes and intimately involved in the scientific literature and research of the
local area and represented the legally-mandated conservation agenda. The ENGOs often solicit
and present long lists of signatures as evidence that they are representing a large and broad
population of stakeholders -- the general public who is concerned about our common fisheries
and ocean resources. Some argue that these signatures are valid like those from stakeholders who
are more closely involved in economic gain from the fisheries. One ENGO representative
complained about a group of researchers not counting a significant number of public comments
in a tally for the Council because the researchers felt they did not deserve full vested value as
108

Although conservation is the common thread between the organizations, the Environmental Defense Fund stands out because
they were so heavily involved in development of the catch share system in place, senior marine scientist at EDF Jake Kritzer was
the chair of the Science and Statistical Committee of the NEFMC from 2013-2016. EDF was criticized by some for pushing
neoliberal economics’ sustainable development paradigm to get the sector quota system going.
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stakeholders. The reasoning offered for this decision to reduce the value of the ENGO signatures
was that the ENGO comments were from non-local public and mimicked the rhetoric of the
ENGO statements; however, individually counting each comment of each fisherman was deemed
acceptable, even if the comment also reproduced the text and/or rhetoric of local fishery
advocacy non-profits.
3.6.1 Lawsuits Driving Priorities
High-profile ENGO representatives are often lawyers and their tool of last resort is a
lawsuit against the NEFMC and NOAA for not meeting the stipulations of the MagnusonStevens Act or National Standards. The Council must treat these lawsuits seriously and priority is
often given to projects that address the lawsuit needs. Lawsuits are an effective way to influence
Council decisions. Some argue that ENGO lawsuits hinder any real, non-reactive work from
getting done because so much labor and financial resources are used on them. When
Conservation Law Foundation's Peter Shelley speaks109, he is met by both groans and applauds
as a fly in the ointment. The fishermen consider him an enemy and the Council members worry
that he will commandeer the Council’s priorities through lawsuits that must be addressed.
Additionally, his group has the funds to make and distribute powerful videos that show the
viewer underwater coral and kelp environments to affect their view of the fishery as a place that
needs protection from exploitation.
3.6.2 ENGO Political Sway at National Level
Fishermen, some Council members, and other stakeholders complained bitterly about the
ENGOs influence on the Obama's administration’s use of the Antiquities act to designate several
canyons and seamounts in New England as a national marine monument. Although Cache's
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This is rare these days. He comes out for bigger events where there is press coverage.
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Ledge, a highly productive groundfish habitat, was a key priority for the ENGOs to get added to
the area of marine monument designation, there was enough argument by the Council and
politicians to keep this area from the official designation. In the deep canyons area, the
significant fishery that is affected is the relatively small red crab fishery. The lobster and clam
fishermen in the region have been given seven years to get out of the area. The biggest problem
with this designation seems to be that the Council feels like the National government should stay
out of their regional management jurisdiction. The arguments of the fishermen also seem to have
more to do with being, by definition, anti-government regulation, again because it reduces their
rights to catch fish. But, at the big Providence townhall on the monument in September 2015,
most ENGOs and university environmental academics were for the monument, while the
Council, fishermen, industry, and some fisheries science academics argued that this was a case of
government overreach in an area where they had no expertise or jurisdiction. Several ENGO
representatives I spoke to about the National Monument issue derided the characterization as
“government overreach” as simply repeated anti-environmental political soundbites or talking
points against federal conservation efforts.

3.7 Environmental actants and their associations: Climate Change, “Natural” Predators,
Disrupted Habitats, and Territorial Competition
The environment – in practice, actants that cannot be regulated by fisheries managers – is
also blamed for playing a significant role in the construction of the groundfish crisis. Alternating
cod booms and busts in the North Atlantic have been recorded for centuries before technological
advances allowed for high volume harvests. There are several habitat factors that make
groundfish, and cod populations in particular, vulnerable or unpredictable. Migratory groundfish
live in sensitive ocean bottom environments that are often characterized as high energy, making
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it difficult to assess their population numbers, and spawning and nursery habits110 and habitats.
Climate change, predators, struggling whale populations, habitats, and alternative energy are all
actants that contribute to and modify the actor-network and play a role in the success or failure of
the fishery.
3.7.1 Climate Change
New Englanders are having discussions about how local and regional changes in the
temperature, currents, salinity, and acidity are occurring in the ocean locally and how these
changes are affecting its fisheries and fisheries management. Due to excess heat retained in the
troposphere by increased anthropogenic greenhouse gases, atmospheric and oceanic energetic
and physical changes are resulting in the slowing down of the Atlantic Meridional Oscillation
Current which is causing warm Gulf Stream current to shift. Scientists hypothesize that these
changes are presently affecting fish migration. The northwestern Atlantic is seeing some of the
fastest warming and sea level rise in the world (Church & White, 2011). Some scientists argue
that temperature changes are already having negative effects on Gulf of Maine cod (Pershing et
al., 2015).111 Lobsters are no longer thriving in southern New England and the GOM shrimp are
disappearing due to increasing water temperature (Howell, 2012). Other species from the south
are moving into the region.112 Several species are moving north up the Atlantic coast in response
to warming waters (M. Hudson & Peros, 2013). Fishermen are expressing concern that the black
sea bass they are now catching in the Gulf of Maine could occupy the niche of voracious
predators of cod eggs. The recent recovery of cod populations off Newfoundland has some
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Age recruitment models which are used for stock assessments may be inaccurate.
Laurie Schreiber, , Volume 19, No. 4, “Southern Species Migrating North as Climate Changes,”; GMRI Blog, “Gulf of Maine,
Explained: The Warming Gulf of Maine, Feb 14, 2018; Colin Woodard, Portland Press Herald, “Deep current of record-breaking
warm water causes concerns for the Gulf of Maine, Apr 24, 2018; GMRI Press Release “Amid ‘Ocean Heatwave’ Gulf of Maine
Experiences Record Temperatures” Aug 30, 2018.
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Species migrating north to New England waters include: red hake, squid, turbot, black sea bass, Chesapeake blue crabs, cobia,
garfish, spots, croakers, mahi-mahi, tilefish, blue fish, stingrays, and skates (Hare et al., 2016; NOAA Fisheries, 2016; Schreiber,
2014).
111
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asking weather cod are also migrating north. Studies of North Sea species suggest that some fish
are moving to greater depths to get to cooler waters (Dulvy et al., 2008) and that fish may get
smaller as water temperatures show a long-term increase (Baudron et al., 2014). Regional
salinity changes are attributed to shifting precipitation patterns, and if Greenland continues to
melt as fast as it is or faster, this could decrease the North Atlantic salinity further (Greene et al.,
2008). Rising ocean acidity from the formation of carbonic acid from increased levels of
dissolved carbon dioxide in the water transferred from the atmosphere, has the potential to
dissolve species that have calcium carbonate shells and tissues that are sensitive to acid like gills.
Decadal climate shifts also may be responsible for some of the changes in stock
populations and locations. The North Atlantic Oscillation (NOA), like the El Niño Southern
Oscillation (ENSO), is a long-distance air pressure differential change that affects ocean currents
and temperatures globally. The NOA temporal signal is about 50-60-year periodicity. Cod stocks
are likely affected by this, along with what they eat and what eats them (Meng et al., 2016).
Research illuminating the cyclicity of this phenomenon is relatively recent, but the booms and
busts of other fish relative to these phenomenon have been recorded for other species including
tuna abundance or scarcity matching the changes in ENSO and the related Pacific Decadal
Oscillation (PDO) (Lehodey et al., 2003) and herring and sardines matching the NAO periodicity
(Alheit & Hagen, 1997). Some scientists speculate that long-term climate change is affecting the
frequency and amplitude of the NAO shifts, which adds another factor of uncertainty to the
management efforts to set effective catch limits for optimal yield and rebuilding and
conservation goals.
3.7.2 Saved Bays: Return of the Predators and Endangered Species
New England, in areas like Chatham in Cape Cod, has recently seen a boom in large
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predators such as harbor and grey seals and great white sharks that eat seals. The return of large
predators is usually seen as a positive outcome by conservationists because it indicates the toxic
material and chemical waste and decimated habitats that originally caused their demise have
been reduced or eliminated and signals a return to an abundance of healthy and nutritious food
for them to eat. However, at one fisheries meeting, there was a brief, but serious discussion of
considering regulations allowing the culling of seals if it seemed like they were responsible for
eating all of the juvenile and reproducing fish. The rise in spiny dog fish sharks is another recent
change in the community dynamics that may not bode well for healthy groundfish populations.
While fishermen off Cape Cod have recently shifted to fishing for spiny dogfish, many fishermen
blame them for eating all the cod and complain about the great difficulty of handling them due to
their painful spines.113 The Council and committee members often made jokes about these
species - they are spiny and some local New England chefs claim that they do not taste good.114
Several species of whales migrate along the coast of New England including humpback,
finback, minke, pilot, and North Atlantic right whiles. Recently, a considerable number of right
whale deaths in the northwest Atlantic have led to the development of protective measures by
NOAA. The North Atlantic right whale is listed as endangered on the IUCN Red List, with only
400 individuals left who migrate up and down the east coast of North America from Florida to
the Gulf of St. Lawrence in Canada. Only 85 are reproductively active females, and their
reproductive rates have been slowing down, likely due to stress from long-term entanglements in
fishing lines and nets. More than 85 percent of North Atlantic right whales have been entangled
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A recent news story reported about a fisherman who was impaled by a spiny dogfish fin and had to be rushed to the hospital
(Sean Horgan, Danvers fisherman impaled by shark's fin, Salem News, Jul 12, 2016;
https://www.salemnews.com/news/local_news/danvers-fisherman-impaled-by-shark-s-fin/article_563d3deb-1849-5896-8eba3e954ef2d801.html)
114
One of the chefs in the New Bedford Waterfront Festival cooking demonstration was extremely negative about their taste even
as the fisherman organizations sponsors, NAMA, were trying to promote them. Cape Cod fishermen, who have begun to catch
more dogfish and market them as “cape shark,” as their other catch targets wane, express frustration that NEFMC members have
mocked dogfish as low quality seafood during meetings and at other fisheries-related events.
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at least once, and about 60 percent have been multiple times. Fishing gear entanglements account
for over 80% of right whale deaths, with ship strikes accounting for most of the rest (NMFS,
2020).115
Right whales prefer proximal coastal waters also making them susceptible to ship strikes.
In 2008, NOAA created seasonal management areas (SMAs), where vessels over 65 feet have a
speed limit of 10 knots or less during the active calving and migration periods in areas of known
right whale distribution and high vessel traffic. However, since then, right whale habitat and
distribution has changed. For example, right whales only recently started foraging south of
Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard,116 a productive fishing area. Dynamic Management Areas
(DMA) with voluntary speed restrictions are now designated for 15 days when three or more
right whales are sighted in close proximity to each other in areas not already designated as
SMAs.
NOAA has responded to the dangers of entanglement in fishing ropes by creating fishing
regulations including gear modifications, such as using lines with low breaking strength during
calving season, and seasonal fishery closures. Most of the entanglements in gear are due to ropes
from lobster and crab traps, but some are due to gillnets used to catch groundfish. Entangled
whales can tow fishing gear for hundreds of miles. Ropeless gear is in the research and
development phase, but it must come with assurances that it will not increase ghost gear left in
the water.117 2017 was an especially bad year for right whales; 17 right whales were killed by
fishing gear entanglement or collisions with ships, including fishing vessels. NMFS determined
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NOAA also found that the use of seismic air guns in the Atlantic Ocean for oil exploration and drilling threatens whales’
survival, but this has been rejected by the Trump Administration who has asked NOAA to change their official conclusions
(Holzman, 2020).
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A 19-year-old female right whale who has given birth three times had a buoy stuck in the right side of her mouth 45 miles
south of Nantucket in March 2020.
117
Abandoned lobster traps litter the seafloor bottom because there is no enforcement to ensure their removal.
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that U.S. fishermen must try to reduce the risk to right whales by 50 percent, specifically
targeting a 50% reduction in the number of vertical lines that connect lobster traps to surface
buoys in Maine118.
The lobster fishery, with the support of Maine’s politicians is fighting this the proposed
reductions for the lobster fishery (Rappaport, 2019). NMFS created by a task force called the
Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Team (TRT) made up of fishermen, scientists, fisheries
managers from Atlantic coastal states, and conservation organization representatives. The Maine
representatives on the TRT are protesting the policy decision support took created by the group
because they say it has not been properly peer reviewed. Maine’s Gov. Mills, U.S. Sen. Collins
and U.S. Reps. Golden and Pingree and members of the Maine legislature have all argued that
the NOAA regulations make fishing more dangerous, without helping the whales. Opponents of
the new rules are citing University of Maine professor Jeffrey Runge whose research indicates
that right whales no longer migrate through the Gulf of Maine because warming waters due to
climate change have eliminated the copepods they eat (Rappaport, 2020). Rep. Golden
introduced an amendment in Congress to prevent NOAA from using the “untested” decision
support tool to assess the risk that fishing gear poses to whales.
3.7.3 Spatial Competition: Wind Energy and other Coastal Projects
The seafood industry is not the only contender for rights to coastal space and resources,
and as other industries compete for a bigger slice of the economic development pie, New
England fisheries are feeling challenged. Offshore wind power, shellfish aquaculture, coastal
recreation, and whale watching are seen as more environmentally sustainable industries than
groundfish fishing. Even as sea level is rising, new condominium projects are being developed

118

NOAA secured $1.6 million of additional funding to help the New England lobster industry comply with these measures.
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among waterfront wharfs in port cities like Portland, ME and Boston, MA. From salmon to
oyster and clam to sea vegetable (kelp) “farms,” aquaculture is a growing industry in the region.
Aquaculture associations are launching video and media campaigns to get the support of
politicians for development rights and combating negative accusations by traditional fisheries
and some conservation groups.
Wind power is currently seen as the biggest threat to fishing of these coastal sectors. The
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), the federal agency overseeing leases for coast
wind projects, has met significant resistance from NMFS and NOAA who would not endorse
their initial Environmental Impact Assessment for the highly contested Ørsted’s Vinyard Wind
Project. BOEM has since created an Intergovernmental Task Force and several other initiatives
have started throughout New England to more thoroughly investigate how wind power will
interact with marine ecosystem and socio-economic status of fisheries across the region. NMFS,
in conjunction with university scientists, has launched a 3-year study of the effects of proposed
turbine arrays on cod and other commercial fish stocks, specifically looking at how disturbances
may negatively affect spawning (Moore, 2020). In response to dozens of wind projects in
different stages along the East Coast of the U.S., coalitions such as the Responsible Offshore
Development Alliance (RODA) and Anglers for Offshore Wind Power (recreational fisheries)
have formed to represent fishing communities in the negotiations of these projects. RODA has
requested that federal authorities create 4 nautical-mile lanes between turbines, which is far
greater than the planned 1-mile spaced arrays proposed by wind developers (Barnes, 2020).
Fishing communities argue that while construction of the wind turbines will initially provide
jobs, the region will lose these jobs after they are built. Additionally, several of the companies
who have secured leases for the wind projects are not American-owned, which frustrates local
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businesses. Despite President Trump’s notorious mocking of wind energy, a five-fold increase in
the federal renewable energy budget is in the works for BOEM. Additionally, the Trump
Administration’s rollbacks of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) protections and
dismissal of NOAA’s warnings about negative effects of seismic testing on fish, squids, and
whales for siting wind and oil platforms, is paving the way for the offshore wind projects to
continue (Brugger, 2020).

3.8 Analysis of the Performation of the Groundfish Crisis
The descriptions of conflict and blame in the groundfish fishery provides a tangible sense of
the everyday discourse that the groundfish crisis is situated in and continually arises from. Table
3.3 summarizes the fishery crisis discourse identifying where blame is placed and how each
group of actants is considered a significant contributor to the problems the New England fishery
faces. Several questions arise when reviewing this table: Could the New England groundfish
fisheries crisis (or maybe non-crisis) be a result of all of the simultaneous factors explained in the
academic literature and management and public discourses above? If so, is it possible to address
so many causes with one unproven management strategy focused on ecosystem dynamics?
Would it be even be possible to say how the hope of EBFM addresses each of these areas?
Table 3.3 is not useful to view as list of factors that are causing the groundfish fishery to
fail. Instead, this table, suggests that what is seen as the problem and how it is causing or
exacerbating the crisis is dependent on what, when, where, and how an individual or group
participates in the fishery, who they associate with and learn from, what they read and view
about the fishery. In their discussion of debates over the failing North Sea cod fishery, Schwach
et al. conclude, “All players in the field agree that the stock has declined, but not on the causes of
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Table 3.3 Who to blame? A summary of the discourse of blame for the New England groundfish
fishery crisis
Actant and Perceived Actions
Fishermen: acting illegally out of greed,
ignorance/mistrust of scientific assessments
Fishermen: swaying local, state and federal
politicians to support industry over
conservation and economic competition
Fishermen and seafood industry: acting as
“foxes in the henhouse” as managers at
NEFMC
Global seafood market: outcompeting New
England groundfish fishery

Non-profit seafood guidelines and
certification systems: confusing consumers
and discouraging them against eating New
England groundfish
The Magnuson-Stevens Act: being too
vague for clear interpretation and application
The Magnuson-Stevens Act: being too
restrictive and rigid

Government bureaucracy: operating
inefficiently with overlapping jurisdictions,
changing (partisan) agendas, and conflicting
interests between relevant government
agencies
The NEFMC: operating with a polarized
Council membership

Perceived Role in Groundfish Crisis
causes groundfish stock declines due to
overfishing, habitat destruction, bycatch
leads to pressure on the NEFMC and NOAA
to allow lax regulation, overfishing, habitat
destruction, bycatch
causes groundfish stock declines due to
overfishing, habitat destruction, bycatch by
allowing overfishing, habitat destruction,
bycatch
makes it difficult for NE groundfish fishery to
survive in the market and charge prices
needed to be profitable, due to disadvantages
imposed by federal laws and regional quotas,
regulations, monitoring, and enforcement
reduces the market for New England
groundfish and other small-scale fisheries
even if they are highly regulated for
conservation
complicates and compromises decisionmaking by causing conflict between managers
does not allow for timely amendments to
Fisheries Management Plans and
experimental management tactics when
current management strategies are showing
negative outcomes
hamstrings the NEFMC’s abilities to set
priorities that address regional fisheries
concerns and to work quickly, compromising
its efficiency and efficacy

inhibits the Council from setting and focusing
on common goals and objectives, and
preventing information and evidence to be
evaluated fairly, compromising the voting
process
The NEFMC: making decisions without a
results in regulations that are harmful to the
clear and accurate understanding of everyday fishery and fishermen, increasing safety risks,
fishing processes and practices
dead discarded fish, and economic losses
Sector catch share management regime:
makes costs to the fishery too high for
enclosing the commons and privatizing access profitability and consolidates the fleet,
to the fishery
excluding smaller, ostensibly moreresponsible fishermen
125

Actant and Perceived Actions
NOAA Fisheries Scientists: producing
inaccurate stock assessments due to
problematic sampling methods and modeling
errors
NOAA Fisheries Scientists: politicizing and
factionalizing the scientific contributions

Perceived Role in Groundfish Crisis
sets quota too low for fishermen’s economic
survival

ENGOs and Conservationists: bringing
lawsuits against the NEFMC and NOAA and
swaying NOAA scientists and administrators
and federal and state judges to reduce or end
marine fishing
Groundfish: being sensitive to environmental
changes and having historically variable
population dynamics
Climate change: destabilizing the regional
sea temperatures, currents, salinity, and pH
Increase in predatory species populations
(black sea bass, seals, sharks, and whales):
eating groundfish, competing for groundfish
prey, and requiring conservation protections
Other coastal sectors (energy, aquaculture,
recreation and tourism, waterfront
development, shipping): competing against
fisheries for use of the marine environment

causes a loss of trust and cooperation between
scientists and managers and fishermen
hindering their ability to debate, negotiate,
and make management decisions together
highjacking the NEFMC’s priorities and
agenda, making it operate in reactionary mode
and reducing its efficiency and efficacy
making it difficult to manage fishing effort
based on periodic stock assessments
causing groundfish migrations and deaths and
inhibiting fish population growth
causing groundfish stock declines and
disrupting fishing operations for the
protection of whales
causing groundfish stock declines due to
pollution and habitat destruction and losses of
fishing grounds due to competition for marine
space

the decline, the severity of the situation, and on proper remedial actions. The debate is an
example of the complex relationship between scientific knowledge, fishers’ experience, and
politics, and between concerned citizens and stakeholders, uncertainty playing a leading role.
However, the debate does not seem to resolve major issues or to have measurable effects on the
decision-making process.” (Schwach et al., 2007). The question then becomes, how can you
achieve a fisheries debate that does affect decision-making in a way to resolve major issues?
There is no practical way to test (or even be aware of) every possible explanation
provided for a fisheries crisis, or to identify and rank the correctness and importance of all the
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ways that the explanatory actions interact and feedback and come up with one causal narrative
that can be addressed by a simple intervention. Even the interventions become explanations for
causation and interact and feedback with the rest of the “causes.” By itself, the process of
identifying and reducing the problem in the fishery network to set of factors that can be modeled
and tested in scenario analysis has not proved successful for New England groundfish.
Therefore, many agree, it is time to try treating the system as a whole for its ailments.
ANT analysis of the discourse of the fishery network about the groundfish crisis provides
three important insights into the way that the network operates that may encourage the creators
of EBFM in New England to attempt more epistemically inclusive and transdisciplinary
approaches that provide opportunities for experimentation and ANT-inspired socio-ecological
systems theory. These insights may also help to show how, if not why, the modeling of factors
and performance of scenario tests have not been successful in this fishery. The first insight draws
on Annemarie Mol’s (2002) theory of the multiplicity of ontological objects and phenomena. As
long as actants’ opposing explanations are devalued as biased and/or arbitrary viewpoints or
perspectives, rather than being accepted as different understandings “enacted in practices which
produce different realities,” the crisis debate will continue to go nowhere (Christensen, 2009).
The second contribution of ANT analysis of the groundfish fishery finger-pointing is an
examination of the power dynamics operating within the network that reveals both stabilities and
instabilities in the associations and their translations that have potential to affect not only the
form and function of the network in crisis, but also whether or not it continues to survive as the
management regime shifts to EBFM. The third insight arises from ANT analysis of how, through
the groundfish crisis discourse, the fishery network is acting in ways that advance the coherence
of the network and in ways that dissipate the associations of the network. Through arrangements
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and rearrangements and transformations, the groundfish network has continued to cohere in
many different configurations for centuries and if EBFM can offer some hope that it will
continue, it will need to consider how it is cohering and dissipating now.
3.8.1 The multiplicity of the fish and the fishery crisis
In her 2001 study of the North Sea cod fishery, Anne-Sofie Christensen concludes,
“Conflicts in fisheries are thus not just based on different kinds of knowledge or different
perspectives: the object of conflict itself, fisheries, is not unified but multiple.” Table 3.2
succinctly shows that for different actants whose everyday practices produce different realities,
the groundfish crisis is actually a different phenomenon. The regulations and conservation
efforts are not working for the groundfish. The economic market and governmental protections
are not working for the fishermen and industry. The pervasive uncertainty in scientific, cultural,
and economic understanding, which makes it difficult to calculate and debate acceptable risk, is
not working for fishery managers. Mistrust and hostility between factions of scientists,
managers, fishermen, industry, and governmental and non-governmental representatives are
fomented by allegiances to and insistence upon singular conceptualizations of the fishery. Is it
possible to get all parties involved to accept this multiplicity of the crisis, or at least suspend their
insistence on a single crisis narrative, in order to lower the resistance to more adaptive and
experimental approaches to regulations, conservation strategies, economic markets, government
assistance, uncertainty – and risk?
For the time being, the groundfish fishery actor-network is still functioning, tied together
through its associations between actants that are all focused on groundfish. But the groundfish
themselves are multiple. How an actant sees the crisis depends significantly on how the actant
sees the groundfish itself. Everyone may agree that cod is a biological creature that inhabits the
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ocean off New England, but their daily practices are dependent on the fish having more meaning
that that. Is cod an economic resource, the focus of a livelihood, a regional mascot, a hunting
target, food, a predator, a constituent of biodiversity, or an animal with a right to exist regardless
of its usefulness to humans? Of course, it is all of these things, and more, at once. And, each of
these categories for fish are also multiple. This is an obvious place to start to see the
simultaneous multiples that are occurring and existing in this network and it is a useful place to
start identifying common goals for network associations with groundfish. Goals for the fishery
are a long way from implemented management regimes, but acknowledgement of multiplicity
can be most immediately and explicitly useful here, allowing the debate to actually affect the
decision-making.
Based on my observations of the fishery, Table 3.4 is a sketch of the aspects of
multiplicity of fish from the perspectives of different actant groups. Others who observe the
fishery might describe these multiples differently and actants find different meanings for the fish
on an individual basis, but the point of this generalized exercise is to show how following the
discourse about the groundfish makes it apparent that groundfish do not have the same meaning
for everyone or everything associated with it or trying to manage it.
Unsurprisingly, comparing the different groundfish ontologies shows that a few of
the different identities contradict and/or conflict each other, even though the groundfish are
several different things at once. The fish are public goods, private goods, and prey for other
marine organisms. They are stakeholder’s concern, the general public’s concern, and managers
and scientists’ concern. They are economic resources, ecological assets, nutritious food, and a
part of the New England regional identity. They are the source of livelihoods and the objects of
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Table 3.4 The multiplicity of groundfish
Actant
Fishermen
Politicians
Seafood industry
Global seafood market
Non-profit seafood
guidelines
MSA
Government bureaucracy

What are groundfish?
Commodity, private good, focus of livelihood (income, daily
work, identity)
Political issue, food security, constituent concern
Food commodity, livelihood
Market good, trade commodity
Object of conservation effort, public concern

Predators
Climate change

Renewable natural resource for sustainable development
Object that needs public policies to protect as a national
economic resource and environmental asset
Object that needs public policies to protect as a regional
economic resource and environmental asset
Object to be protected though rights to a private good
Object of biological, ecological, or socio-economic study
Object of conservation effort; public good
Living, aging organism that must eat, reproduce, live in
environmental conditions within its range of tolerance, and
avoid predation
Prey (energy and nutrition)
Object responsive to changes in climate conditions

Other coastal sectors

Object of competing and interacting sector’s interests

NEFMC
Sector catch share
NOAA fisheries scientists
ENGOs
Groundfish

conservation efforts. They are commodities and they are biological organisms that need to avoid
predation and harvesting for survival.
Several of the actants - the markets, the “natural” non-human predators, climate change,
other coastal sectors - are either hostile or indifferent to meanings of the fish that do not concern
them. Fortunately for the fish, these actants do not get a direct seat at the decision-making table,
but their actions and associations still must be accounted for. Most of the other actants in this
network have a vested interest in a thriving fish population whether it is seen as public or private
good, economic or ecological asset, food or an animal with rights. Clearly defining goals that
ensure healthy groundfish populations should be straightforward, if not easy. However, without
explicitly acknowledging and defining the multiplicity of the fish during negotiations for priority
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and goal setting, management is not having an easy time stating clear goals and defining terms of
reference for tasks delegated to Council committees.119 Discussing and debating the fish’s
multiples would force negotiations on effectively taboo issues on whether conservation concerns
need to override economic concerns for specific decision, on whether right to fish is guaranteed
or whether economic growth in the fishery is a sustainable strategy and whether there is market
demand for that fishery or not, and other difficult, but necessary conversations and evaluations
that would make decision-making easier further down the process.
3.8.2 An actor-network analysis of power dynamics
Using an actor-network theory lens to understand the power dynamics in the New
England groundfish fishery illuminates how agency is distributed and how actions arise from
“negotiations” between actants in the form of translations.120 This approach does not frame
“society” in a way that locates power with an individual actant who can wield it to cause an
action.121 Instead, it analyzes how a web of actants and associations organizes and stabilizes to
achieve alignment of actants’ interests. Power, or capacity to act, is a result of translations that
enlist and deploy elements in the network. Translation processes in a commercial fishery
network such as New England’s groundfish fishery occur in the work that goes into making the
fishery manageable (Jahn P Johnsen, 2014). “Successful” translations enroll actants to advance
the ideas of particular actants, affecting management decisions and strengthening the
associations of those actants in the network and the network as a whole. Analyzing power
dynamics in the New England groundfish fishery actor-network means observing the translations
119

When the EBFM PDT was tasked with providing advice on setting a control rule for herring considering its important role as
forage fish, they were continually frustrated that the Council would not provide clear goals for the control rule that would help
the PDT research and provide advice.
120
A detailed discussion of an ANT approach to understanding power is in Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.
121
An imperfect but useful analogy: “Wielding power” in Actor-Network Theory considers how the network functions,
investigating “network” as a verb. “Being powerful” considers how the network is a form or “agencement,” investigating
“network” as a noun. Function and form of “power” is co-constitutive in Actor-Network Theory, just as network(ing) and being
a network is co-constitutive.
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that affect management decisions thereby constructing what the network is and what it means –
and whether it is a successful, cohering network or failing, dissipating network.
Strong and enduring associations of more established actants in the network are able to
realize their vision of the network through these types of translations, but they are also
transformed by what they impose on the network themselves. These associations are constantly
transforming and changing resulting in a dynamic flux of power in the network; “overflowing,”
the result of translations that are failing the network, lead to new arrangements of associations
and transformations (Callon, 1998). Associations that maintain network stability longer can be
viewed as evincing more power and finding success in producing effects under the contexts and
circumstances for the time being.
The analysis of power dynamics presented in Tables 3.5 a, b and c are based on
investigation of the functioning of the network between 2015-2020. This period coincides with
development stages of EBFM for New England, and the power dynamics may change
significantly once implementation advances. The categories of greatest, lesser, and least are used
to compare the relative power of network associations through their translations. The “actants”
represent the individuals and groups that make up the institutions in the network along with their
daily practices and technologies related to the fishery. The actants’ interests and positions in the
network are their agendas for fishery management and are related to their experience of
groundfish as described in the groundfish multiplicity Table 3.4. The translations that occur
through the associations of the actants that affecting the construction and cohesion of the
network through management decisions are described in the third column of the table.
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Table 3.5a Power dynamics in the New England fishery network: Greatest capacity to affect
management decisions of actants and their associations through translations
Greatest capacity to affect management decisions through associations and translations
Actants (with Actants’
Translations Affecting
Assessment of Power of
their
Management
Network Construction
Network Associations
practices and Interests and
and Cohesion through
through Translation
technologies) Positions
Management Decisions
(2015-2020)
MagnusonPrevent
Legal framework
MSA renewals are written
Stevens Act
overfishing;
organizes and stabilizes
with primary inputs from
(MSA)
protect national
the network, establishes
NOAA Fisheries as a bill
economic resource durability of the network created by and voted on by
and environmental by requiring all actants to Congress members; once
asset; promote
adhere to its mandates,
the Act is approved by
domestic industry and scripts roles for the
Congress, it bounds what
human actants; broadly
the fishery is and how it
defines permissible
functions
knowledge to construct
the network
NOAA
Uphold MSA and The institution organizes
NMFS must approve all
Fisheries or
other Federal laws and stabilizes the network NEFMC actions as meeting
National
such as the
and establishes durability legal requirements; its
Marine
National
of the network through it leadership is dependent on
Fisheries
Environmental
oversight role of regional appointment by the federal
Service
Policy Act
management and
administration and approval
(NMFS)
Endangered
development of fisheries
by Congress
Species Act,
policy
Marine Mammal
Act
NOAA’s
Provide
Researchers and analysts Scientists’ visions of the
NEFSC
biological,
script roles for actants
fishery and the ways that
scientists and ecological, and
and associations and
they “know” it play the
social
socio-economic
construct operating
primary role in management
scientists and information and
frameworks for the
strategies and decisions;
GARFO
guidance for
fishery through their
subject to MSA, but stable
analysts
successful fishery practices and
and changing paradigms of
that meets MSA
technologies; their
scientists lead the
mandates
scientific understanding
negotiations
disciplines the network
through their models and
representations, research
paradigms, and support of
management mechanisms
and other actions
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NEFMC

Northeast
Multispecies
Fishery
Management
Plan
including
sector catch
share system

Groundfish

Politicians:
Congress and
Executive
Office

Prevent
overfishing;
Protect regional
economic resource
and environmental
asset; promote
regional fisheries
industries

Through negotiations,
voting, creating
regulations, the institution
organizes and stabilizes
the fishery and establishes
durability of the network

Membership makeup and
relationships between
Council members bound
management strategies and
implementation in line with
their interests and
interpretations of the MSA
and with final approval by
NMFS; NEFMC’s
development and
amendment of the Northeast
Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan …
Prevent
The FMP simplifies the
The FMP establishes stock
overfishing;
network through rules for assessments as the primary
manage fair and
management of
tool to determine OFL and
equitable access to groundfish and marketABC, and guidelines for
a public resource
based mechanisms and
ACLs. A mandated
rules distributing fishing
approach in the 2006 MSA
rights and scripts roles for reauthorization, designed by
the fishermen and their
NMFS with input by
associations
(ENGO) EDF, and
implemented by the
NEFMC in 2010, the sector
catch share permit system
regulates how access to
fishing is granted
Protect and
The fish establish
When stock assessments
promote survival
durability because the
find low populations and no
(food, habitat,
entire network is
rebuilding, the MSA
reproduction)
dependent on their
requires management to
survival and thriving
respond
Protect national
Politicians simplify the
Through writing and
economic resource network by promoting it
sponsoring laws for
and environmental as an economic sector
governance of fisheries and
asset; promote
that can be governed
securing federal funding for
domestic industry through Acts from
fisheries crises,
Congress and Executive
Congressional politicians
Orders; roles are scripted shape the network. The
for actants and actants are Executive Administration
enrolled in politicians’
also sets the agenda for
visions
marine planning and
conservation.
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Table 3.5b Power dynamics in the New England fishery network: Lesser capacity to affect
management decisions of actants and their associations through translations
Lesser capacity to affect management decisions through associations and translations
Actants (with Actants’
Translations Affecting
Assessment of Power of
their
Management
Network Construction
Network Associations
practices and Interests and
and Cohesion through
through Translation
technologies) Positions
Management Decisions
(2015-2020)
ENGOs
Protect marine
Actants are enrolled in
NGOs influence fisheries
organisms and
conservation agenda
policy through their
ecology; conserve through ENGO efforts
associations with NEFSC
biodiversity and
and GARFO scientists,
fish habitat
politicians, the media. The
power in their associations
is buttressed by public
petitions to politicians and
NEFMC and controlling
sustainability narratives
through seafood guidelines
and popular perceptions of
the efficacy of fisheries
management. They also file
lawsuits to hold NOAA and
NEFMC accountable to
their interpretations of
MSA.
Seafood
industry

Protect economic
resource; promote
regional industry

Seafood is functionally
indispensable to the
fishery network; all are
enrolled in supporting its
success

135

As a valuable industry for
the region and a culturally
significant symbol of New
England, and as an “overall
benefit to the Nation”
protected by MSA, the
seafood industry’s success
is a focus of management

Fishermen

Protect economic
resource; promote
regional industry;
provide net
income growth
and long-term
employment
security;
incorporate
fishermen’s
experiential
knowledge in
decisions

University
scientists and
social
scientists

Provide
biological,
ecological, and
socio-economic
information
regionally and
knowledge about
fisheries, in
general, to achieve
successful fishery
(conservation
and/or economic
growth)
Promote local and Politicians enroll actants
regional economic to their interests in
growth
economic development

Politicians:
State and
Local

Fishermen are
functionally indispensable
to the fishery network; all
are enrolled in supporting
its success

As a job sector for the
region and a culturally
significant livelihood,
fishermen are supported by
politicians, the public,
popular media and
academic analysis and
protected by the MSA and
NEFMC actions. They file
lawsuits, usually with
ENGOs or local politicians
to hold NOAA and NEFMC
accountable to their
interpretations of MSA.
Researchers script roles
Non-government scientific
(sometimes alternatives to advice is brought in for
NEFSC scripts) for
consideration of
actants through their
management by NEFSC and
practices and
GARFO scientists, ENGOs,
technologies
fishermen and industry, and
through membership on
Council
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Governors, mayors, and
state and local legislators
interact with each other, the
media, Congress, NOAA,
and NEFMC to promote the
MSA’s mandates for
economic benefits. All
politicians must satisfy their
fishing communities
constituencies. They file
lawsuits to hold NOAA and
NEFMC accountable to
their interpretations of
MSA.

Table 3.5c Power dynamics in the New England fishery network: Least capacity to affect
management decisions of actants and their associations through translations
Least capacity to affect management decisions through associations and translations
Actants (with Actants’
Translations Affecting
Assessment of Power of
their
Management
Network Construction
Network Associations
practices and Interests and
and Cohesion through
through Translation
technologies) Positions
Management Decisions
(2015-2020)
Global
N/A
Global seafood trade
Global seafood trade
seafood
affects the economic
requires the fishery to be
market
viability of the network,
stable and consistent, and
enrolls actants in an
economically competitive
economic agenda
Endangered
Protect and
Endangered species,
Federal laws override
Species
promote survival
through their legal status, fisheries management
(food, habitat,
enroll actants in a
regulations. Right whales
reproduction)
conservation agenda
are significant actants for
lobster fishery, no rules for
gillnets used for groundfish
fishing have been proposed.
Climate
N/A
Environmental changes
Response from NMFS
change
from climate change
(climate strategy report) to
effects groundfish
motivate regional councils
survival; enroll actants in to generate management
a conservation agenda
strategies for current
ongoing and predicted
changes; research agendas
of government and nongovernment scientists are
gearing up to address
management.
Other coastal Allow for
Some enrollment of
Coastal recreation, whale
sectors
economic growth
actants through support
watching, wind power, and
in other marine
for conservation agenda
aquaculture are seen by
sectors
and non-fishing industries some as more sustainable
industries than groundfish
fishing. Coastal real estate
is a significant interest
affecting politicians’
priorities.
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Regional
Predators

Protect and
promote survival
(food, habitat,
reproduction)

Some enrollment of
actants through support
for conservation agenda

Legal protections and
popular support for return
of sharks and seals to the
region; fishermen
complaints about effects of
northward migration of
black seabass, and growing
shark and seal predators to
Council.

The actors and their associations with the greatest capacity to affect management
decisions are the governmental institution elements of the network that enact and perform the
management regime including: the MSA, NMFS, NEFSC and GARFO, NEFMC, the Northeast
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan including the sector catch-share system, groundfish, and
Congress and the Executive Office. Groundfish populations survival and abundance grounds the
network; groundfish in association with the MSA and management actions produces the effect of
how managers vote and how that affects the network as a whole, so therefore, in this sense, have
share in the “power” of voting. This analysis shows the entrenched and concentrated power in
the fishery is connected to this top-down managerial framework in U.S. fisheries. The MSA acts
as a constitution and all actants in association with it are transformed by it and the MSA, in turn,
is transformed by those associations. These repeated and reinforced interactions and transactions
organize the network and work to stabilize it for the sake of its success.
Actants and associations in the “lesser capacity” category do not directly make the laws
and regulations that organize and stabilize the fishery, but through their associations with those
who do, they do share this power. These include: ENGOs, the seafood industry, fishermen,
university scientists and social scientists, and local and state politicians. Highly dependent on
whose information and what type of information is included in the negotiations of management
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decisions and legal mandates, their power is stabilized through the MSA’s scripting of their
roles, but also can be enhanced or diminished through their representation and inclusion by
NMFS, government scientists and analysts, and NEFMC managers.
The actants in the “least and/or most uncertain capacity” category include the global
seafood market, endangered species, climate change, other coastal sectors, and regional
predators. They may not be playing a direct role in current management actions at this point in
time, but preparation for their effects on the network are ongoing through governmental and nongovernmental research and development of strategies to address their effects that will result in
affecting management decisions.
While there is evidence of stability of associations and translations, and therefore
resultant power dynamics categorized in the tables, in the period of 2015-2020, the groundfish
“crisis” and efforts to develop EBFM strategies indicate flux. The current power hierarchy
described in the table may be radically altered if several types of changes are necessitated by
overflowings and if new associations and translations become established. For example, the least
powerful aspects of the New England fishery network – such other marine sectors or climate
change – have significant potential to make more powerful associations fall in line with the
transformations they are performing, with or without a shift in the management regime to EBFM.
As long as stock assessments show that cod are declining and not rebuilding, the MSA requires
management to respond through accountability measures; however, “overflowing” scenarios
cause major shifts in the power dynamics as the network associations and translations readjust.
For example, the power to affect network cohesion of the groundfish in association with the
MSA may soon be reduced by rapidly intensifying environmental pressures like climate change
and increased predators and with “management failures.” Adaptive responses of the network
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could de-emphasize the promotion of the groundfish fishery if it becomes impossible to manage
successfully; other industrial and recreational sectors may gain power through associations if
negative effects of environmental changes (or unintended negative consequences of management
decisions) on groundfish cannot be mitigated.
Changes in network power dynamics are strongly linked to Congress and the Federal
Executive Office who may advance different agendas for fisheries, emphasizing immediate
economic goals over conservation protection, or the other way around. While actants may now
be categorized as having “lesser capacity,” their capacity can and does change with
congressional majorities and presidential administrations122. Within the “greatest capacity”
category, changes to the MSA, including its mandate for sector catch shares, could result in an
increase the power in the associations of the fishermen if more participatory management was
mandated or decrease the power in the associations of the catch share system if it was modified
or abandoned due to analysis showing that it was not resulting in meeting management goals and
objectives for fishing communities or groundfish. Development of Fisheries Acts and Executive
Orders are also dependent on advisors to the politicians such as ENGOs, seafood industry
lobbyists, other marine sector’s supporters, and scientist and fisherman testimonials and whose
agendas and what types of information is used in creating these laws and decrees.
Powerful associations produce network processes that are successful in terms of network
cooperation or success. As EBFM is designed and developed, and if it becomes the implemented
management paradigm overriding or replacing the Northeast Multispecies FMP, the network
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For example, On June 5, 2020, President Donald Trump opened the Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National
Monument off the New England coast to commercial fishing, reversing an order signed by President Barack Obama in September
2016. Several current and former NEFMC members who have financial interests in New England’s fishery were present at the
signing of the Executive Order where Trump declared that the Obama Administration “regulated you out of business.”
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associations, currently grounded by groundfish, will reorganize and power dynamics will reflect
the outcomes for the groundfish and its fishery network. This reorganization could involve a
change in the types and sources of information and analysis that make their way into associations
with the actants in the “greatest capacity” category and/or increasing the power of some
associations in the “lesser and least” capacity categories. If scientists move toward socioecological approaches for Ecosystems-based Management and/or if anthropological,
sociological, or ecological qualitative theory is incorporated along with socio-economic
quantitative models through co-management, adaptive management, and interactive governance,
the network will look and function very differently and the power dynamics will experience
instability.
3.8.3 Coherence and Dissipation of the Groundfish Actor-Network
Dissipation
At public meetings to get feedback from fishermen about their views on the efficacy of
the NEFCM held in late 2017, the few fishermen who showed up described how they and their
colleagues, families, and friends had lost all faith in the system at this point and did not even
want to deal with the Council because they feel completely demoralized and disempowered
(Horgan, 2017).123 These feelings reflect the lack of trust between the fishermen and the
managers, scientists, and government and ENGO representatives. The deteriorating relationships
serve as dissipative forces, stressing the associations of the actor-network and threatening its
existence.
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As part of an independent review of the NEFMC, the Fisheries Leadership & Sustainability Forum (also known as the
Fisheries Forum, housed by the Ocean and Coastal Policy Program at Duke’s Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy
Solutions) conducted 14 port meetings for stakeholders, a webinar on “Leadership and Sustainability,” an online survey, and oneon-one interviews in November and December of 2017. At the three meetings I attended in New Bedford, MA, Chatham, MA,
and Stonington, CT, the attendance was one, three, and zero fishermen respectively; the webinar was also poorly attended.
NEFMC Executive Director expressed frustration at the December 5, 2017 NEFMC meeting citing the $200,000 spent on the
review.

141

Rapid cultural, economic, and ecological changes are also taking their toll on the
functioning of the fishery. The changes are transforming the coastal socio-ecological system in
ways that negatively affect the fishery. Socio-culturally, areas around the waterfronts where
fishing boats are docked are gentrifying and condominiums and hotels and high-end real estate
are vying for ocean front sites with recreational boat slips. The popularity of eco-tourism is
growing along the New England coast, and the docks are packed with tourists lining up for whale
and bird watching trips and tours of the harbors. Socio-economically, inconsistent trade policy,
fickle demand and changing tastes in fish and restaurants have made it difficult to depend on a
consistent market for what the fishermen are catching. As discussed above, rapid ecological
changes in the seawater properties and ecological makeup of the marine species have been
adding significant pressure on an already stressed system. Actant associations that are
undergoing rapid changes involving other economic sectors, increasing predators, the economy,
and the climate are not under the authority of the MSA and are working against the coherence of
the fishery actor-network. All of the uncertainty in the research that involves these rapid changes
leads to frustration and mistrust.
Another dissipative force that sows mistrust is the divisive commitment to ideological
stances. Strong identification of fishermen, scientist, managers, conservationists, and community
members with cultural, ethical, political, and epistemological factions is not only making
compromise and consensus difficult, but it is also making the management rhetoric more about
winning the debate than achieving a successful fishery. The different value systems are formed
by different interests, ethical frameworks, and social views influenced by educational
background, socio-economic class, livelihood and community associations, are a significant part
of the actor-network that requires a lot of work to work through and overcome. The MSA
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mandate to achieve both conservation and economic benefits requires good-faith negotiations
that are made more difficult when animosity based on ideological divisions is not in check.
American distrust of science and resistance to government regulation is not a new
phenomenon but it has played a central role in complicating the negotiations of New England
fishery management and continues to, in different manifestations, today. This suspicion and
defiance of authority shares the inclination of scientific skepticism itself, and according to
sociologist Jeffrey Guhin, can be traced back to the rejection of “elite” ministers during early
19th century Second Great Awakening who claimed ultimate authority over how to interpret the
Bible. Guhin observes that “the American idea of equality can have a dangerous effect when it’s
used to insist on an intellectual equality” (Hashemzadeh, 2019). More current forms of this
distrust of science and government institutions – and government scientists – play a significant
role in the challenges that the New England groundfish fishery faces. While skepticism within
scientific fields results in professional peers pointing out mistakes and problematic assumptions,
this gives rise to additional experimentation by scientists, not the acceptance of a completely
different knowledge base. Sociologist Gordon Gauchat (2012) describes that, today, outside of
scientific research communities, multiple factions or “cultural domains” like religious groups,
industry groups, or critics of Western medicine offer alternatives “generat[e] their own
knowledge base that is often in conflict with the cultural authority of the scientific community”
and do not consider this knowledge “open to question” (Gauchat, 2012). Surgeon and writer Atul
Gawande argues that rather than rejecting science, people are dismissing the authority of the
scientific community by claiming to have “the truer scientific authority” and asserting that
scientific consensus emerges from a conspiracy to suppress dissenting views. He describes a
pattern that is emerging for making these claims that includes producing alternative experts

143

without active or relevant scientific research, cherry-picking data and papers that challenge the
dominant view as a means of discrediting an entire field, deploying false analogies and other
logical fallacies, and insisting scientists achieve absolute certainty (Gawande, 2016).
The apparent rise in the distrust of scientific expertise and growth in trust in
interpretations of “facts” at odds with the scientific consensus has paralleled the rise of 1) social
media; 2) the number of new media options, and 3) in some cases, like fisheries management,
partisan divisions (Funk et al., 2019; Nichols, 2017). A report by the Stanford History Education
Group points out that for college-educated students, the surfeit of conflicting information on the
Internet is making it extremely difficult to evaluate information (Wineburg et al., 2016). Studies
show that if people view a ‘piece of misinformation’ over and over across their Internet
searching, the more likely they are to believe it (Pennycook et al., 2018). Pew Research
Center’s124 report “Trust and Mistrust in Americans’ Views of Scientific Experts” found that in
2016 Democrats (43%) had significantly greater confidence in scientists than Republicans
(27%). While a large majority of Democrats (73%) “believe scientists should take an active role
in scientific policy debates,” over half of Republicans surveyed (56%) say “scientists should
focus on establishing sound scientific facts and stay out of such policy debates.” In terms of
whether scientists’ judgements are unbiased and based on facts, 62% of Democrats agreed with
this while 55% of Republicans say scientists’ judgments are “just as likely to be biased as other
people’s.” Education level does not seem to play the same role as party affiliation; Gauchat’s
study found that while in 1974, conservatives with college degrees had the highest level of trust
in science and the scientific community, in 2010, they had the lowest (Gauchat, 2012). While
fisheries scientists, managers, and fishing community members never explicitly identified their
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Pew Research Center’s publications about fisheries management and comments at the New England Fishery Management
Council meetings are regularly criticized as biased by fishermen and industry.
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political affiliations publicly or personally to me at fisheries events, portrayals of scientific
conclusions as “liberal bias" in comments at New England fisheries management meetings and in
the local media op-eds are common.
Coherence
An actor-network by definition is contingent entity that requires work to hold it together.
Despite strong dissipative forces, the development of compatibilities among actants and their
visions for the network allows for coherence. The democratic nature of fisheries management in
the United States makes the management process slow and contentious, but it also has several
reinforcing features that keep everyone working together. With the MSA serving as a
constitution, American fisheries must negotiate a balance of power between the groups that come
to the management table. Although its current reauthorization process is stalled in Congress and
it is criticized by those who use it, the MSA organizes and stabilizes the network and transforms
the network associations by mandating consistency and repetition in the practices of management
and simplifies them by requiring efficiency. Reciprocally, other network actants not only
participate in modifying the MSA through evolving interpretations, but also actively amend and
update the MSA and National Standards through a well-defined public process. Legal
interpretations of the MSA in state and federal lawsuit verdicts over the past several decades
have favored upholding a strong conservation obligation. Congressional debates over fishery
laws have also sided with conservation concerns over economic concerns. Efforts to change the
language of the MSA to place greater emphasis on the importance of the health of the economic
sector have not succeeded yet, possibly because fishing is not important to every representative’s
constituents across the country, while conservation without feeling any personal price can be an
easy win.
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While fishermen feel disenfranchised at the NEFMC meetings, they have other ways that
they enroll actants to their advance their management ideas and express their aspirations as well,
thereby affecting the management decisions and strengthening their associations in the network.
The history of New England fishing as a critical American economic development sector dates
back to the settling and establishment of the country’s bourgeoisie class (Kurlansky, 2011).
Reality TV shows and educational media network documentaries excite the imagination of
American citizens with images of rugged working American, the last of their kind, imbuing them
with history, identity, and character. The story is interesting! This works to boost their political
popularity and representation because everyone wants to see the success of the free, hardworking
fisherman who is responsibly earning their livelihood and risking their lives to provide the
country with ostensibly renewable resources. If the political negotiations over conservation and
fishermen’s economic success went too far in one or the other direction, that could spell the end
of the groundfish fishery network. But for now, it remains stabilized.
Institutional momentum is working in two ways to encourage the coherence of the network.
It increases durability by keeping actants “in the fold” due to the incredible amount of effort,
resources, and money invested in the network over the years. The massive dedicated staff at
NOAA and other fisheries research and management institutions want to see the success of the
fishermen and fish who they have dedicated years of their lives to. This common goal of fish
population abundance serves as an “obligatory point of passing” making the existence of this
network indispensable to all of the actants involved. Everyone in the network, including the
ENGO representatives, have roles that they play in keeping the fish and the fishery alive.
Examining these dissipative and coherent activities in the network shows areas of
dissipation that EBFM has to work to resolve and what elements of coherence it can take
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advantage of. An appealing aspect to EBFM is the way it will necessitate different fisheries and
different economic sectors and government agencies working together on fishery management
plans that are based on shared environments rather than individual fish populations. For EBFM
to find successes in the New England fishery network, it will need to accomplish the following
jobs:
1. Repairing of relationships between fishermen, council members, NOAA and university
scientists, and NOAA Administrators and halting the ongoing development of factions in
management and science
2. Negotiating multiples of the fish and fishery from the early stages of setting of priorities
and goals for management strategies
3. Finding a cohesive way to deal with uncertainty (scientific, economic, socio-cultural,
management) by accepting success as a form of truth; negotiating epistemological
hierarchies and conflicts explicitly, in good faith
4. Finding markets and marketing strategies that work for the New England groundfish
fishery such as recommendation and certification systems that work with regional
councils
5. Allowing for transformations in the network when there is “overflowing” - when an
accepted idea or practice is no longer working and requires a paradigm change
6. Defining and facilitating how experimentation and adaptation can be accomplished across
the entire range of management from federal law to everyday management practices
7. Finding agreement on how climate change and other environmental changes should be
explicitly accounted for in management
8. Negotiating with other coastal and ocean use sectors
9. Preparing for less powerful actants becoming more significant by addressing the ways to
build coherence of the network in the face of dissipative effects.

3.9 Conclusions
Through ANT analysis of the narratives of blame for the groundfish crisis in this chapter,
several findings emerged. First, detailed cataloguing of ostensible causes for the “groundfish
crisis” argued by professional analysts, stakeholders, and concerned citizens illuminated the
multiplicity of the crisis; there is not one crisis that could be studied – the crisis is actually many
different phenomena at once. Multiple ontologies, not just multiple perspectives, exist and
interact. Second, analysis of the power dynamics operating within the network reveals that both
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stabilities and instabilities in the associations and their translations have potential to affect not
only the form and function of the network in crisis, but also whether or not the groundfish fishery
continues to survive (or maybe thrives) as the management regime shifts to EBFM. As the power
dynamics are experiencing growing instability in the face of rapid “environmental” and
economic changes, epistemological inclusivity is needed to set goals and implement actions that
address instabilities created by the uncertainty these significant changes are introducing. A third
key finding of the analysis presented in this chapter calls EBFM developers in New England to
pay attention to the ways that the groundfish fishery, through its everyday processes and through
its network arrangements and rearrangements and transformations, is cohering and dissipating
now: If EBFM is going to have a fighting chance, it will need to overcome, or at least weaken
the dissipative forces that include: a longstanding state of poor relationships and a lack of trust
between the fishermen and the managers, scientists, and government and ENGO representatives;
2) rapidly changing cultural, economic, and environmental circumstances that are creating
anxiety about uncertain futures; and 3) a highly partisan political environment that is putting
ideological divisions about environmental conservation and economic policies in high relief. The
next chapter further explores multiple understandings of the crisis and analyzes how different
social science research approaches focused on the groundfish crisis interact and are negotiated in
management debates and proposals for interventions for the crisis, including EBFM.
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Chapter 4 - Performation of the Groundfish Fishery Crisis in New England: Academic
Discourses Transforming an Actor-Network
“A crisis is an important occasion to evaluate and learn."
Kåre Nolde Nielsen & Petter Holm, A brief catalogue of
failures: Framing evaluation and learning in fisheries
resource management, 2007
In this chapter, academic literature from natural resource management and political
ecology research on the groundfish crisis and potential interventions to address it are compared
and contrasted and evaluated in terms of their current potential for contributions of information
and knowledge for decision-making in the New England Fishery Management Council. In the
first section, the research and conclusions of three areas of resource economics is reviewed:
bioeconomic modeling, sustainable natural resources management, and models of rational actors
and actants. Next, two different political ecology approaches, one focusing on the roles of
economic institutions and neoliberal capitalism in failures in fisheries management and the other,
identifying ways that the neoliberalization of fisheries is being resisted through alternative
economic practices and community representation and engagement. The chapter concludes with
a discussion on why quantitative natural resource management approaches using neoliberal
economic assumptions dominate the fisheries management discourse and are interpreted as “best
science” for use, even as National Standard 2, the Science Information provision of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, explicitly makes room for including of “emergent science” and
qualitative analysis.

4.1 Introduction: Social Science Approaches to Understanding the Groundfish Crisis: What is
Going Wrong and Why – and How to Fix It
Many studies about struggling marine fisheries by academic, government, and
independent consultants seek to address why established management practices have not been
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able to reverse stock declines in cases like the New England groundfish fishery. In this chapter, I
contrast two broad social science research approaches to identifying the causes of and solutions
to overfishing and depletion in New England's groundfish fishery. Both approaches analyze the
space where science, economics, ecology, culture, and politics interact in fisheries management,
but differ in their conceptualization and representation of the socio-economic system.
There is no agreement about how to assess the problems of failing fisheries and their
causes, and therefore no agreement about the necessary improvements to a system for monitoring
and managing a fishery. Many disciplines contribute to this effort, each bringing their own lenses
for examination which help them to see specific things while leaving them blind to other things.
So while something useful can be gleaned from every study and every analysis, it does not
necessarily lead to cooperation on how to address the problem as a whole. For example, many of
the different analyses conclude that EBFM is what is needed – but, in different forms and for
different reasons.
The first category of research discussed here is the steady-state system, solution-oriented
natural resources management paradigm that is employed by NOAA fisheries. Work in this area
is based in neoclassical economics and bioeconomic theory that models fishermen as rational
economic actors who are stakeholders in a renewable natural resource. Biological, ecological,
and economic data are used to generate quantitative models that drive fisheries policy. To
amend and improve the management information from the bioeconomic models, natural resource
managers seek more and better scientific and socioeconomic data, in addition to better
understanding of the ways that real-life socioeconomic behavior deviates from ideal model
assumptions.
The second area of research discussed here falls into the broad category of political
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ecology. Some of the social scientists who study the New England fishery “crisis” through the
lens of political ecology are affiliated with the day-to-day operations and policy making of the
Council, including historians, sociologists, geographers, and anthropologists who are interested
in the issues raised by fisheries management and who often argue for new approaches that
include ethical debates, qualitative social analysis, and alternative economic visions.
Academic approaches to analyzing the New England groundfish fishery include both
quantitative and qualitative modeling of the fishery as a bioeconomic or socio-ecological system
and policy analysis through decision modeling or social theory to examine cultural and political
aspects of the fishery. Prior to the development of EBFM, discussions of the social, cultural, and
economic sources of problems for the groundfish fishery in the solution-oriented resource
economics and sustainable natural resources management (NRM) literature have not
meaningfully engaged and integrated knowledge from political ecology literature. Differences lie
in implicit evaluations of the “correct” hierarchy of knowledge production about “social
processes” and their impact on the fishery. NRM studies suggest top-down conservation
incentives and quota systems with private property rights as the most logical and effective
solution to address overfishing. The political ecology studies see this move to increased
privatization and enclosure at the heart of management problems. It is not the purpose of this
review of the academic analysis of representative groups on the groundfish crisis to identify a
viewpoint that seems more correct than the others. Rather, as in chapter three, the purpose of the
analysis of the academic discourse on the failure of the groundfish fishery is to describe and
analyze how the network’s meaning, form, and function are being constructed and affecting its
coherence. Despite epistemological and disciplinary differences, different analyses share some
similar ideas about the immediate causes of aspects of the crisis, such as consolidation of the
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fleet that resulted from catch share economic processes.

4.2 Solution-Oriented Resource Economics and Sustainable Natural Resources Management
Bioeconomic Modeling
As stated in the Magnuson-Stevens Act and National Standards, the National
Environmental Policy Act, and National Ocean Policy Executive Order, socio-economic analysis
is a central part of fisheries management and requires economic models for assessment to satisfy
their legal mandate to minimize the community economic impacts of fishery management
policies (Seung & Water, 2006). Fisheries economists employ natural resource economics
theory, primarily based in neoclassical economics125, that is also used for coal, forestry, and other
resource commodities. Bioeconomic modeling, along with its theoretical underpinnings and
tools, is taught in fisheries science degree programs, and is carried out by NOAA fisheries social
scientists.
At the foundation of bioeconomic fisheries analyses are dynamic models126 based on
Wassily Leontief’s economic input-output (I/O) models. These models are input data hungry and
require a lot of information about the relationships that are actually occurring such as
information about labor characteristics and behavior. I/O models work by assuming the economy
is in equilibrium with supply and demand. The Gordon-Schaefer Model is one of the major
models used to compute the maximum sustainable yield in fisheries. The Gordon-Schaefer
bioeconomic models identify how the commons are to be made manageable by creating a
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Arguably, model analysis and interpretations by NEFSC social scientists do include some ecological economics theory, but
the algorithms for the I/O models used for fisheries do not include socioecological considerations explicitly or implicitly.
126
Computational modeling approaches employ either statistical or dynamic models. Statistical models use regression analysis
where the dependencies and interdependencies of economic, social and biological variables are examined using statistical
analysis for the best fit for correlation. Dynamic models represent the behavior of the bioeconomic system over time using
empirically- and theoretically- derived equations for the relationships between the variables and the changes they undergo.
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capitalist enclosure, with the assumptions that this rationalization of fishermen, their community
relations and economics have positive effects on the fishery (human and non-human
components). These models were first used in the 1950s and have been adhered to for the past
six decades. One challenging consequence of this algorithm is that it sets up a dichotomy of
profitability versus conservation.
Quantified data used as input for the models not only includes economic data, but also
information about the biological, ecological and social environments and relationships. Noneconomic information for the model input may come from biological or social studies or as
model output from biological or ecological models, in a hierarchical or nested fashion. If the
models are nested, economic model output could feed back into biological or ecological models
and vice versa. The I/O models tend to be based on real data and trends and are often designed
specifically for a region in a case by case fashion since the relationships are not the same in
every fishery.127 Managers want predictions of how changes in the biological, economic, and
regulatory conditions will affect fishing effort, in terms of space (territory), amount of effort, and
species focus (level and distribution) to ensure profitability and conservation. The Social Science
Division of the Northeast Fisheries Science Center (NEFSC) and the Greater Atlantic Regional
Fisheries Office, under NOAA, provide the majority of the regional information from ongoing
studies about the “socio-cultural dimensions” 128 and economic trends of the fishing communities,
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As with all computational models, a lot of work goes into justifying assumptions and choices of parameterizations
mathematical relationship calculations, empirical studies and input variables used, and interpretations of the output data. Incorrect
assumptions and choices for the model can give you inaccurate and imprecise output, and one small change can change a positive
trend into a negative one, or just as easily make it neutral. Models need to be tested, usually with known results, before they then
they can be fitted with the data from the problem at hand. Sensitivity analysis has to be performed to make sure changes in inputs
get a reasonable response. Testing and validation to make sure the results are probable still does not do the work of interpreting
what the result mean for the problem that the model is providing information.
128
To meet the mandates of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act, NOAA Fisheries collects and analyzes basic information on the social and economic characteristics of fishing
communities for management decisions. NEFSC Social Sciences Branch produces community profiles, social indicator
evaluations, and a database of oral history interviews, along with commercial and recreational fisheries economics analyses.
Social indicator evaluations include 1) social vulnerability or community’s ability to adapt to change, 2) gentrification pressure
that affects commercial or recreational working waterfronts, 3) fishing engagement and reliance on commercial or recreational
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and NEFSC Population Dynamics Division provides biological information from stock
assessments.
Sometimes the interpretation of the results of fisheries bioeconomic models indicate that
there is not enough data presently available to be able to make useful interpretations of the
results (Agar & Sutinen, 2004; Foley et al., 2012; Seung & Water, 2006). In applications of
bioeconomic I/O models to examine the New England groundfish fishery, the results of studies
are sometimes equivocal. For example, fishermen will say that a certain regulation has
negatively impacted their economic situation, but a regression model will say there was little
economic negative effect seen in the regression model (Fleury, 2009). Holland and Maguire
stress that the complexity of New England’s multi-species, multi-area groundfish fishery is
extremely unwieldy to model (Holland & Maguire, 2003).
Development and analysis of the sector catch share quota system129 is a significant
contribution of bioeconomic models to groundfish management in New England. The natural
resource economics approach applying the Gordon-Schaefer model rationalizes access to a
common pool resource through the provision of cost-free rights to a portion of the Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) for fishermen in the sector system.130 Bioeconomic theory and case
studies of applications have encouraged U.S. regional fisheries management bodies to adopt
property rights-based catch shares to promote sustainable fishing efforts and prevent fisheries
collapse (Costello et al., 2008). Modeling by Holland and Wiersma (2010) supports the quotabased catch share system showing that if quotas are set low enough for all species, the economic

fishing, and 4) sea level rise risk. The community profiles and indicator evaluations are available online at
https://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/read/socialsci/communitySnapshots.php and The Voices from the Fisheries interviews are found at
https://voices.nmfs.noaa.gov.
129
New England’s sector catch share system is considered more of a harvest cooperative approach rather than an Individual
Fisheries Quota (IFQ) system since incentives provided by sector management are more community-based.
130
For fishermen who do not want to join a sector, there is a separate allotment or share of the TAC for the Common Resource
Pool.
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impacts might have been high for a few years, but the positive biological effects would reverse
that economic trend (Holland & Wiersma, 2010).
Sustainable Natural Resources Management
Natural Resources Management academics, whose applied research straddles scientific
and social scientific theory, acknowledge that bioeconomic modeling contributions to
management must be used in context of the changing social and ecological landscapes and that
management advice must reflect the actual status of the fishery, providing “corrections” for
unrealistic model simplifications or negative consequences that result from bioeconomic modelbased advice. For example, several issues with catch shares are seen as sources of problems in
the New England groundfish fishery require further analysis and corrective regulations. Once the
initial windfall of getting the “free” fishing rights is over, anyone coming into the fishery
thereafter has a big cost. This cost is often in the form of leasing, which eats into the profits.
Consolidation of the quota in fewer hands needs to be controlled because this can lead to fewer
jobs and a greater stratification of workers’ pay in the fishery. The quota may be held by private
investors, taking the money out of the fishing community and burdening fishermen with another
cost to pay, siphoning off their profit (Allison et al., 2012). The contraction of community and
consolidation problems highlight the inefficient over-investment that went on during the
development push of the 1970s and 1980s (Holland & Wiersma, 2010). In addition to
recognition of uncertainty about economic processes, many researchers point out that the current
bioeconomic models do not adequately represent the increasing environmental degradation of
fish habit related to coastal development, pollution runoff, and climate change that is likely
driving declines of groundfish stocks even when fishing effort is being regulated to allow stocks
to rebuild (Pershing et al., 2015).
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“Ludwig’s Ratchet” is a commonly-cited description of a process of fisheries
mismanagement that was put forward by fisheries scientists and mathematicians who work on
issues of sustainability and natural resources management. In a 1993 paper by Ludwig et al., the
“ratchet effect” is briefly described as a process whereby steady-state bioeconomic theory does
not take into account irregular fluctuations in the fisheries resource and this results in harvesting
levels that are often too high and encourage additional economic investment (Ludwig et al.,
1993). Hennessey and Healey (2000) apply this idea of the “ratchet effect” to show how the New
England groundfish fishery has experienced overcapitalization even after the expansion led to
declining stocks in the 1970s and 1980s (Hennessey & Healey, 2000). When the fishery reached
a state of near collapse, the government responded to the economic problems with an influx of
financial assistance in the form of business loans for capital investments in boats and fishing
equipment. When the fish stocks showed signs of rebounding, even though significant scientific
uncertainty existed about the validity of the increasing stock trend, managers allowed fishing
effort to increase so that fishermen could pay for the investments that were made and the cycle
“ratcheted” up. Hennessey and Healey (2000) cite Ludwig et al.’s argument that the scientific
uncertainty about stock abundance does not allow reduced quotas to prevent overexploitation
until after the fact. Decision-makers take an optimistic viewpoint of the abundance in light of the
uncertainty, and the mistrust of the scientists, and choose to expand the fishery whenever there is
an apparent short-term stock increase, dissipating profits broadly. The bioeconomic models look
at aggregate profit without considering individual fishermen’s success. When the stocks collapse,
the industry seeks and receives financial assistance, which ends up becoming a long-term
economic fix to fishery economics that is implicated in its overexploitation.
In contrast to the standard NRM perspective, Hennessey and Healey (2000) do not
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propose more scientific certainty and greater regulation as solutions to Ludwig’s Ratchet because
they argue that route did not save the Newfoundland cod fishery in the early 1990s. Similar to
ideas proposed in Ludwig et. al.’s 1993 paper, they call for adaptive-management principles like
those espoused by EBFM theory, as a way to integrate fisheries science, management, and
harvesting. Others have taken the lessons of the ratchet effect and the collapse in Newfoundland
to call for the end of subsidies for continued fishing because they encourage fishermen to
establish residences and careers in places and ways that cannot support them in the long term and
it leads to unsustainable “resource use.” Ruitenbeek (1996) suggested that instead of subsidies,
“compensatory mechanisms” specific to the fishing industry are what is needed to help
fishermen in a transition period away from a collapsing livelihood (Ruitenbeek, 1996).
Models of Rational Actors and Agents
A different type of system equilibrium computational modeling approach to social and
economic behavior used by natural resource management researchers focuses on the “decisionmaking” by economically rational actors for the management process and uses game theory
strategic interaction scenarios to understand policy actions. For example, Acheson’s model based
on Rational Choice Theory tests what type of decisions will allow the players to “win” by
benefitting from their choices (J. Acheson, 2011; J. M. Acheson & Gardner, 2011). The
“choices” are limited to what rational social and economic actors would do to increase their
benefits such as profits and availability of resources for exploitation. He models the relationship
between the fishermen and the management system in the groundfish fishery in New England as
an example of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, a situation where rational individuals with a common
problem may not cooperate despite wanting to achieve similarly beneficial outcomes. The lack of
cooperation is assumed to be the result of selfish, rational economic choices primarily.

157

Specifically, he examines why the fishermen oppose government rules and will not cooperate to
make their own conservation rules. Acheson concludes that, for fisheries management,
problematic timing and delays in actions sets up a situation where cooperation seems fruitless for
the fishermen. For example, he sees that there are a number of factors that make it rational for
groundfishermen to have a very short time horizon. Rationally, fishermen face great uncertainty
that their investments in resources will bring future benefits because there has been a long
history of declining catches under top-down management schemes, so there is motivation to take
advantage of what is available now to pay off prior debts in case there is no future. A lack of
faith in the ability of scientific knowledge to determine how to rebuild stocks drives the shortsited vision. He states that, “The groundfish industry has virtually none of the community
characteristics that lower transaction costs” making it impossible for fishermen to frame
conservation rules informally or to get “the government” to make rules that everyone sees as fair
(J. M. Acheson & Gardner, 2011).
Theoretically, prisoner’s dilemma solution is to let the players play the game forever and
eventually a Nash equilibrium131 will provide good results. On an experimental level, you achieve
this equilibrium by getting players to communicate and they talk their way out of the dilemma.
Acheson argues that fishermen and NEFMC do not have the time to keep playing the game until
there is cooperation. Another way of winning is to get a rule to get the fishermen to play the
dominant strategy of cooperating with management rules; this is what is demanded by federal
law, but it still is not working. He says the third and only workable option is development of a
conservation ethic by changing the ethical culture of the industry; this is called “social
preferences” solution where a player’s payoff is not just economic result but more broadly on the

131

A Nash equilibrium is a mathematical game theory solution for situations where each player knows the other player’s
strategies and has no incentive to change their own strategy.
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overall outcome – altruism, reciprocity, equality, justice, and willingness to punish offenders. He
says that groundfishermen need a huge cultural shift for this to happen but that the institutional
framework is too restrictive as mandated by MSA, so the community cannot experiment.
Acheson suggests that if the sectors were allowed to limit all others out of an area by buying up
localized permits, this could work, similarly to the lobster fishermen, but sees failure that
NEFMC did not limit sectors geographically.132
A third example of a computational decision making-model is Boyce’s (2010) common
agency model that tests the rational choice hypothesis that co-management between resource
users and regulators results in a greater resource exploitation in favor of the economicallyinvested actors, which is commonly referred to as “the foxes guarding the henhouse” (Boyce,
2010; Jentoft et al., 1998; McCay, 1991; Pinkerton, 1989). The common agency model is a
dynamic rather than a steady state model that uses the Markov perfect equilibrium133. In his
study, Boyce (2010) modeled the competition between “harvesters” and “conservation” groups
over fish quota that is designated by government regulators (Boyce, 2010). Using a rationalized
definition of “socially beneficial” as required by the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Boyce’s model
shows that the regulators give more weight to harvesters welfare than the conservationists’ goal
to protect the fish stocks because, while both competitors value the stock, conservationists do not
value the harvest so their support of regulation is unconditional, while the harvesters support is
conditional based on their economic welfare.
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This interpretation contradicts a study by Brewer (2012) about problems with lobstering boundaries. Brewer does not share
Acheson’s bioeconomic theory assumptions about the efficacy of privatization and enclosure of sector catch shares.
133
The Markov perfect equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium where multiple players interact non-cooperatively and
face a common state vector that is determined by the choice of the other player in the previous period. The current state space
influences and is influenced by the players decisions.
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4.3 Political Ecology
Economic Institutions: The Role of Neoliberalism
Many studies of fisheries political economy challenge the assumptions that drive the
bioeconomic modeling and natural resource paradigms for fisheries management strategies such
as catch share quota systems. Researchers argue that failing fisheries have more to do with
capitalism itself rather than the individuals or institutions that are negotiating their roles in the
fishery system (Mansfield, 2011)134. Minimizing or rejecting the role of neoliberal policies in the
problem of overexploitation of fisheries ignores the politics of fisheries development over last
several decades and treats overfishing as an acute problem. Critiques of the relationship between
neoliberalism and fisheries depletion demonstrate how global scale political economics since
WWII has affected local-scale fisheries and created feedbacks between industrialization and
overfishing (Mansfield, 2004a, 2004b; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Pinkerton & Davis, 2015).
Globally, a primary cause of stock declines has been identified as intensification of fishing
since the late twentieth century, due to increases in the size and number of fishing vessels and
improvements to equipment (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2010).
Many researches have made the case that industrialization of fisheries for economic development
lies at the foundation of overfishing (Acquay, 1992; Mansfield, 2011). Fisheries development, as
a political and economic process, “imposes a particular, culturally specific vision of what nature
is, who should control it, how people should use it, and who should benefit” based on western
notions of modernity and capitalist relations (Mansfield, 2011). Fishermen around the world
have adopted profit-maximizing strategies as they have been encouraged to expand and globalize
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I have included Mansfield’s and others work in this section on analysis of New England fisheries crisis even though the works
cited were not focused on New England. Although Mansfield’s earlier work on the role of neoliberalism in fisheries depletion
was based on case studies in the Northwest Pacific, in Mansfield 2011, she uses New England’s groundfish fishery as an example
that demonstrates these processes very clearly and writes about North American fisheries more generally.
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their markets in the name of development and forced into debt to keep their fishing operations
alive. Industrialization of fisheries has expanded under the economic liberalization, privatization,
free trade and open market policies of neoliberalism. Mansfield and others have argued that the
industrialization of fisheries has led to intensification of socio-economic inequality which has
resulted in environmental and social degradation and marginalization, and each exacerbates the
other. Even when fishing communities are involved in the decision-making processes for
managing local fisheries, the strategies must be supported by government policies for any chance
for enforcement (Ostrom & Basurto, 2011; Kevin St. Martin, 2007).
Political ecology analysis of fisheries is further illuminated by the treadmill of production
theory of environmental sociology (Gould et al., 2004; Schnaiberg, 1980). As the scale of
fisheries production increased with huge investments in new forms of production post-WWII,
there was a need for even greater production to meet the increase in fishermen and fishingrelated businesses and to pay back investments in new technologies. The positive feedback in
production led to, and continues to advance, increased environmental degradation from resource
extraction (i.e. fishing) and reduced the resource being extracted to below sustainable levels (i.e.
overfishing). Daniel Pauly and others have argued that “open access policies and subsidy-driven
over-capitalization” caused a shift in production from larger predator fishes to smaller
invertebrates and herbivore fishes in northern fisheries (Daniel Pauly et al., 1998). Because the
addition of lower trophic level fish to targeted stocks has not substantially increased total
landings, Pauly et al. identify economics and governance as drivers of fisheries crisis.
As the treadmill of production model reveals for New England groundfish, consumer
demand and decisions about consumption do not drive decisions about the supply (production) as
classical economic theory posits. Therefore, the political economy and political ecology of the
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fisheries is primarily the construct of those who govern and regulate the production of the
fisheries in relation to (and support of) the industry operators who have invested their capital into
the system. Most fishermen and fishing community members are caught in supporting the
increases in production and investments in expanding the industry, even as it is providing less
and less opportunities for jobs and economic returns for them and threatens the resource that they
are directly dependent on. The complexity of governance of fisheries in ecological and
economic crisis is highlighted by the treadmill of production model because achieving social,
economic, and ecological progress remains elusive and yet abandoning effort and capital to
achieve these goals, metaphorically getting off the treadmill, is not an option. This type of
analysis suggests that the negative impacts on the socioecological system can only be addressed
by re-constructing the political economy and political ecology of the fishery in a way that rejects
the treadmill processes and practices; this would likely require a reorganization of the roles of
those involved in decisions about production.
In New England, an incredible increase in groundfish catch came about due to
improvements in technologies for finding and catching fish that were possible because of postWWII technical equipment boom and a federal focus on fishing as an economic sector for
development. The modern groundfish trawler boats took advantage technologies included larger
horsepower engines, sonar fish-finders, computerized navigation (radar, autopilot, GPS) and
communication equipment, computers to control and monitor fishing gear, large motorized trawl
winches, and refrigeration systems. These technologies were not inexpensive, but boat owners
were offered development loans to partake in the competition to expand their capabilities.
Additionally, for those with capital, this became an opportunity to expand the number of boats
they owned. With all the new people attracted to the industry by the availability of cheap loans
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and a quickly growing industry and the opportunity to finance more than one boat, New England
ports' fleets expanded rapidly. Investment in expensive technologies necessitated greater catches,
which in turn led to more growth. The growth of the industry was the desired result. When it first
started to appear that the groundfish populations were being depleted too rapidly to recover to
the same levels in the mid-1970s, the boat owners took the economic hit of the fisheries
shutdowns. Therefore, there was a race to be the first to catch the most, before quota levels were
exceeded and the fishery was shut down. This encouraged intense competition and rapid
depletion. Managing the collapsing groundfish fishery for economic growth, or even to achieve
returns on investments in technologies for extraction efficiency, fails to address the political
economic and political ecological relations that perpetuate a cycle of increasing ecological
degradation and decreasing socio-economic equity and well-being.
Poststructural Political Ecology
Another thread of political ecology analysis incorporates anthropologic and ethnographic
methodologies and theories, taking a poststructural approach (Mather et al., 2017). St. Martin’s
analysis of New England fisheries makes room for more heterogenous economic relations and
documents the non-capitalist and “alternative economy” aspects of the New England fisheries so
that they do not get erased or forgotten by government fisheries science and bioeconomic models
and in the creation of regulations. He argues that the fisheries science and management discourse
makes it seem that there is a teleological march to a state of modern capitalism and observes the
process of neoliberalization of the fishermen happening, but also being resisted (Kevin St.
Martin, 2007). For example, he points out that while economists saw the EEZ designation as
being a move towards privatization as a successful natural resource economic mechanism and
fisheries scientists saw it as a way to control overfishing, New England fishermen viewed it as a
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way to move the resources out of the hands of corporations and back into the hands of familyowned businesses and fishing communities (Kevin St. Martin, 2007). While fisheries
bioeconomic theory pushes for "output controls," namely quotas, as property rights as the best
solution to overfishing, fishermen continue their cooperative and territorial practices within
localized communities. The share system, where the owner agrees to a pre-established portion of
the profits to go to each of the crew members keeps the economic relationships between the
fishermen out of the capitalist model. St. Martin also points out that New England fishermen stay
in their "livelihoods" and remain in the local economy where strictly capitalist economic actors
would leave when the resource is limited and the wages are low and move their capital
elsewhere. Bioeconomic theory assumptions about the "human dimensions" of fisheries systems
misses the opportunity to base management on a better understanding of human-nature relations
and the multiple ways that economics continually emerge in both capitalist and non-capitalist
relationships within the fisheries communities. The personal, fishing, and economic relationships
in fisheries communities are not strictly capitalist enterprises as they are represented in the
management discourse and cannot be modeled successfully as such.
St. Martin describes the conundrum that has arisen for fishermen in light of quota
reduction measures. The response to these fishing reduction measures has been "opposition" to
fisheries science and management and demands for increases in allowed catches by challenging
scientific findings, complaints in news media and documentary film interviews and op-eds,
lobbying local and federal politicians, protesting and other rhetorical strategies at fisheries
management meetings, and bringing lawsuits against NOAA. Opposition comes from individual
fishermen but also from fishing interest groups ranging from community organizations centered
around the fishermen themselves or industry groups based on specific fishery. Their efforts seem
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somewhat futile compared to the influence that is wielded through lawsuits brought by national
ENGOs that have the money to show support for conservation efforts and bring legal challenges.
This futility leads fishermen to resent the environmentalists and government regulation and they
have adopted and anti-government stance that draws on the rhetoric of "freedom" and free trade.
This, in turn, makes privatization and property rights look like the best possible thing to do for
economic stability135. This, in turn, leads to bioeconomic modeling of the fishermen in a way that
turns them into one-dimensional capitalist subjects playing the game where the market rules
instead of fisheries scientists and managers. Additionally, fisheries management turns into nonnegotiable quota limits dictated by a very specific scientific and managerial process that does not
leave any room for alternative ways of addressing the needs and problems of the fishermen and
their communities. The fishermen want higher allocations through this process. It brings the
problem right back to where it started, thereby erasing the practices and values of the fishermen
that work against this very thing.
A transformation of relations among fishermen who work together on individual boats
deepens division between owners and non-owners (non-owners, considered "co-venturers" under
the share system, are dispossessed of the right to fish) has created a "politics of opposition and a
culture of non-compliance" by the fishermen (Kevin St. Martin, 2007). Through his fish
communities mapping projects, St. Martin is trying to make economic difference a part of the
"solution" and challenge the hegemony of capitalism in the fisheries in order to do this. He
argues if we can allow the fishermen's identities and roles and the conceptualization of the
commons remain open and flexible in the science and management discourses that it will work
against the troubling pigeon-holing that this monolithic capitalist conceptualization is causing.

135

Ironically, many ENGOs also see stability through property rights as a way to achieve environmental sustainability.
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Olson also writes about getting communities involved in resource management, as has
been encouraged by many social scientists and mandated by policy frameworks in the last couple
decades136 (Olson, 2005). Similar to St. Martin’s discussion about how any ongoing economic
relationship that is not capitalistic gets labeled as pre-capitalist in the management discourse and
is viewed as a historical or primitive way of things that will necessarily be replaced, Olson points
out that anthropology is marginalized in public policy because "community" and "culture" is
located outside modernity and rationality (Olson, 2005; K. St. Martin, 2005). "The effect of this
is to undermine the critical capacity of anthropological notions of culture to analyze power and
practice, as well as to undermine the potential that alternative spaces like communities offer for
political engagement." She echoes JK Gibson-Graham’s argument that communities get reduced
to "places that get impacted" thereby ignoring what communities can do and focusing on what is
done to them. She says the association of community only with "small-scale, family-based
fishing practices" risks missing complex interactions and creating only one kind of authentic
community; it’s a "passive, homogeneous" representation. While inclusion of community in
policy may seem to counteract bioeconomic modeling biases, it sometimes ends up creating an
ideology of "nostalgic preservationism" rather than community as actively becoming. Olson
argues that even with a shift to area-based management that recognizes and focuses on spatial
heterogeneity of the resources, the fisheries economics and management still uses a homogenous,
culturally constructed view of fishermen (Olson, 2006).

4.4 Discussion: Whose Best (Social) Scientific Information? Getting an Epistemological Seat at
the Fisheries Policy Table
To trace associations and the role of fisheries social science research in the performativity
136

Julia Olson is an anthropologist at the NEFSC.
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of the network, I followed how different epistemological approaches focused on the groundfish
crisis interacted in academic literature and fared in the NEFMC decision-making arena. Table
4.1 summarizes general categories of social scientific natural resource management and political
ecology research on New England fisheries and the socio-ecological systems. Notably, despite a
range of different areas of focus and problem identifications, almost all approaches conclude that
a shift to Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management offers potential to address failures in the
current management system. However, each approach is looking to EBFM for something
different. How EBFM is developed and eventually implemented in New England will depend, in
part, on how the current problems in the fishery are seen and what proposed solutions are given
consideration.
For application and implementation of fisheries management in New England, natural
resource management approaches are currently occupying the main role as the “best scientific
information available” as described in National Standard 2 – Science Information (NS2), a
Magnuson-Stevenson Act Provision (§600.315). The methodologies, information and types of
knowledge offered by these positivistic, quantitative modeling approaches are supported at the
governmental research institutions NOAA, NEFSC, and GARFO. National Standard 2 provides
guidelines to Councils for determination of the best science including “high quality and timely
biological, ecological, environmental, economic, and sociological scientific information to
effectively conserve and manage living marine resources.” The application of knowledge from
political ecology approaches is less apparent than from natural resource management approaches
in the day-to-day discussions in NEFMC council, committee, and PDT meetings that I attended
throughout 2015-2017, but it does have a role in the discourse. While the work on fisheries
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Table 4.1 Summary of general categories of social scientific natural resource management and
political ecology research on New England fisheries and the socio-ecological systems
Approach

Focus/Problem ID

Natural Resource
Management:
Bioeconomic
Modeling,
Community Profiles

•

NMR: Ludwig’s
Ratchet

Solutions

Overfishing
Environmental factors: models do
not represent increasing
environmental degradation
Socio-economic change:
uncertainty about economic
processes

•

•

Positive feedback of overexpansion
due to development subsidies:
irregular fluctuations in the fishery
resource resulting in harvest levels
that are too high and encourage
additional economic investment

•
•

NMR: Rational
Choice Theory
models; Common
Agency models

•

Lack of cooperation between
fishermen and government

•

Political Ecology:
Political Economy
and Environmental
Degradation

•

Neoliberal market
Treadmill of Production

•

Poststructural PE:
Geography and
Anthropology of
Fishing Communities

•

•

•

•

Representation and enrolling of
fisherman as rational economic
actor
• Lack of cooperation between
fishermen and government

Quota systems
• Catch shares
• EBFM for better
information about
ecological and socioeconomic relationships

Stop federal subsidies
Quota systems
• Catch shares
• EBFM for integration
among science,
management, and harvest
activities; adaptive
management
Development of a
conservation ethic by
industry
• Localized permit holding
Fixes/alternatives to
Capitalist relations
• EBFM for participatory
management
Understanding and
support of non-capitalist
economic relations
• EBFM for participatory
management and view of
social beyond economic
•

communities of St. Martin and Olson may not dominate the everyday NFMC discussions, these
researchers and others who share similar qualitative social-scientific approaches are respected
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participants in regional management and marine planning institutions (NEFMC, NROC, RPB),
national professional meetings (fisheries and management meetings, workshops, conferences
such as the National Scientific and Statistical Committee Workshops and the American Fisheries
Society annual conference) and international fisheries organizations (ICES, MARE). They also
contribute to NEFMC committee meetings and have interactions with managers and fisheries
scientists and social scientists at GARFO and NEFSC. Knowledge from analyses of dynamic
processes of power and translation within the network does circulate, albeit not in those explicit
terms, in the fisheries management discourse in New England and in interactions of regional
council members and fisheries social scientists and scientists in regional meetings, and therefore,
in essence, play a role in governance of the New England fishery.
National Standard 2 both affects and is affected by what Council members and the public
(through a commentary process) value as the best science. NS2 was last amended in 2013 by the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) “to ensure the highest level of integrity and
strengthen public confidence in the quality, validity and reliability of scientific
information.” NMFS, a division of NOAA in the Department of Commerce, is responsive to the
needs of the eight regional management councils and makes amendments to them as necessary.
The 2013 amendment to NS2 addressed the role of the Science and Statistical Committees of
each of the Councils in providing scientific advice to the Council for Annual Catch Limits, but
also clarified SSC members participation in peer review panels withstanding any conflict of
interest. In their role of providing scientific advice, SSCs are positioned to identify and report
any need for changes to the National Standards. The SSC also makes suggestions to the Council
on how to respond to any NMFS changes to the National Standards137.

137

During my fieldwork in 2015 and 2016, changes to National Standards 1, 3, and 7 were being negotiated by NMFS with the
Regional Management Councils that included “Updating optimum yield and maximum sustainable yield concepts” and making
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Environmental, economic, and social scientific methodologies and information that use an
epistemological approach similar to natural science (i.e. scientific method) of measuring objects
of study and calculating changes over space and time, are accepted as “best” science for use in
management, and are easier to include in multidisciplinary bioeconomic modeling efforts.
Defining structural categories for analysis and finding independent relationships between them is
a trusted scientific way to sort out information to rationally process it to make sense out of our
world. When research knowledge is linked to policy recommendations, the theoretical analyses
that get the most attention are the ideas that identify the direct causes and effects that
immediately and obviously make sense. For example, despite critiques of the geographical work
of widely-known researchers such as Jeffrey Sachs (e.g. the success of development in coastal
countries versus failure in landlocked countries) or Jared Diamond (e.g. the key role of several
contributing factors in ecocide and societal collapse) for being overly deterministic, making
problematic assumptions from a perspective of hegemonic privilege, accepting correlation as
causation, and being dangerously irresponsible in generalizations that a primary factor controls a
socio-ecological system, their work is widely lauded and both directly and indirectly affects
policy at many levels.138 While useful information is offered by these types of deterministic
studies whose explanations and answers are quickly recognized as sensible and obvious, the
elevation of causally deterministic epistemologies to the status of the best or only rational and
acceptable ideas for policy-making – to the exclusion of other epistemologies – has been
implicated in the failure of fisheries governance (Bavington, 2010).

“Provisions to further advance ecosystem-based fisheries management”. The NEFMC SSC played a significant role in these
changes through their advice to the NEFMC and NMFS.
138
Jeffrey Sach’s theories on economic growth as a function of access to the coast are considered a poor use of GIS mapping and
analysis by many geographers. Jared Diamond’s book Collapse, while used in many high school and undergraduate courses
because of the easy-to-follow research methodology and analysis, is also heavily critiqued by for its simplistic ecological
determinism. Both scholars are very influential in the non-profit and United Nations intiatives, and, even to some extent, U.S.
domestic and foreign policy arenas, as well as in educational institutions.
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National Standard 2 does emphasize the use of established quantitative methods and
models where uncertainty can be statistically calculated and objectivity is defined by scientific
standards, however the Standard does open the door for “emergent science” and “alternative
scientific points of view…when there is a diversity of scientific thought.” Since natural resource
management approaches are multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, NS2 must include guidance
on both “natural” and social science. If socio-ecological systems theory continues to emerge in a
stronger role in the fishery management network, NS2 will also need to accommodate
transdisciplinarity where the distinction between natural and social science and quantitatively
and qualitatively derived knowledge is effectively integrated.
National Standard 2 section 4 states (emphasis added):
(4) Scientific information includes, but is not limited to, factual input, data, models,
analyses, technical information, or scientific assessments. Scientific information includes
data compiled directly from surveys or sampling programs, and models that are
mathematical representations of reality constructed with primary data. The complexity of
the model should not be the defining characteristic of its value; the data requirements and
assumptions associated with a model should be commensurate with the resolution and
accuracy of the available primary data. Scientific information includes established and
emergent scientific information. Established science is scientific knowledge derived and
verified through a standard scientific process that tends to be agreed upon often without
controversy. Emergent science is relatively new knowledge that is still evolving and being
verified, therefore, may potentially be uncertain and controversial. Emergent science
should be considered more thoroughly, and scientists should be attentive to effective
communication of emerging science.
(5) Science is a dynamic process, and new scientific findings constantly advance the state
of knowledge. Best scientific information is, therefore, not static and ideally entails
developing and following a research plan with the following elements: Clear statement of
objectives; conceptual model that provides the framework for interpreting results, making
predictions, or testing hypotheses; study design with an explicit and standardized method
of collecting data; documentation of methods, results, and conclusions; peer review, as
appropriate; and communication of findings.
(6) Criteria to consider when evaluating best scientific information are relevance,
inclusiveness, objectivity, transparency and openness, timeliness, verification and
validation, and peer review, as appropriate.
(i) Relevance. Scientific information should be pertinent to the current questions or issues
under consideration and should be representative of the fishery being managed. In
addition to the information collected directly about the fishery being managed, relevant
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information may be available about the same species in other areas, or about related
species. For example, use of proxies may be necessary in data-poor situations. Analysis
of related stocks or species may be a useful tool for inferring the likely traits of stocks for
which stock-specific data are unavailable or are not sufficient to produce reliable
estimates. Also, if management measures similar to those being considered have been
introduced in other regions and resulted in particular behavioral responses from
participants or business decisions from industry, such social and economic information
may be relevant.
(ii) Inclusiveness. Three aspects of inclusiveness should be considered when developing
and evaluating best scientific information:
(A) The relevant range of scientific disciplines should be consulted to encompass the
scope of potential impacts of the management decision.
(B) Alternative scientific points of view should be acknowledged and addressed openly
when there is a diversity of scientific thought.
(C) Relevant local and traditional knowledge (e.g., fishermen's empirical knowledge
about the behavior and distribution of fish stocks) should be obtained, where appropriate,
and considered when evaluating the BSIA.
(iii) Objectivity. Scientific information should be accurate, with a known degree of
precision, without addressable bias, and presented in an accurate, clear, complete, and
balanced manner. Scientific processes should be free of undue nonscientific influences
and considerations.
Qualitatively-derived knowledge is discussed and presented in scientific evaluation
reports for the NEFMC in cases where it is determined that quantitative measurements or surveys
or models cannot be done. For both qualitative or quantitative analysis used in management, the
legally-mandated practice is to officially make a wide solicitation for feedback to make sure that
all of the considered information and assumptions of the models seem appropriate to all of the
stakeholders, scientists, and managers. For qualitative studies, in lieu of statistical values for
uncertainty, detailed disclaimers made in the reports state the complexity of the system makes
the uncertainty difficult to evaluate. In a presentation by a GARFO social scientist on the
evaluation of impacts of different alternative actions for the Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) for Amendment 18 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan,
evaluations of potential “impact” were summarized using the same scale for very different types
of references based on very different types of information. Several tables in the Executive
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Summary of Amendment 18 summarized the potential impact on “Valued Ecosystem
Components” of each amendment alternative that was being considered.
Figure 4.1 is a reproduction of Table 89 in the Amendment 18 FEIS provided the
analytical evaluation descriptors that led to the designations of high negative, low negative,
negligible (although the term neutral was used in the FEIS), low positive, high positive, and
uncertain for impacts. This ranking is system is based on a management tool called a
Cumulative Effects Assessment developed in the 1970s for Environmental Impact Statements
and continually modified as guidelines for “appropriate methods and tools” with step-wise
processes and procedure for evaluations for policy decisions139.
As the FEIS states, “Impacts of all alternatives …are judged relative to baseline
conditions, as described in Section 6.0, and compared to each other.” Section 6 is a 67-page
detailed description of an abundance of data that went into the evaluation and assignment of
these designations. The FEIS clearly states the preference for quantitative scientific analysis, but
acknowledges, “[w]here possible, quantitative impacts are estimated, but the Council has limited
ability to quantify the impacts of some of the management measures proposed in this action. As a
result, most alternatives are a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis.” The
disclaimer for needing to use qualitative research was listed with the caveats for uncertainty to
use qualitative research was listed with the caveats for uncertainty in quantitative economic
analysis because of “complicating factors.” For example, the economic modeling analysis come
with this disclaimer, “There is limited ability to model long-range economic impacts. Any
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Management Strategy Evaluation is a more recent tool that is gaining acceptance and being used to assess negative and
positive impacts of management decision options. This evaluation process involves using modeled simulations to compare
possible outcomes of different management actions and “assess the consequences of uncertainty” (Punt et al., 2016). MSE
provides consistency and “best practices” guidelines for this type of options evaluation process. The role of this tool is discussed
in terms of the development of EBFM in New England in chapter 5.
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Figure 4.1 A Table in Section 7.1 Analytical Approach and Limitations of the Amendment 18 to
the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (pp. 206-207) that shows the Cumulative
Effects Assessment metrics used in the evaluation of impacts of Amendment 18 proposed
alternatives.

attempt to model economic impacts into the future assumes no changes in the structure of the
economy in the interim. This is an unrealistic assumption over the time periods associated with
the rebuilding plans.”
This process of cautiously incorporating qualitative information unfolded in a similar
way in the evaluation of impacts that involved both quantitative and non-quantitative analysis in
the EBFM Plan Development Team’s report to the Council on “Scientific Advice on Herring
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Control Rules that account for forage requirements and the role of Atlantic herring in the
ecosystem.” After independent and group analysis of both quantitative and qualitative research,
the PDT debated in several tense meetings on how to present their evaluation. They presented
the information the report was based on throughout the document and summarized in the
following tables in Figure 4.2 along with disclaimers for not having quantitative data. Section
10.2 Socioeconomic Considerations of this report ends with the following disclaimer: “Finally,
Rice and Duplisea (2014) provide an important historical perspective on the management of
forage fish fisheries. In particular, the review points out that many of the concerns regarding
forage fish fisheries currently under discussion were raised in the 1970’s. Although the tools
with which to analyze the trade-offs have changed, the fact that the discussion continues 40 years
on indicates the complexity of the issue.”
The point of these examples is not to critique the thorough and transparent effort to assess
possible impacts on complex issues for policy development nor to imply that knowledge from
social theory developed through political ecology research is directly making its way into
NEFMC reports. What these examples do show is that, although knowledge from quantitative
models and analysis are the most widely accepted, qualitative knowledge does make it into the
final analyses along with expressions of awareness that quantitative studies are not always as
uncontroversial, accurate, or precise or complete as the “best” quantitative information to be
used preferentially. The efforts to make information and procedures for evaluation consistent
can serve as an impediment to getting knowledge from “emergent” or “alternative”
epistemologies into the discourse and decision-making process, but there is a dynamic set of
associations in the fishery actor-network between the legal and logistical frameworks,
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Figure 4.2 Reproduction of tables from the EBFM Plan Development Team’s report to the
NEFMC on “Scientific Advice on Herring Control Rules that Account for Forage Requirements
and the Role of Atlantic Herring in the Ecosystem”. The “potential effect” column changed
names and descriptions over several drafts as the PDT negotiated the best way to represent
knowledge where information of processes or values for uncertainty could not be quantified.

researchers, decision-makers, and the environment, ecology, and biology of the fish and fishing
communities themselves which do not always “cooperate” with the currently accepted “best”
scientific information and approaches.
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Brewer, who has researched Maine’s lobster and groundfish fisheries, calls for a more
pluralistic commons theory for fisheries management that incorporates the poststructural and
critical theory aspects of political ecology (Brewer, 2012b). She argues that fisheries researchers
and managers must continually question the assumptions that their assessments and
recommendations are based before moving ahead with strategies that are limited or harmful by
applying common property theory too narrowly or inaccurately (Brewer et al., 2017). She states,
“While scholars and decision makers are inevitably limited in capabilities and resources, if we do
not maintain broadly critical perspectives on our own assumptions, if we do not allow analysis
and deliberation to inform one another before initiating social experiments, we run the risk of
creating new policy problems, even if we resolve existing ones.”
Applications from knowledge produced through political ecology, science studies,
"alternative" economic analysis and visions, explorations of different relationships of laborers,
owners, and community members, and other social relations included in "human and nature"
may not be explicitly identified in current groundfish management decisions, but the ideas are
present. Their presence means that they are active actants in the fishery network that may have
an opportunity to play a larger role if they begin to be translated into practices and processes for
scientific analysis and management decision-making. Knowledge from "progressive" values of
equity and intersectionality and inclusion and opportunity for the marginal groups and nonanthropocentric viewpoints will continue to interact with the fisheries network and could be
included in a flexible and adaptive management regime that is seeking to experiment with
including different epistemological approaches. EBFM foundational ideas brings in some of
these things.
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4.5 Conclusions
The review and analysis of the social science literature on the groundfish crisis and
fisheries crisis in general in this chapter establishes that while many social scientific studies
conclude that a shift to Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management offers potential to address
failures in the current management system, different analytical approaches look to solve
differently perceived problems. This is an important finding because it illuminates the experience
that how EBFM is developed and will eventually be implemented in New England is influenced
by how the current problems in the fishery are seen and what proposed solutions are given
consideration. Although there are frequent overflowings of descriptions and predictions that are
used in management decision-making, the preference for consistency of information content and
format resists inclusion and development of “emergent” or “alternative” ideas into the discourse
and decision-making from research areas such as political ecology, or other post-structuralist or
critical social sciences. As established in the previous chapter, the standard knowledge
contributions to the NEFMC negotiations are not aimed at addressing many issues such as
climate change adaptation and communication across political partisanship divides, let alone
understanding of non-capitalist economic processes and fishing community culture, equity, and
well-being that can be contributed by political ecologists whose research is discussed this
chapter. The next chapter is an analysis of how the fishery science and management processes
and practices that are producing information and knowledge, as well as negotiating a “crisis,” are
translating Ecosystems-Based Management theory and federal guidance on EBFM into the
beginning stages of development of an Ecosystems Fishery Management Plan.
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Chapter 5 - Translating Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management in New England
For the past twenty years, approaches to fisheries management have been slowly evolving. It is
now widely recognized that for the effective management of a fishery, it is not enough to consider
only targeted species in isolation of their environment and other influences. An ecosystem
approach to fisheries management (EAFM) offers a far greater chance of developing realistic,
equitable, and sustainable management plans. This approach pursues sustainability by
balancing ecological and human well-being through good governance.
Hiroyuki Konuma, in Foreword to UN FAO
publication Essential EAFM: Ecosystem approach
to fisheries management training course, volume 1
for trainees, 2014
Chapter 5 examines the regional fishery science and management processes and practices
during a period when the science-based management paradigm is moving toward an ecosystem
conceptualization of the marine ecosystem, and efforts are being made to translate that into
fishery and industry practices by social scientists, economists, and managers. First, EcosystemBased Management theory and principles are explained and connected to fisheries management
needs 1) to work with complexity and uncertainty; 2) to allow for flexibility and adaptability to
changing circumstances, and 3) to better integrate human dimensions into management
decisions. In the next section, U.S. federal efforts, beginning in the mid-1990s, to develop
guidance for EBFM are detailed to establish the foundation for the New England Fishery
Management Council’s (NEFMC) efforts. Based on EBM theory and federal guidance
documents, the NEFMC began to develop their plans for EBFM with the expertise contributed
by regional fisheries scientists and economists.
Early efforts in the Council are described in the next section, and include descriptions of
the work done on ecosystems issues, but not directly on creating an Example Ecosystems Fishery
Plan. The chapter concludes with an in-depth ANT analysis of the emergence of EBFM in the
NEFMC. Two major findings discussed in this chapter include 1) that specific makeup and
functioning of New England fishery and its unique culture is affecting the way EBM theory is
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being translated into specific mechanisms for EBFM implementation; and 2) that
epistemological and ideological tensions and conflicts within the fishery are threatening its
cohesion and success.

5.1 Introduction: The Translation of EBFM Implementation Strategies
For the past several decades, fisheries literature has been calling for ecosystems-based
decision-making (Brewer, 2011; Fogarty, 2014; Grumbine, 1994; Scheiber, 1997). For most of
this period, the argument for an ecosystems approach was primarily based on identifying marine
ecological processes that affect stock population fluctuations. In the past two decades, as the
theoretical framework supporting Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management has developed,
scholars continue to identify additional ecological and social roles for ecosystems management
in reversing stock declines and collapses and avoiding past management errors. Much of the
research that calls for EBFM acknowledges that major issues of institutional momentum and
political entrenchment in current management strategies, and financial and logistical constraints,
create hurdles for getting EBFM off the ground and successfully operating (Brewer, 2011;
Degnbol et al., 2006; Hilborn, 2007; Maaike Knol, 2013; Nielsen & Holm, 2007). These
governance concerns are issues that implementation strategies for EBFM must address and
resolve.
Despite the perception among many stakeholders, managers, and some scientists involved
in management that Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management is a vague, poorly-defined
concept, Steven Murawski, former head of National Marine Fisheries Service, stated in 2007 that
“as a discipline and as a practice, fisheries scientists and managers are now clearly beyond the
whys and whats of EBFM and squarely in the middle of the hows” (Murawski, 2007). Various
interpretations of EBFM lead to a wide variety of applications for management in different
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regions around the world. The most common shift in management practices has been to multispecies approaches that consider trophic relationships. Key biophysical objectives and EBFM
implementation strategies have developed over decades by independent and collaborative work
between university and government scientists, NGO researchers, and stakeholder input through
workshops and written correspondence. Other examples of applied management objectives
include reduction of bycatch and protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems such as coral reefs
and seamounts and spawning and nursery habitats. Additionally, ecosystem approaches to
fisheries management include incorporating information based on ecosystems models140 about
fish community dynamics and large-scale environmental deviations such as climate change and
ocean current changes (Morishita, 2008).
This chapter is an exploration of the ways that, through the New England Fisheries
Management Council, EBFM theory is translated into implementation strategies though
everyday associations in the fishery network. Through these associations, the development of
EBFM is performed as the scientists, managers, fishing communities, and marine ecology and
physical environment all act together, transform their associations, and reorganize the actornetwork. The chapter concludes by considering dissipative forces that challenge the cohesion of
the network during these translation processes. With coherence of the network as the indication
of “success” of management interventions, identifying, describing, and trying to understand the
roots of these dissipative forces is one way to contribute to mitigating their negative effects.
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Ecosystems models rely on data from previously quantified marine ecosystems relationships to model possibilities for the
state of the resources and the wider ecosystems on which they depend. Because ecosystems and their components are dynamic
and exhibit notable variability, stochasticity and non-linearity, prediction at any but the simplest levels is very challenging.
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5.2 Ecosystem-Based Management Theory and Principles
Decades of theoretical and applied scholarship in both natural and social sciences have
contributed to the development of the concept of Ecosystem Based Management (EBM) for
renewable natural resource industries such as fisheries and forestry (Berkes & Davidson-Hunt,
2008; Bunch et al., 2008). EBM principles are rooted in ecology, environmental science, and
socio-ecological systems theory, and incorporate contributions from environmental and
ecological economics, environmental sociology and anthropology, participatory action research,
and systems-focused areas of management sciences such as soft systems theory, adaptive
management, and interactive planning (Bunch et al., 2008). Imperatives that emerge from the
extensive literature on EBM principles include: 1) applying an understanding of the
interconnectedness of all aspects of physical, ecological, and human systems and the feedbacks
that occur within these systems; 2) accepting change as a fundamental aspect of the system
requiring flexibility to adapt management actions; 3) accounting for cumulative factors that can
impact socio-ecological systems in compounding ways; and 4) analyzing socio-economic and
socio-cultural interactions and outcomes holistically to include broader conceptions of profit and
labor, value and values, and community agency, equality, and prosperity (Waltner-Toews et al.,
2008).
EBM theory emphasizes that change is a fundamental aspect of any system and that
steady-state conditions are temporary realities, not long-term norms. This leads to the
understanding that, even when the scientific information about the current state of the system is
well-known, decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and risks. This requires that EBM
strategies offer managers flexibility to modify or choose different management options to
accommodate changes to the system when current management strategies are not working well.
EBM theory promotes that management objectives need to include multiple benefits beyond
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Maximum Sustainable Yield for both human and non-human communities. It also emphasizes
that conflicting value systems and changing ecological and socio-economic conditions
necessitate negotiations of tradeoffs.
5.2.1 Ecosystems-based Management for Fisheries
Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management (EBFM) is the broad term applied to any
ecosystem-based initiatives that are part of a fisheries management body’s efforts to regulate
fishing effort to prevent overfishing141 (Link, 2010). Applications of EBM theory to fisheries
management strategies foreground the role of ecosystem relationships in the abundance and
stability of commercial stocks. Reasons for transitioning away from management primarily based
on single-stock population assessments and toward EBFM include the urgent need for strategies
1) to work with complexity and uncertainty, 2) to allow for flexibility and adaptability to
changing circumstances, and 3) to better integrate human dimensions into management
decisions. While most researchers and managers agree with all of these interrelated governance
needs, there is significant debate on how each aspect is defined and how EBFM can accomplish
them. Major trends in research on these three aspects of EBFM are described below.
Working with Complexity and Uncertainty
Some stakeholders, managers, and scientists in the New England fisheries argue that
trying to manage fisheries in light of ecosystem considerations adds more scientific complexity
and uncertainty to the already overwhelming scientific information requirements. However, a
common claim in the literature calling for EBFM is that it can reduce the amount and range of
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The term Marine Ecosystems-Based Management is used to describe ocean planning more generally, and includes
coordination efforts between fisheries and offshore energy production, aquaculture, coastal development, commercial shipping
and other industrial and recreational uses of coastal areas. The term Ecosystems Approaches to Fisheries Management is used by
American regional fisheries management for more ad hoc ecosystems-based regulatory measures that do not fall under a
consolidated ecosystems fishery plan. NOAA Senior Scientist for Ecosystem Management Dr. Jason Link has attempted to make
the distinction between these terms explicit and more uniform in their published literature (Link, 2010).
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scientific information needed and simplify management processes, thereby making fishery
management more tractable. In their assessment of the groundfish crisis, Apollonio and Dykstra
(2008) posit that a good “ecosystems hypothesis” for managing New England fisheries could
greatly simplify the current management regime and make it more effective. They argue that the
“present system suffers from the multiple burdens of great complexity, great uncertainty in its
rule-making authority, arbitrary deadlines, and no clear point of final responsibility."
Policies need to perform well despite scientific uncertainty and risks associated with
unexpected and undesirable changes in the ecosystem. Because many ecosystems considerations
such as trophic interactions, habitat quality, and climate change effects on water currents and
temperature involve dynamic, path-dependent processes, one EBFM approach to uncertainty
would be to make decisions that are not reliant on needing to know or predict precise populations
or the exact state of aspects of the system at any given moment. Using ecosystems information
for management does not necessitate using “mechanistic details of ecosystems” and predictions
directly (Schindler & Hilborn, 2015). Using ecosystems models and ecological and socioecological systems theory, more information about the fishery can be included in policy
decisions without requiring high-precision population estimates to make decisions. Ecosystems
models step out from the specificities of single-stock assessments and provide information about
the community of interacting fish in their shared habitat. Stock assessments would still be used to
monitor the health of the populations of individual species, but management decisions would be
made on the more general information provided about energy dynamics and trophic
relationships, other interspecies interactions, habitat and niche needs, and fishing effort
interactions. In this sense, working with uncertainty would involve employing multiple
ecosystems models together to provide information on different aspects of the ecosystem,
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establishing boundaries to uncertainty by reducing the number of possible scenarios (Elizabeth A
Fulton et al., 2011; Schindler & Hilborn, 2015).
One fisheries science tool that has been developed to address uncertainty used in singlestock management is seen as having significant potential for ecosystems-based management.
Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) is a tool that allows scientists and managers to simulate,
or quantitatively model, the performance of different management strategies to see if they can
meet management objectives. Operating models are created to simulate the fishery socioecological system along with proposed harvest strategies. Three ways that MSEs are designed to
provide information for decision-making include 1) classifying scenarios and conditions as
“more likely” through simulations of multiple plausible hypotheses; 2) suggesting strategies that
are robust in the face of the uncertainty, and 2) identifying tradeoffs that address priority
management objectives ((Butterworth, 2007; Punt et al., 2016). MSEs are meant to refocus the
“costly and highly politicized” debates whether or not there is enough certainty about the status
and function of the system to act on toward negotiating management strategies even when
uncertainty has not been resolved (Butterworth, 2007; The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). One
requirement for MSEs to work well is sufficient identification and representation of different
areas of uncertainty142 in the system model so that strategies that perform well regardless of
uncertainty can be identified – and so that areas where research is needed can be prioritized (Punt
et al., 2016).
The simulations provide information to assess tradeoffs. That data is typically presented
in graphic forms of web diagrams of performance statistics, Pareto frontier plots of optimum
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In the frequently referenced paper “Management strategy evaluation: Best practices,” Punt et al. (2016) describe five
“sources” of uncertainty in operating models for MSEs: process uncertainty (e.g. natural mortality rates); parameter uncertainty
(e.g. estimated values); model uncertainty (e.g. best representative equations); input data uncertainty (e.g. errors when conducting
assessments), and outcome or implementation uncertainty (e.g. subsequent impacts of fishing on management strategies).
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solutions for sustainability, and other types of graphs and plots showing results of the
performance of management mechanisms, like harvest control rules, in terms of different
outcomes such as yield, profit, fishing effort, spawning stock biomass, and interannual biomass
or profit variability. Because many possible scenarios are considered, determination of the
likelihood of success of different management strategies are informed by more information that
just stock assessments. This process can also be useful to identify the inputs that have the
greatest effect on the results of different management strategies. Operating models can be
modified to bring in new information or address discrepancies between real-life situations and
events and model output (Punt et al., 2016).
From the perspectives of some systems researchers143, the approaches to addressing
complexity discussed above are actually focused on complicatedness, not complexity.
Complexity of socio-ecological systems is “characterized by irreducible uncertainty, multiple
attractors144, and nested hierarchical scales viewed from multiple perspectives” (Kay, 2008). This
definition of complexity of systems embraces the idea that we are not in control of the system
and therefore cannot actually manage people or nature in the traditional sense. This requires a
fundamental change in management practices away from solution-oriented strategies that assume
one correct perspective that relies on monitoring of the system to correct “mistakes” (Kay, 2008;
Kay & Schneider, 1994). Instead, complexity reveals that the best scientists and managers can do
is to anticipate the way the system is likely to work and to be ready to cope with “surprises.”
Systems scientists working on Ecosystems-Based Management posit this can be done with
broadly participatory decision-making by multiple “epistemological communities.” Kay argues:
“[u]nder conditions of complexity, science can arrive at a set of answers that are not even
143

Many systems researchers whose work contributes to the theories of complexity, uncertainty, and Ecosystems-Based
Management described here are represented in book The Ecosystem Approach (eds. Waltner-Toews, Kay, and Lister, 2008)
144
For self-organizing systems, or systems where some level of order arises out of interactions in the system, attractors are a set
of mathematically-described states that the system tends toward regardless of the starting conditions of the system.
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probably correct but are only, at best, possibly correct. […] Investigators into complexity
do not seek prediction, control, right answers, or efficiency. These are not sensible goals
under conditions of complexity. Rather the investigators seek understanding, adaptability,
and resilience. Scientific inquiry, more than ever, becomes an act of collaborative
learning and knowledge integration. The role of expert shifts from problem solving to
exploration of possibilities and from giving correct advice to sharing information about
options and trade-offs.” (Kay, 2008)
Capacity for management to be carried out in this way has to be built through practice
and experience and requires the creation of institutions and policy that supports interactive and
iterative learning environments. Different strategies and perspectives that are offered by a
community of scholars, practitioners (fishermen, industry, and fishing communities, in this case),
and policy makers need to be negotiated through a system of peer review that rigorously
investigates and questions the data, information, and methods, but managers must be open to
implementation of management ideas that challenge their own expertise, experience, or preferred
understanding. Everyone involved in this type of complex system management would need to
continuously improve their understanding of the co-development and inseparability of socialecological systems. For this type of management, the overarching question is, “Is the system
moving in the desirable direction?” If it is not, the question becomes, “Can our current
understanding take us where we want to go?” If not, managers must lead the efforts to seek,
negotiate, and implement alternative perspectives, paths, and scales of action to “encourage” the
system toward a better state.
Allowing for flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances
Ludwig et al. (1993) argue that even if scientific certainty was attainable, it would have
relatively little influence on management decision making. Healey & Hennessey (2000) therefore
suggest that redefining institutions to integrate fishery science, fishery management, and fishery
harvesting more effectively would more directly improve decision-making capabilities.
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Interactive governance theory addresses this need for integration by calling for “institutional
experimentation” to develop greater compatibility and mutual responsiveness between the
“governance system” and “system-to-be-governed” in fisheries (Bavinck et al., 2005; Jentoft,
2007; Jentoft et al., 2010; Kooiman et al., 2005, 2008). Since all of the participants in these
systems – the management and political institutions, the stakeholders, the resources, the
ecosystems - are “diverse, complex, dynamic, and vulnerable,” success of the fishery is
necessarily dependent on the ability of the participants to actively work and learn together as
they try new organizational dynamics and management strategies to address fisheries challenges
more effectively (Jentoft, 2007).
Brewer (2011) sees EBFM as ideally providing the flexibility and adaptability of
management mechanisms to handle the path-dependent characteristics of ecological and social
domains of social–ecological systems by allowing for “more iterative and bidirectional
exchanges between scientific and practical perspectives…” (Brewer, 2011). In their article on
goals and strategies for rebuilding New England groundfish stocks, Brodziak, Cadrin, Legault,
and Murawski (2008) argue that rebuilding targets need to be considered, and reconsidered over
time, due to “uncertainties due to density dependence, trophic interactions or environmental
factors” so that rebuilding plans can adapt to changing circumstances. “This underscores the
importance of viewing management as an ongoing experiment that requires flexibility.” Some
argue that rather than framing options as limited with a traditional precautionary approach,
EBMF needs to embrace flexibility and seek creative and situationally-tailored options.
Adaptability complements the flexibility approach by emphasizing regular and comprehensive
monitoring and assessment to indicate when responsive changes to management mechanisms are
needed.
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Integrating human dimensions into management decisions
In theory, EBFM brings “human dimensions” into management strategies much earlier
and more thoroughly than the current management paradigm by conceptualizing the fishery as a
socio-ecological system. It requires a major shift in the way that the “human dimension” is
conceptualized and analyzed in traditional management practices. Current single-species
management is based on assumptions about the rational economic behavior of individual
fishermen, and EBFM theory proposes the importance of the inclusion of an anthropological
perspective of community actors in the analysis of management options (Hall-Arber et al., 2009;
Olson, 2010, 2010; Kevin St. Martin, 2001; Kevin St. Martin et al., 2007).
Although social sciences have made significant contributions to the debates about
sustainability, employment of socio-ecological social science concepts in natural resource
management lags behind the research and theory development (Hicks et al., 2016). Charnley et
al. (2017) argue that some criteria for evaluating the “best available” natural science for natural
resource management decision-making do not work well for all relevant social scientific
methodologies and epistemologies. They call for establishing evaluative criteria for “best
available social science” that allows for decision-making contributions from qualitative research
and constructivist epistemologies that emphasize the relevance and value of multiple
perspectives and voices and acknowledge and address the researchers’ biases and assumptions
that influence the research (Charnley et al., 2017). This is seen as a necessary to get the EBM
concepts for equity and justice into the decision-making (Breslow et al., 2016; Charnley et al.,
2017).
Ecosystems Based Management (EBM) scholars have sought to bring in ideas from the
concept of “well-being” that has been developed in a broad range of fields including psychology,
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medicine, economics, and sociology and applied as measurable social indicators in the fields of
public health and international development (Coulthard, 2012; M. L. Plummer & Schneidler,
2012). Definitions, research methodologies and interpretations of human well-being vary widely
(M. L. Plummer & Schneidler, 2012). Established and proposed indicators of well-being for
EBM range from strictly economic determinants of well-being (both objectively measured and
self-reported) to more difficult factors to measure such as values, agency, inequality, and
elements of culture (Hicks et al., 2016). In most cases, these indicators are limited in their ability
to answer specific management questions but can offer insight and guidance and make
management decisions more defensible (Charnley et al., 2017).
Researchers contributing to the U.S. West Coast Integrated Ecosystem Assessment (IEA)
of the California Current Large Marine Ecosystem have defined human well-being as “a state of
being with others and the environment, which arises when human needs are met, when
individuals and communities can act meaningfully to pursue their goals, and when individuals
and communities enjoy a satisfactory quality of life” (Breslow et al., 2016). This definition
incorporates material and subjective aspects of human well-being, and considers both individual
and community motivations and social relations. The West Coast IEA researchers have proposed
a systematic way for managers to develop “valid and pragmatic” social indicators for marine
EBM that are appropriate to specific areas (Breslow et al., 2016; Charnley et al., 2017). In their
evaluation of over 2000 well-being indicators used globally, they found that the “most
conceptually useful” indicators do not have the data that would allow for the analysis of
tradeoffs. Therefore, establishing well-being indicators would serve to guide social science
research needed for EBM.
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5.3 Federal Guidance on EBFM for Regional Fisheries Management Councils
The first formal efforts toward the development of EBFM in the regional management
bodies in the U.S. grew out of the 1996 amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Conservation and
Management Act, called the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA). These updates to the MSA
included conservation obligations for fish habitat and effects of fishing on the environment. Two
reports released in 1999 laid the groundwork for regional Councils to begin to explore
ecosystems considerations in management and begin the process of developing EBFM plans.
The first was a report written for scientists and the public by The National Research Council
Ocean Studies Board’s (OSB) Committee on Ecosystem Management for Sustainable Marine
Fisheries for the National Academy of Sciences. This OSB project included a broad range of
scientists and social scientists, including industry and ENGO representatives and focused on
analyzing fisheries sustainability to ensure that “fishing activities […] do not cause or lead to
undesirable changes in biological and economic productivity, biological diversity, or ecosystem
structure and functioning from one human generation to the next.” The report concluded, “… the
committee proposes a new context, an ecosystem viewpoint in which humans are the major
player, in which we must proceed in order to have any hope of maintaining sustainable fisheries
in a world in which climate is changing and the human population is growing” (National
Research Council, 1999).
A second highly influential report released in 1999, which was aimed at policy makers,
was the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Ecosystem-Based Fishery Management: A Report
to Congress by the Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel (NMFS, 1999). The Ecosystem
Principles Advisory Panel (EPAP) was created by NMFS by a mandate of the 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act to “assess the extent that ecosystem principles are used in fisheries management
and research, and to recommend how such principles can be further implemented to improve our
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Nation’s management of living marine resources.” The EPAP, a multi-disciplinary and panel of
scholars and practitioners, “set a framework for beginning to take actions” toward applying
ecosystem principles in fishery management. The report provides principles, goals and policies
for the development of EBFM. One notable recommendation is to develop regional Fisheries
Ecosystem Plans (FEP) to be used as guidance for how ecosystem information should be used
for existing for single species or multispecies complex Fishery Management Plans (FMP). The
report also highlights the need to assess and account for uncertainty by “developing risk-averse
management strategies that are flexible and adaptive.” It suggests that EBFM will require the
exploration of alternative forms of governance to meet the goals of ecosystem health and
sustainability, to “create incentives for humans to be prudent predators,” and to experiment with
approaches to decision-making in the face of opposing objectives of different stakeholders and
sectors.
Two subsequent papers co-authored by members of the EPAP emphasized the need for
conservative and precautionary approaches to setting Optimal Yield levels to prevent irreversible
negative changes in marine ecosystems (Fluharty & Cyr, 2001; M. P. Sissenwine & Mace,
2002). In Governance for Responsible Fisheries: An Ecosystem Approach, Sissenwine and
Mace stress fisheries contribution to human welfare “as food, livelihood, recreation and for
cultural reasons” and that “a responsible fisheries should produce a high level of human benefits
on a sustainable basis.” The paper has a significant section on the objectivity and quality of
scientific information necessary for EBFM and proposes a professionalization of scientific
advisors on marine ecosystems. Similar to what NOAA Senior Scientist for Ecosystem
Management Jason Link proposes in his 2010 book on EBFM, Sissenwine and Mace argue for
training scientists to negotiate “subjective” social science issues of fairness and unacceptable
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change to ecosystems in addition to their natural science expertise.
Based on advice from NOAA Science Advisory Board’s External Ecosystem Task Team,
NOAA’s Executive Council called for Integrated Ecosystem Assessments (IEA) and established
an IEA Priority Area Task Team (Fluharty et al., 2006; NOAA Internal Ecosystem Task Team,
2007). NOAA’s Integrated Ecosystem Assessment Program was created in 2006 to provide an
analytical framework to implement ecosystems-based management for multiple “marine resource
sectors” that includes industries such as fisheries, aquaculture, energy, mining, tourism,
recreation, shipping, and transportation. NOAA produced a white paper describing the IAE
concept in 2006 and a subsequent NOAA technical memorandum on IEA in 2008 stating, “A key
goal of IEAs is to move toward clear, well-defined ecosystem objectives built on a science
strategy that fuses ecosystem components into a single, dynamic fabric in which human and
natural factors are intertwined (P. Levin et al., 2008; P. S. Levin et al., 2006). Federal funding
for IEAs began in 2010 and IEAs were established for five regions in the United States including
the Northeast, which is divided into three subregions, the Gulf of Maine, Georges Bank, and the
Mid-Atlantic. The Northeast IEA (NEIEA) program provides an annual State of the Ecosystem
report to the New England and Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Councils. The report
provides assessments of several management objectives based on evaluations of ecological,
environmental, economic, and social indicators. Development of risk assessments and
Management Strategy Evaluations (MSE) for specific areas are also part of the work of the IEA
to support the inclusion of ecosystems-based information into decisions for fisheries
management. The IEA process includes the use of a formal MSEs employing “models […] to
simulate the behavior of ecosystems and provide the ability to forecast changes in ecosystem
state as a consequence of management scenarios and decision rules.”
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Building on IEA efforts, in 2015 and 2016, several NOAA report drafts started circulating
that provide guidance to regional management councils as they develop EBFM including NOAA
Fisheries Climate Strategy and NOAA Fisheries’ Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management
Roadmap. NOAA Fisheries’ Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management Roadmap serves as a
template within American regional marine fisheries for general strategy for implementing
EBFM. Key implementation strategies includes 1) the acquisition of data and knowledge from
various sources in order to provide a thorough understanding of critical ecosystem components
through academic literature, resource users, and environmental experts; 2) defining social and
ecological indicators for monitoring an ecosystem's status and providing feedback on
management progress; 3) setting thresholds for each indicator and setting targets that would
represent a desired level of health for the ecosystem; 4) determining risk for the indicators and
negotiating tradeoffs; and 5) determining a process for observation and monitoring.

5.4 Beginning to Construct EBFM in New England
In 2005, the New England Fisheries Management Council, along with the other Atlantic
Ocean regional fisheries councils, received a grant from Congress to work with the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS or NOAA Fisheries) to begin discussions about developing
management strategies in consideration of ecosystems contexts. The formal EBFM efforts in
New England began with 10 Stakeholder Workshops between Oct 2-Nov 3, 2005. During and
following the workshops, a stakeholder questionnaire was completed by 113 participants to
gather information about objectives for fishery management, indicators of a healthy fishery,
matching management tools to objectives, delineating local ecosystem boundaries, and the
capacity for local governance. In 2005 and 2006, many presentations were made at the various

194

committees and subcommittees of the NEFMC on implementation efforts in other fisheries,
science in support of EBFM, and strategies to begin drafting an EBFM Plan. In 2008, the
Council informed the Science and Statistical Committee (SSC), the NEFMC’s scientific
oversight committee, of its desire to have EBFM Plan developed and implemented over next 3-5
years.
The major outcome of this assignment was a White Paper, largely based on a stakeholders
workshop held August 26-27, 2009, outlining a conceptual framework for moving toward EBFM
in the Northeast region. The final version evolved from number of drafts between MarchNovember 2010. In the White Paper, the SSC acknowledged the failure of current methods and
critiqued the current management system as unwieldy. It stated a desire to consolidate the current
nine Fishery Management Plans administered by the Council, thereby making governance more
efficient. Species-focused management would be replaced or supplemented by governance
systems that better connect human activities to defined ecological regions. It emphasized that the
federal legal mandates in the MSA, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA) require resource managers to take account of the impacts of
human activities on the ecosystem, as well as the impact of management on fishing participants
and communities. The Report suggests that legal changes in the MSA and the National Standards
are needed for Regional Councils to implement EBFM as envisioned in the White Paper.
While work on integrated ecosystem assessments and ecological models continued at
NOAA’s Northeast Fisheries Science Center, EBFM was not on the NEFMC’s priorities list in
2011, 2012, 2013. Council work on the creation of a comprehensive EBFM management plan in
New England was sidelined by two other management priorities. Intense efforts were focused on
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dealing with the groundfish crisis by concentrating on difficulties with the single stock
assessments and addressing the blowback from setting extremely low groundfish quotas.
Additionally, spatial management objectives, mandated by federal law, were a critical priority
for the Habitat Committee, which had been working on the Omnibus Habitat Amendment since
2004.
The Omnibus Habitat Amendment (OHA2) addressed trophic and other ecological
interactions in areas of Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) by designating Habitat of Particular
Concern (HPC). Prior efforts to minimize the adverse effects of Council-managed fisheries on
EFH were largely developed and implemented plan by plan, although fishery effects on EFH are
cumulative across fishery management plans because fish and fishery distributions overlap
across both species and plans. After intense efforts over eleven years, in April 2015, the Habitat
committee finalized the Environmental Impact Assessment and final draft of the Amendment
with preferred alternatives to suggest to the Council for adoption as the final amendment. On
January 3, 2018, three years after the draft OHA2 was delivered to the Council and fourteen
years after the efforts on OHA2 started, the NMFS informed the NEFMC that it approved OHA2
with two exceptions, including a hotly contested exemptions for clam dredges in a couple of the
newly designated habitat management areas. Notably, even though the Habitat Committee and
the EBFM Committee shared both members and environmental concerns, the specificity of the
mandate for EFH and HPC designations resulted in the lack of any integration of the OHA2
efforts with the work on EBFM implementation strategies over the same time period.
Meanwhile, EBFM returned to the Council’s priority list in 2014. On May 22, 2014, the
EBFM Oversight Committee Meeting reconvened. This first meeting was a series of
presentations on EBFM practices around the world; a summary of this meeting was presented at
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June 2014 NEFMC Council meeting. The Oversight Committee met again on July 31, 2014 with
more background presentations on EBFM examples and candidates for ecosystem indicators. A
recent PhD graduate presented her dissertation findings about stakeholder understanding of
EBFM and buy-in at this meeting. Additionally, a formal request for members of an EBFM
Advisory Panel was issued; this panel is representation for industry, environmental NGO, and
fishing communities’ interests, but it was not assembled. This preliminary EBFM research was
presented again at Sept 2014 NEFMC meeting. On October 15, 2014 the EBFM Plan
Development Team met. It was led by Michael Fogarty, chief of Ecosystems assessment at the
time, who has worked on ecosystems issues at the NEFSC since 1980. It was at this meeting that
the NEFSC suggested the general structure for how an EBFM Fisheries Ecosystem Plan (FEP)
could proceed. This general structure was not presented at the November 2014 Council meeting
and would not be discussed at the NEFMC for several more meetings. The delay was due to a
motion that was passed during the 2015 priority-setting deliberations charging EBFM PDT to
develop a guidance document for Herring Amendment 8.
The NEFMC shifted priorities away from working on a management plan for EBFM to
contribute to ongoing work going in the Atlantic Herring Committee. From January to June
2015, the primary focus of the EBFM Committee was developing guidance for an amendment to
consider control rules for the Atlantic herring fishery that account for herring’s role as forage in
the ecosystem. This task was assigned to the EBFM PDT to respond to Flaherty, et al. v. Bryson
et al., a case brought against the NEFMC, that found the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management
Plan violated the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) and
other federal acts because it did not sufficiently recognize the importance of Atlantic herring as
prey for other commercially-valuable fish. Initial efforts to address the case included
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consideration of alternative control rules including the “Lenfest” and “Pacific” control rules
recommended by the ENGO EarthJustice in its comments to the Council regarding the 20132015 herring fishery specifications, on behalf of Herring Alliance and plaintiffs in case. The
NEFMC’s SSC rejected the alternatives as inferior to the ones already presented by the Herring
committee, and so the EBFM Plan Development Team, the scientific subcommittee of the EBFM
committee, spent the following six months wrestling with the issues of risks and tradeoffs as they
relate to the herring catch harvest policy in context of the food web and the marine ecosystem.
In March 2015, the EBFM PDT delivered a memo to the Council seeking additional
guidance and insight from the Council about the management objectives to be achieved with a
forage-based control rule. They indicated that until they received feedback about what objectives
are important to managers, it would be difficult for the EBFM PDT to develop a satisfactory
guidance document. Their request was never satisfactorily answered. This process proceeded in
some ways as a trial run for thinking about some of the objectives for EBFM and how they could
be implemented. Several very tense and frustrating meetings of the PDT to discuss advice for the
Herring Committee highlighted what could and could not be done through the knowledge base
and technologies available to the PDT member scientists and social scientists.
The result of the EBFM PDT’s deliberation was published in a white paper, “Scientific
advice on herring control rules that account for forage requirements and the role of Atlantic
herring in the ecosystem” in June 2015. A major portion of the paper is dedicated to a literature
review of relevant studies on herring biology, ecology, predator consumption, and forage fish
economics. The report emphasized that indirect effects on benefits to other species and trophic
interactions are difficult to quantify and that decision-makers must settle on an ABC control rule
that meets multiple objectives considering scientific advice about “the way we think things
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work.” Potential effects on herring yield and biomass could be quantified, but ecosystem effects
from trophic interactions would necessarily be given qualitative evaluation.
The report did offer two technologies from the suite of strategies discussed by Fogarty at
the October 2014 EBFM PDT meeting to provide some of the quantitative evaluations to assess
trends, if not provide precise values and rates. The first of these is ecological trophic models that
use existing data on predator consumption habits to calculate energy flow requirements. The
Northeast Fishery Science Center (NEFSC) has several models in process, but several of them
have substantial shortcomings for use and all of them require more research for input data and
more time — up to years — for development. These models require many simplifications of the
system and rely heavily on predatory consumption estimates that have been critiqued as patchy
and imprecise. The second tool proposed in the report is a Management Strategy Evaluation to
help quantify how different control rules developed based on ecosystems considerations compare
in what leaving a higher biomass of prey would cost in terms of lower yield and higher
variability in yield. The upshot of the advice was to wait for the development of ecosystem
models in progress and a MSE created for the Fisheries Ecosystem Plan. It was determined that
ecosystem functional group aggregate data on forage fish as part of the FEP, rather than data on
herring alone, would be more accurate and useful.
The joint work of the Herring and EBFM PDTs concluded that available research could
not assess the tradeoffs of leaving more herring in the ocean for predators, including
economically important ones, and the benefits for the herring industry. Prior research showed
contradictory results, with strong arguments on both sides of the debate. The White Paper on the
EBFM PDT’s recommendations note that Rice and Duplisea (2014) state that “many of the
concerns regarding forage fish fisheries currently under discussion were raised in the 1970s.
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Although the tools with which to analyze the tradeoffs have changed, the fact that the discussion
continues forty years on indicates the complexity of the issue.” Some of the scientific uncertainty
and complications for understanding, modeling, and predicting trophic relationships discussed in
the herring white paper, based on a broad literature review concerning herring as a forage fish,
include:
1) Uncertainty in life history parameters of all predatory and prey species makes spatial
and temporal changes difficult to parameterize and model (e.g. diet changes, growth
rates change, etc).
2) Variation in activity pattern (e.g., energy needed to search for prey) and prey quality
together also can effect growth rates of predators.
3) In terms of quantifying and modeling, alternative food sources of herring predators,
alternative prey are not necessarily equivalent. Assumptions of the availability of
alternative prey resources, ignores the variations in nutritional value between species.
4) A reduction in the energy density of herring as forage when they are at high
populations suggests that their energy content is not a fixed value but varies with
population density.
5) Predator-prey interactions are not only governed by the abundance of prey but how
prey are distributed over the space that predators search within (e.g. predation is a
density-dependent process and has implications for the energy predators expend in
search behaviors and the efficiency in which they capture and consume prey to
produce growth and reproduction).
6) Spatial management measures require assessing patch size attributes of herring
interactions with predators, and fishery performance, requiring new data or analyses of
existing data in new ways.
7) Feedback loops where forage fish prey on young fish of predators and themselves see
complicate modeling of feeding interactions.
8) Climate change (both decadal variations and long-term) affect the ways and rates that
herring and its predators respond to changing water temperature, salinity, thermocline
formation, and currents making it difficult to quantify and model these processes
accurately.
9) Herring can be left unharvested, but there is no manner in which to allocate
unharvested fish between predators. Which species benefit from a higher stock of
herring is a stochastic process depending on the competitive advantage of each of the
species predating on herring, as well as the relative biomass of the predators and
alternative prey stocks, and potential seasonality of herring availability to each species.
10) Although economic surplus has been estimated for some species, there are major gaps
in our knowledge regarding the values being derived from herring either directly or
indirectly. Some of the value generated by herring is non-market (for example, the
welfare generated from watching aggregations of marine mammals off public
beaches). Survey methods for estimating these values are expensive to implement,
sensitive to the information presented and exact questions asked, and prone to
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hypothetical bias. Ultimately, then, economic researchers rely on imperfect proxies for
the economic relationships and values they are modeling, which generates additional
uncertainty into the trade-off assessment.
Even before delivering the herring guidance document at the June Council meeting, a
memorandum was distributed at meeting of the full EBFM committee on March 30th and 31st of
2015, one the next steps for EBFM development. In the memo, the EBFM Committee chair and
vice-chair, the Council, and GARFO staff listed policy alternatives for implementing EBFM.
Discussion of the memo culminated with plans for exploring development of an example Fishery
Ecosystem Plan, or eFEP. The EBFM committee discussed how the eFEP could serve as a
template for what an implemented plan would look like in order to 1) provide detailed
descriptions to stakeholders to solicit feedback and 2) determine what data would be needed and
what changes would have to be made in the National Standards and the MSA to support a move
away from the current quota system based on the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield.
After delivering the herring guidance document to the Council in June 2015, development
of an example FEP began in earnest. The herring ABC control rule advice assignment served as
a preparation for the PDT’s work on the eFEP. For herring, the EBFM Committee was asked to
set limits on harvest of forage fish, but the eFEP’s focus is primarily on setting quotas for
commercially harvested predators. It was suggested that the eFEP might run parallel to current
management processes to get a sense of the way that advice could be derived for management
and even possibly to simulate outcomes that might come from decisions made based on the eFEP
protocols. Despite the complications and concerns about quantifying model inputs described in
the Herring Advice document, the EBFM PDT pressed on with the ecosystems models and
management strategy evaluations, as key components to the operational framework to serve as
the basis for an example Fishery Ecosystem Plan. A little over a year later, at the September
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2016 full Council meeting, the EBFM committee circulated their first iteration of their eFEP
working document, the Draft Operational Framework and Operating Models to support an
Example Fishery Ecosystem Plan for Georges Bank.
The overall approach presented in the operational framework is to assign species to
functional aggregate groups using a combination of feeding guilds, technical interactions with
fisheries and other ecosystem components, as well as biological characteristics. The strategy
would employ an overall catch cap in a modeled area called the Ecosystem Production Unit
(EPU) based on the estimated energetics of the system and observed primary productivity. The
ideas is that constraints related to patterns of energy flow and utilization and biological
interactions within and between Fishery Functional Groups contributes to greater stability at
higher levels of ecological organization. Catch limits would be allocated by functional group, but
in aggregate would not exceed the EPU catch cap that would define overfishing. Biomass
‘floors’ would be established to protect species from becoming unacceptably overfished or
depleted. These floors could be developed using survey information and could be based on a low
percent of maximum stock size, considering the effect on risk and economic return. It further
requires the identification of Ecosystem Reference Points establishing limits and targets for
management and methods for determining catch levels in an ecosystem context.
Output from ecological models would be collated and compared to give an assessment of
the ongoing dynamics of the marine ecosystem. Several classes of ecological models exist to
study these relationships in the ecological system and a few models exist for the broader socioeconomic-ecological system. At present, the focus of the majority of these models is ecological
considerations to estimate fishery production potential. These models include two types of
Minimal Realistic Models: 1) Extended single-species assessment models which augment Single
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Species Assessment Models with Environmental Considerations; and 2) Multispecies Models
that estimate Biological Reference Points for multiple species that include various ecological
interactions. Typically, Biological Reference Points such as stock abundance and fishing
mortality rate (e.g. BMSY, FMSY) are computed for each stock and compared to current levels of
stock abundance and fishing mortality rate in order to determine the stock’s relative health and
establish MSY. A key element of the approach is the critical role of Management Strategy
Evaluations in analyzing management options under consideration. The MSE is intended to be
used to compare performance metrics of different harvest control rules, such as the probability of
yield being under MSY, yield amounts, interannual variability in yield, or robustness to scientific
uncertainty. The economic analysis explored in the PDT’s work on the operational framework
for EBFM was a form of portfolio analysis, based on the principles of economic investment
strategies, to calculate economic risks and returns across varying mixes within and between
Fishery Functional Groups. Finally, the eFEP would lay out methods for determining tradeoffs
and how they will be assessed and used in conjunction with biological, ecological, and socioeconomc metrics to generate catch limit advice for multiple stocks.
At the January 2017 NEFMC Council meeting, the EBFM committee again circulated
their working eFEP document, the Draft Operational Framework and Operating Models to
support an Example Fishery Ecosystem Plan for Georges Bank, along with an example of
application of an operating model and a catch advice framework. The latter documents were
requested by the Council who had difficulty understanding how the operational framework (first
presented at the September 2016 Council Meeting) would turn into management advice. In
addition to developing the specifications described above in the eFEP, the EBFM PDT continues
its efforts to include climate change science into the models and analysis. Evidence is building
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that stocks are migrating or suffering losses based on warming waters, ocean acidification, and
salinity changes. Encouraged and guided by NOAA Fisheries NOAA Fisheries Climate Science
Strategy145, climate change is gradually becoming a larger part of the discussions within and
between the EBFM committees and the Council.

5.5 Tracing Associations and Observing Translations as EBFM Emerges in the New England
Fishery Actor-Network
Analysis of the performativity of New England’s fishery governance in relation to the
efforts to develop implementation strategies for the EBFM for the region highlights that the
dynamic governance negotiations are not just between the fisheries scientists, managers, industry
and ENGO representatives who are in the room at the Council meetings, but also between the
warming oceans, the changing currents, the migrating and disappearing fish, the changing
economic and political forces, legal instruments, U.S. Congressional representatives, and global
fishing issues. This research observes how all of these forces come together through the
enactment of regional fisheries policy development in the New England Fisheries Management
Council. Through direct observations of these negotiations, one can see the ways that EBFM is
emerging in the specificities of this time and place and identify a few key associations that are
heavily influencing what the emergence looks like. Awareness of this performance can be useful
for researchers to see how their collective actions and negotiations allow for the actor-network to
cohere and for the fishery to operate successfully or where they cause dissipation of the actornetwork due to conflict or lead to actions that do not work in practice for the success of the entire
network.
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Surveys on the understanding and acceptance of EBFM indicate that the majority of
stakeholders and Council members who responded are positive about the general intentions and
themes of EBFM. However, when the question of implementation strategies and practical
logistics come up, a more hesitant attitude becomes apparent. Respondents to the surveys had
concerns in three overarching categories: 1) data needs; 2) economic feasibility, and 3) legality
(Biedron, 2014). These concerns surfaced at Council meetings whenever EBFM was broadly
discussed. For example, Dr. Jason Link, NOAA’s Senior Scientist for Ecosystem Management
who introduced NOAA Fisheries Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Management Road Map146 in fall of
2016, repeatedly assured the Council that federal law in terms of the MSA and National
Standards supported EBFM measures and that changes could be made easily to address any
specific instances where the law was vague or seemed to prohibit an EBFM regulation. Dr.
Michael Fogarty, the former Chief of Ecosystems Assessment for the New England Fisheries
Science Center, also addressed concerns about the availability of science data for ecosystems
models by stating that needs were being met and could be met for future requirements, and that
the models were coming together quickly and would be available for EBFM implementation.
When Council members questioned whether EBFM is too radical for the legal instruments or too
data intensive and complex for the current science, Fogarty pointed out that a version of EBFM
existed even before the regional councils were formed and took over management of New
England through ICNAF and reminded the Council that EBFM science has been developing for
well over sixty years.
Away from the Council table, scientists and ENGO representatives said the “real reason”
for the Council “dragging its heels over EBFM” were fears of economic vulnerability of the
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fishing industry to reductions in quotas that might result from ecosystem constraints and
uncertainties. At the Council meetings, economic discussions on EBFM included expressions of
concern about where the money for research and implementation will come from since it is
needed in addition to all the resources needed for stock assessments. Although it was never
explicitly discussed in the official meetings as the reason for wanting to get example catch
advice, several scientists and ENGO researchers working on the EBFM strategies indicated that
they believe that the Council members want to see what the advice will be in terms of quota
allowances because they do not want to accept EBFM if it will decrease quota and therefore
produce negative economic repercussions. Some of those who indicated this belief
acknowledged that EBFM could very likely lower quota caps to account for environmental
factors that are not included in buffers for risk.
5.5.1 New England’s Grounded (Fishery) Network: A Different and Multiple Fishery
Repeatedly throughout this ethnographic research, scientists, full-time managers, industry
members, and conservation NGO representatives told me that the New England Fishery
Management Council functions very differently from other Councils, affecting how its fisheries
are managed and EBFM is taking shape. The descriptions and explanations did not always align
with one another, but each interlocuter emphasized the uniqueness of the relationships of the
Council and its members to each other, the local ecology, and the political processes, now and in
the past. These actants also felt that New England’s “different type of system” affects the ways
Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management is being conceptualized by individuals, how the goals
and objectives are being formed by the Council committees, how the costs and benefits are being
viewed, and the specific ways EBFM implementation is being constructed in New England.
Specifically, participants in the fishery believe that New England has several divisive
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issues that other U.S. regional Councils do not have or have to a lesser degree that affect the
everyday interactions and management processes, and how these processes are perceived by the
participants as they are happening. These issues include a serious mistrust of government
science by the fishermen and industry representatives and a skeptical attitude toward government
agency-produced science by some Council members in favor of other scientific studies that
support larger quotas (see chapter 4). Additionally, New England’s Council has a reputation
among scientists and ENGO representatives for its inability to commit to clear and actionable
and long-term conservation goals. While this is seen as a major problem by scientists and
ENGO representatives, it is seen as a working strategy by Council managers and encouraged by
industry representatives: they argue that setting broad goals too early in the management process
decreases their flexibility to creatively find ways to ensure conservation of stocks while not
putting fishermen and the industry and communities out of business.
Many argue that these conflicts are escalated by the fact that the NEFMC has a large
number of industry representatives on the Council, including state representatives who are
allegedly “beholden” to the largest fisheries interests in their states. Scientists feel that, compared
to other regional councils they have worked with, the NEFMC is “especially slow getting science
into management.” One scientist suggested, “Maybe it’s good that power is not so entrenched
that nobody questions the science.” But others counter that presentation and discussion of
scientific support is gratuitous at Council meetings because everybody knows how they are
going to vote based on whether they believe the quotas and fishing access should be increased or
decreased. Many stakeholders who attend the Council meetings defend the managers’ tireless
efforts on behalf of the industry observing that they are constantly dealing with intensive media
coverage, the agendas of regional politicians, and collapsing stock crisis, denying them the
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luxury of planning for the long-term future. A few of the industry representatives who served on
the Council during the period of this fieldwork were considered, by allies and adversaries alike,
to be exceptionally persuasive rhetorically and adept at bargaining for the votes needed to
advance their pro-industry agendas. An impressed ENGO representative commented that the
industry representatives on the Council were “[g]ood opponents. They read everything. You
really have to step up your game.”
Several scientists felt that communication between scientists and council committees were
not well coordinated, even with Plan Development Team interactions. Scientists complained that
they really have to be willing to put themselves out there because they are challenged and
misinterpreted at Council meetings: “What scientist wants to sit there and be told his work
sucks?” An ENGO representative commented that the Council “doesn’t really care about
science of non-industry perspectives” and said that the comments they provide during mandatory
comment requests before a regulatory vote are addressed to Council, but they are often really
meant for NOAA Fisheries because NOAA is ultimately legally responsible for meeting federal
regulations for fishery management and therefore must listen. Within the NEFMC, some argue
that there is a hierarchy of the fisheries in terms of who influences fishery-wide regulations like
the Omnibus Habitat Amendment, and project that the scallop and herring fisheries will be
highly influential with implementation stages of EBFM.
The interview excerpts below are representative of several of the themes I heard
repeatedly and reinforce how the development of EBFM in New England is emerging from the
fishery participants’ sense of deep history and culture of the region and its experiences with the
groundfish crisis. They capture a sense of the NEFMC culture that you get some sense of
through the media and interviews with fishermen, but the way this “culture” plays out in
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management is more palpable at the management meetings and interactions at these meetings
and other events and come to play out during voting on regulations.
NOAA Scientist from the Pacific Northwest: Alaska is the last part of the country to be
colored by fish culture. It is the “negative” of New England. Management has learned
from what went wrong elsewhere…I was part of a U.S. delegation to a UN meeting about
fisheries in New England to discuss “discards at sea.” I believe that I got this insight from
hearing a fisheries scientist from New England speak: The New England fishing
community doesn’t believe in the process and results. It is the opposite in Alaska. But we
have context because the management is leading to successful results. For New England, it
seems like a belief system. Like global warming, some see it as a religion… But I think it
will all come down to rationalization in the end. There will be fighting, and the blame will
just shift. If it’s EBFM, people will just blame “the ecosystem” or “climate change”
[instead of the stock assessment controversies].
ENGO Representative: If you want to know what is happening in the development of new
policies in fisheries management, it’s, as you have learned, it is a very kind of slow and
tortuous process and it’s very difficult to know what is going on if you don’t go to the
meetings, even though it feels like a huge waste of time to be there… you kind of have to
be there to listen to what is going on because there’s no other way to really know at the
most basic level, going to the Council meetings and the committee meetings that are
associated with the Council, is to just know what is going on.
[…] in the Southeast and the Gulf of Mexico, Pacific, and now Alaska, the
councils are very different in those different places. Like when I go to the MidAtlantic, I actually feel like some of the Council members are really interested in
what I have to say and will talk to me on the side, and want to know what we
think about things, and will actually use our suggestions in their own thinking
about what they are going to try to push at the Council. That doesn’t happen very
much in New England…it ranges all the way from New England and the MidAtlantic and the Pacific and the North Pacific; The North Pacific has a whole
bunch of scientists on their Council, so they are very highly skilled, trained people
who are really operating on a different plane from what is going on here in New
England…a fisherman [I know] in the North Pacific…he’s always horrified with
the things that I tell him are going on here. The use of science and the
management of fish and fisheries for sustainability are just part of the culture,
people are used to it, it’s not very old. So when the fishery started, they already
had the idea that fisheries is something that is based on science.
[…] On a very basic level, the science we have in New England on ecosystems is
really very strong. I think awful lot of people on the Council itself have no idea
what we mean when we talk about EBFM. I think that there is a huge
communication barrier between the scientific...There’s a group of scientists doing
great science, there’s a group of Council members who mostly are clueless about
what EBFM means but know they are supposed to do it, and then there’s, I think,
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there’s a big communication breakdown. I think the Council staff, I think they
need a really skillful staff person to build a bridge from where the scientists are to
where the management is, and they don’t have that. I think some conversations
have already happened that are along these lines but I think there’s also…I think
there are people in power on the Council and at the Council office are nervous
about EBFM and want to make sure…not really sure what EBFM is going to turn
into, but they want to make sure that they have control over it because they want
to prevent it from being something they don’t want it to be. And they are,
probably most people on the Council are not going to make a commitment to
EBFM until they know what it means in terms of how many fish they can catch,
which is a big problem.
In some ways, that is the fundamental problem with the New England Council is
that you don’t have people on the council who recognize that they have a longterm stewardship responsibility and they need to commit to achieving some big
lofty goals, whatever it takes… I think there is a bit of a power struggle tied up in
it, a lack of vision, what they need to do is hire probably more than one person
who actually experience with EBFM, knows what it means, has a clear vision of
where it is going to go. One of the things this Council has a horrible time with is
agreeing to goals, and then deciding these are our goals. I don’t mean little nittygritty technical things. Okay, we want a resilient ecosystem that can support these
functions for the community including whale watching and things that are kind of
readouts of healthy ecosystem and then figure out how we are going to get to
these goals. Instead what they do is they get all buried down in the technical stuff
and decide what they are going to do based on what they are willing. It’s not easy,
but you have to try to do it, and I don’t think you can get anywhere. This problem
with the Council not framing goals goes way back before they were ever thinking
about EBFM. They would work on a policy, and they would almost intentionally
not define what the ultimate goal was because they wanted to see, they want to
see what the consequences are of various paths and decide which goal they want
to have based on what it is going to mean for what they care about the most. I’ve
seen it over and over…I remember in 2008 talking about this with some of the
Council members about this being a big problem. I guess it was Amendment 16
where they were trying to overhaul the groundfish plan so that it would have catch
limits and have sector system and all that and people were very reluctant to be
clear about what the goals were before they knew what it meant to achieve those
goals…which in some ways is natural, but…
University Scientist: Here in the Northeast, we have some of the best models in the world,
so if WE can’t do these things…Other regions are implementing EBFM with less data
density in most cases than we have. We just need to have the resources to apply it, and so
that’s the political management roadblock, so to speak. All this stuff that Mike [Fogarty]
leads now and Sarah [Gaichas] works in, they’re just on the cutting edge of all this stuff.
But they’re eight people, and only four of them are modelers, and there all of these things
that ought to happen and how much time does everyone have?
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There was lots of arguments that we needed to bring in fish data and overlie it
with the habitat and see where the actual habitats were and kept getting pushback
- ‘the actual fish stuff is for the groundfish committee’ - and that the resistance
within the fishing community. […] I mean, take a look at cod and their groundfish
survey, they’re absent in many more places in the Gulf of Maine than they had
been, and they are bunching up in the western part of the Gulf and so all these
guys that have dayboats are saying we have more cod than we’ve seen in ages.
Yeah, that makes sense; it’s not in conflict with the data; they’re just not looking
at the regional or global picture, so to speak. And there is no conflict there, I just
think people, and rightly so, are worried about their individual businesses.
But here we are, 40 years after extending our jurisdiction, management under the
New England Council, that’s taking cod from being overfished in 1976 at some
higher level to 3% of sustainable biomass in 2014. It’s not a success story, it’s not
a management success story. All along, the Canadian story has been different,
where there have been actual errors in assessments. Our assessments have
generally been, even for the crisis in the late 80s and early 90s, have been shown
to be pretty spot on, at least in terms of trends and directions and relative
numbers. And it was the actions of the managers that kept allowing overfishing by
not accounting for bycatch and not accounting for post-release mortality and lots
of different sources, and we can even go to habitat, the continued denial that
there’s any connection between seafloor habitat condition and the survival of year
classes and growth rates continues, and, part of it, some of it, there’s been some
recent work by folks at [University of Massachusetts Dartmouth] SMAST that
shows NO statistically significant difference in species composition inside and
outside of Closed Area 2. That’s what we are trying to do; this isn’t a statistical
battle or experimental design battle. This is, ‘What do we understand about how
the system works with all the variability within it and maximize the potential for
those animals to survive?’ We never answer that question for anybody because
nobody ever asks it. By the time things end up at a Council meeting, people
already know how they are going to vote; the science becomes irrelevant. Science
is politicized and it’s hard to bring those things to a full Council meeting where
people are ultimately going to make decisions, and nobody read those five
volumes in the Habitat Amendment (and you thought you were going to wait for
the movie, right!) and so people go in and vote the way they think about things or
the way they talk to other people about things and it’s, clearly, it’s not a way to
run a train. I am not sure, at least in the current makeup in this Council, that they
have the actual desire to do these things. […] It’s mostly been a paper chase.
Clearly the existing framework doesn’t work well. I mean this [EBFM] is not just
a change because it’s the cool thing to do. This is the change because what we are
doing now isn’t working very well. OY [Optimal Yield] has lots of flexibility as
long as it’s not arbitrary or capricious, in terms of what you’re doing, but no one
has ever done it here in New England. To say, well, cod's going down the toilet so
we’re going to cut another 30% from the numerical estimate reference point, to
come up with an OY less than that in order to account for uncertainty, and to let
animals grow bigger, nobody’s ever done it for any species. […] People on west
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coast, in the North Pacific, treat fishing as a business and most of their fisheries
are considered sustainable, but even with that, most people say if there are no fish
next year, I am not paying off my boat…
University researcher: In my opinion anyway, the NE Council is, I don’t know what the
right descriptor to use is… well, I’m not very impressed with this Council. I don’t think
this Council really cares very much about science or about the non-fishing industry
perspectives on things, even though they are using a public resource that belongs to
everybody. […] The Council is not working; it hasn’t worked for 40 years. There’s always
excuses made why it hasn’t worked. […] Magnuson has worked in other parts of the
country quite well; why it’s not working in New England is a cultural problem.
Groundfish […] it’s commercially extinct, on industry’s watch; you’ve lost your
right to manage this. Every other part of the country figured this out; you haven’t,
you lose, end of discussion, accountably. One year here, one year there, that’s
fluctuation, but with groundfish it has been, especially with cod, which is
symbolically important, but financially not really. […] Yeah, let us get at it or else
we are going to go out of business. No, you put yourself out of business. […]
Look, we’re managing the implosion of the 21st century fishery in New England.
It’s been centralized, single-stock by single stock, serialized depletion, as I
mentioned, centralized catching, centralized processing, centralized distribution
and that drove the resource into the ground.
[…] EBFM promises a way forward with a very different vision of how the 21st
century New England fishery could survive. Unfortunately, Amendment 18 to the
groundfish plan pretty much, that could have also restructured the human effort on
this but it was eviscerated by industry reps. I want EBFM to take a nice long time,
especially with the Council’s current make up. Because the current makeup is look at who is on the Council. […] The state directors, who are supposed to
represent the public, don’t. The state directors represent the richest members of
their public, the central processors, the auction houses, those people who tell them
what to do. […] …the further along it gets before the various industry reps get it
into their sites, the more robust it’s going to be. Once it gets out there, the worst
thing that could happen right now, I think, from the scientific and ecological
perspective, is to have some of the interested parties that have consistently
mismanaged their own resources jump in there and try to gerrymander the models
to optimize the profitability of their clients. They’re doing their job and so I am
not faulting them, but the process needs to recognize at some point, your financial
interest is going to compromise the viability of this management model, and you
should not have a dominant say in how it is developed. That’s not going to happen
though. So, the longer this can go along quietly and make a small target, the better
[…] We’ve gone from that level of minutiae goes from management to
engineering; we don’t know enough to engineer this ecosystem. The problem with
the 2007 reauthorization of MSA is that it took a very traditional, internalist vision
towards science and it viewed science as the way science was viewed in the
1950s, value-neutral, objective, but […] scientists tend to have as much as an
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agenda to grind as [industry] does, so it’s on both sides, the problem is when you
weaponize the science, then the biggest gun wins, but that’s exactly what we’re
doing. […] But then you turn around and try to gerrymander the system, so it
doesn’t look like you are trying to get it all, but you are trying to get it all.
Industry Representative: All these PDTs are made up a state and federal scientists, they
don’t have industry people on them; which is different from other parts of the country
apparently, but New England is a very different type of system, we’re more of a town
meeting type management; I couldn’t survive in the Pacific Northwest; it would drive me
nuts. It’s more of a dictatorship, they have public comments for an hour at the beginning
of the meeting; they don’t allow public comments at every motion and I think that they're
lucky because they didn’t start off with a depleted resource. So, I think New England does
a great job managing looking at where we started from. We got a lot of stocks that are
back, healthy, but we got a bullshit management system that doesn’t allow them to be
harvested, you know, from the groundfish perspective and that’s what I’m saying.
The characterizations of fisheries management culture of the New England Fishery
Management Council described above are continuously confirmed by interactions of actants in
real-time at meetings and other fisheries events and in formal and informal conversations; this
understanding of the day-to-day performance of fishery management is not obvious from
analysis of documentation alone. However, it is also useful to recognize that even though there is
some agreement on the characteristic relationships and predispositions at the NEFMC meetings,
not everyone can agree on how to represent the meetings in a way that advances the strength of
their position within the network. Even before regulations are negotiated, the public record of
the negotiations is negotiated itself. Recognition of this allows you to see the multiplicity of the
experiences of the meetings themselves rather than a straightforward and clear process of
negotiating a single fishery. This is relevant to emergence of EBFM because this is how the
process works and it can be important to “win” these negotiations so that the official narrative
reflects the fishery of the winners. These are not straight-forward negotiations of best science
and best policy; they are battles for the reality of the fishery that include how the science is
represented and what that science is, what the goals of actions turn out to be, and what the risks
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and tradeoffs are and how they are valued.
An example of how the different perspectives of different actants affect the management
processes can be seen in how difficult it can be to produce official summaries of meetings that
everyone who was at the meeting agrees on. When comparing my careful and copious field
notes from attending management committee meetings to the official summaries that are
collectively written and approved by the committee, my notes often paint a very different picture
of how the discussions and negotiations proceeded. An interchange I witnessed at one meeting
for which there was no official written summary, despite the legal requirement for one, shows
that even Council members recognize this issue. In a discussion at a Science and Statistical
Committee meeting, the chair suggested that they move to two-day meetings instead of one day,
so that “we can get more headway on reports.” One committee member, a university population
dynamics scientist, agreed that it is useful to nail down the text of the summary report at meeting
because even though it is hard to get a quorum at the meeting, email discussions are too hard,
because you “can’t see peoples’ reactions, and how strongly they feel.” Another SSC committee
member, a NEFSC population dynamics scientist commented, “There have been problems when
the pre-Council reports are seen; some SSC members may interpret discussion differently.” The
chair then sought comments from the audience. An industry representative who is not on the SSC
responded: “…it is important to discuss what was written here and what was written afterwards.
It has been troublesome when the report was written mostly afterwards.” They agreed with the
government scientist who spoke earlier: “walk out the door, and some will say one thing and
others say another.”
The problems that arise when creating summary documents that are presented at the
general Council meetings and used for the legal record are not due to a lack of effort to capture
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the essence and details of meeting. It is a difficult task – especially when some of the discussions
and decisions will be controversial within the Council, with the federal fisheries branch of
NOAA, with stakeholders, and the general public who cannot attend SSC meetings.
One of many informative examples of where my field notes do not line up with an official
committee summary document, with significant repercussions for understanding what gets
included in “ecosystems considerations” can be seen in the two-day EBFM Committee on March
30th and 31st, 2015. The first part of the discussion at this meeting was about a task assigned to
the newly constituted EBFM Plan Development Team to advise the Council on a harvest control
rule that accounts for herring as a forage fish. Throughout this meeting, there was some tense
indirect banter between an EBFM committee member who also has financial interests in the
herring industry, and two tuna fishermen who were in the audience and represent stakeholders
whose businesses depend on the availability of herring to other fisheries and whale tourism
through the CHOIR Coalition. The Council member questioned whether the tuna industry’s
concerns should be included in the EBFM PDT’s advice about ecosystem considerations for
herring. They repeatedly said that the tuna industry’s concerns were “social” issues and not
ecosystem issues, and that the issues that they were raising about the need for spatial
management to address localized depletion were not possible to address with a control rule so
they should not be considered in the EBFM PDT advice document. The discussions that
followed took her lead and it was agreed by the Committee to “keep space and time out for now
and do the best, simplest thing”, and as one committee member said, just try to make a control
rule that “won’t get us into trouble.”
Some of CHOIR’s comments were briefly noted in the official summary meeting notes,
but the indirect back and forth exchanges between the Committee member and the tuna
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fishermen did not register as such, especially not the pacing and soto voce angry comments of
the tuna fishermen. Also, the powerfully influential rhetorical style and privileged position of the
Committee member is only evident if you are in the room and hear how others talk about them.
They command respect and attention, even by those who are often on the opposite side of their
arguments. This influence was extremely important to the negotiations of the EBFM’s tasks
moving forward at this meeting. However, outside of that meeting, CHOIR’s concerns did get to
the PDT and were included in the advice they composed for the Council. This is partly due the
fact that CHOIR joined forces with the ENGO Earth Justice, who were strong supporters of the
lawsuit to protect herring stocks. Earth Justice has effective tactics of getting PDTs to use the
information that sometimes gets excluded from Council and committee negotiations. As I
learned from subsequent interviews I conducted, ENGO representatives email, call, and visit
PDT members, and remind them that their legal obligation to give advice based on the best
science requires that they review any relevant studies they are made aware of and include the
study in the record. Capturing the management processes of the Council through attendance at
the meetings, reading the summary documents, and speaking to and overhearing individuals
about their efforts to influence the NEFMC decisions makes it clear that winning the policy
debates depends on the effectiveness of actants and their associations to dominate the public (and
written) narrative of the fishery. I would have no idea why “localized depletion” and the need for
spatial availability of herring was initially taken off the table for the PDTs work and then made
its way back into EBFM PDT advice document and other Council meetings. The winners of this
debate may argue that the “best science” prevailed, but it can be argued that it did not do so
simply because it was the only best science.
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5.5.2 Dissipative Forces Acting in the Actor-Network: Epistemological and Ideological Tensions
and Conflicts that Threaten Cohesion
Epistemic conflicts in New England’s fisheries science and management processes affect
the ways that Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management is emerging. These epistemic conflicts
include not only the differences in what individuals and groups count as valid information to
manage the fisheries, but also differences in what the fishery comprises and what is valued about
the fishery. For example, on a coarse scale, whether the fishery is seen primarily as an industry
for economic development or as socio-ecological system (or ecosystem) to be conserved affects
what is offered and chosen as the best science and the best management interventions.
Contradictory epistemic positions also indicate whether a person or group thinks an ecosystemsbased management strategy can/cannot do in terms of science-based information and
management and whether or not EBFM can become operational and improve fisheries
management.
Two general areas of epistemic conflict, each with different ways that conflict is
manifested, effect how influence and power is enacted to protect what is valued. The first general
epistemic conflict involves disciplinary training and includes 1) differences in the analytical
positioning and methodologies of different types of natural scientists, broadly defined here as
biologists and ecologists, and 2) differences between primarily positivist, quantitative scientific
and social scientific approaches and other empirical approaches that are primarily qualitative,
based in ecological and social theory, and are based on the conceptualization and analysis of the
“natural" and “social" world as a construction largely affected by human perception and political
processes. The second general epistemic conflict includes a values conflict that emerges from the
interests, ethics, and social views individuals have developed over their lives influenced by their
educational background, socio-economic class, livelihood and community associations, and
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ethical frameworks, and plays out through political ideologies and contemporary partisan
affiliations that affect their choice of best science and social science, their acceptance of the
stock and ecosystem assessments, and their contributions to fisheries management.
These conflicts in ways of seeing and understanding the fishery affect the ways that the
New England fisheries management network is enacted to conduct research, define goals and
objectives, analyze costs and benefits, and create regulations. They also set up conflicts that arise
due to the different ways that different participants in the management process define and work
with the foundational management concepts of uncertainty, risk, tradeoffs, stability, and
flexibility. These conflicts threaten to dissociate the actor-network, disrupting its functioning and
contributing to the failure of governance. This is evident in the early phase of work by the EBFM
Plan Development Team and Committee through discussions in Council and committee
meetings, through the creation of documents by the PDT to give advice on the management of
herring in context of its role as a forage fish, and in interview discussions.
Epistemic Conflict 1: Biological and Ecological (Mis)Understandings Affecting the Emergence
of EBFM
Part 1: One Generalized Description of the Conflict: Pragmatic, Objective Fisheries
Biologists vs. Doomsday Environmental Scientists
Tension between population biologists and ecosystem scientists in fisheries research is
explicitly discussed in the fisheries biologist literature by two scientists, Hilborn and Sissenswine
(Hilborn, 2007; M. Sissenwine, 2007). Hilborn, who is highly regarded by many fisheries
managers, is a professor of aquatic and fishery science at the University of Washington. He is
well-known for publishing critiques of the research and activism of ENGO researchers,
conservation scientists, and ecologists in academic journals, blogs posts, twitter posts, and opeds. Sissenwine is the former Director of Scientific Programs and Chief Science Advisor for the
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U.S. National Marine Fisheries (NMFS) and currently has a highly respected voice on the New
England Council.
In viewpoint articles in environmental science journals, they both argue that fisheries
scientists who are part of the management process (who are mainly population biologists due to
the stock assessment requirements) are much more pragmatic and optimistic - and correct - than
the environmental scientists who view the global collapse of fisheries as imminent (Hilborn,
2007; M. Sissenwine, 2007). Sissenwine (2007) laments that big-picture ecologists bring their
environmental biases into their understanding of the state of the fisheries and their potential for
management for success, and claims that fisheries scientists are more objective and better
informed. Both argue that, frequently, the articles that make it into the respected, widely read,
ecumenical science publications like Science and Nature, and subsequently make it into
newspapers like the New York Times and Washington Post, are from ecologists who predict
doomsday scenarios147. Sissenwine (2007) suggests this is because these apocalyptic scenarios
make good headlines and satisfy the public's need to find groups other than themselves to blame
for environmental degradation. He also argues that when fisheries scientists find inaccuracies in
these studies or refute the interpretations, the publications rarely, if ever, print retractions.
Part 2: A Slightly More Specific Description of the Conflict: Fisheries Biologists focused
on smaller-scale, immediate solutions for healthy and prosperous fisheries vs. Fisheries
Ecologists focused on larger-scale, long-term conservation goals
On a broad, global scale, the differences in perspectives between ecologists and biologists
include very different assessments of whether or not the science supports the conclusions that the
world is facing a catastrophic level of overfishing that needs to be addressed through reduction
of harvesting. The “viewpoints” discussed above present one-side of this tension, assuming that
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See D. Pauly et al., 2005; Worm et al., 2009
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fisheries ecologists who work in fisheries management share their (biologists’) disagreement
with the ecologists they critique. This representation misses important ecological, ideological,
and political aspects and the nuances of the tensions between fisheries biologists and ecologists
that will continue to affect management as it shifts to EBFM and can be witnessed through
ethnographic observations of fisheries science and management in action at the NEFMC.
A prevalent discourse about fisheries management in fisheries biology148 literature is
focused on biological overfishing149 that can be addressed through resource management. In this
literature, the most commonly-cited cause of fish stock declines is identified as intensification of
fishing resulting from increases in the size and number of fishing vessels and improvements to
equipment (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2010). There is consensus
among influential fisheries biologists who are closely involved in and write about fisheries
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Fisheries biology as distinctive from fisheries ecology literature. There is some overlap in these literatures, but the divisions of
perspective can be seen roughly along these epistemological lines.
149
FAO fisheries term portal subdivides the general term overfishing into five categories: biological, growth, recruitment,
ecological, and economic overfishing. The portal lists a definition of overfishing as "A generic term used to refer to the state of a
stock subject to a level of fishing effort or fishing mortality such that a reduction of effort would, in the medium term, lead to an
increase in the total catch. Often referred to as overexploitation and equated to biological overfishing, it results from a
combination of growth overfishing and recruitment overfishing and occurs often together with ecosystem overfishing and
economic overfishing". Biological overfishing is defined as "Catching such a high proportion of one or all age classes in a fishery
as to reduce yields and drive stock biomass, and spawning potential below safe levels. Can involve both growth overfishing and
recruitment overfishing. With reference to a surplus production model, biological overfishing occurs when fishing levels are
higher that those required for extracting the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of a resource." ((Both definitions are from:
Garcia, S.M. (Comp.). 2009. Glossary. In Cochrane, K. and S.M. Garcia. (Eds). A fishery managers handbook. FAO and WileyBlackwell:473-505.),
For further clarification of the subcategories of overfishing, consider the definitions provided on the FAO term portal:
-growth overfishing: Occurs when too many small fish are being harvested too early, through excessive fishing effort and poor
selectivity (e.g. too small mesh sizes) and the fish are not given enough time to grow to the size at which the maximum yield-perrecruit from the stock would be obtained. A reduction of fishing mortality on juveniles, or their outright protection, would lead to
an increase in yield from the fishery. (Definition source: FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, FAO, 2014.)
-recruitment overfishing; A situation in which the rate of fishing is (or has been) such that annual recruitment to the exploitable
stock has become significantly reduced. The situation is characterized by a greatly reduced spawning stock, a decreasing
proportion of older fish in the catch, and generally very low recruitment year after year. If prolonged, recruitment overfishing can
lead to stock collapse, particularly under unfavourable environmental conditions. (Definition source; Restrepo, V. 1999.
Annotated Glossary of Terms in Executive Summary Reports of the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas Standing Committee on Research and Statistics SCRS). ICCAT, Madrid, Spain.)
-ecosystem overfishing: Occurs when the historical species balance (composition and dominance) is significantly modified by
fishing (e.g. with reductions of large, long-lived, demersal predators and increases of small, short-lived species at lower trophic
levels). (FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, FAO, 2014.)
- economic overfishing: Occurs when a fishery is generating no economic rent, primarily because an excessive level of fishing
effort is applied in the fishery and does not always imply biological overfishing. (Definition source: FAO Fisheries and
Aquaculture Department, FAO, 201
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management in New England is that local regulations can successfully prevent or end
overfishing.150 International conventions and federal laws to address overfishing and
overexploited stocks are considered by the fisheries biologists to be flawed, but strong and
workable guidance documents for fisheries scientists and managers to implement. Complaints by
fisheries biologists include that the MSA and National Standards, the legal guidelines of the U.S.
regional fisheries management bodies, pose mandates that can be too broadly interpreted and that
counterproductively set economic development and conservation at odds. However, there is a
sense that with more funding for more science, smartly-negotiated consensus definitions of
reference values and indicators, and good political governance and compliance, the processes in
place to successfully manage and even re-build collapsed stocks is possible (Brodziak, Cadrin,
Legault, & Murawski, 2008; Methot, Tromble, Lambert, & Greene, 2014). Fisheries biologists
publicly support and credit restrictive fishing measures with stocks that are rebuilding in New
England, such as the groundfish haddock (Jon Brodziak, Cadrin, et al., 2008; Rosenberg et al.,
2006; Worm et al., 2009).
Most articles published by fisheries biologists about the New England fisheries avoid the
widespread media narrative of fisheries collapse and focus on the possibilities of management
interventions. In fisheries biologists' framing of management, their research is firmly positioned
as solution-oriented efforts to meet the objectives of preventing or ending overfishing (Hilborn &
Ovando, 2014). In this literature, conservation management goals of marine ecosystems include
some acceptable inherent risk of overexploited stocks; therefore, advocates for significant
reductions in or total cessation of commercial fishing are dismissed as negligent of MSA
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There predominant view that commercial fisheries are worth the effort, money, and risk of overfished stocks. However, a few
scientists such as Cadrin (Testimony on NOAA’s Fishery Science: Is the Lack of Basic Science Costing Jobs?, 2011) and
Longhurst (Mismanagement of Marine Fisheries, 2010) challenge the science capabilities and the possibility of achieving
sustainability, respectively.
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mandates for addressing socio-economic factors. This resource-based perspective of fisheries
biologists accepts the risks and responsibilities of managing a living resource for a society that
wants marine fisheries as a valuable industry and desired food source with the assumption that it
has the potential to be exploited sustainably (Longhurst, 2010). Success means that managed fish
stocks are recovering, not overfished, and in the best case, fished at Optimal Yield, or the rate at
which the fish stocks are stable, and the economic profits are maximized. By this evaluation and
interpretation, there are many more examples of successes than failures in cases where fisheries
management is implemented like it is in the United States, Canada, Norway, and Australia
(Osterblom et al., 2010; M. M. Sissenwine et al., 2014)
A common theme in fisheries biologists' recommendations for the New England
groundfish fishery is that, to meet NMFS requirements, more frequent and more accurate stock
assessments are necessary. Without this, many argue (in published articles and in the interviews I
conducted) that decisions about quotas that are being made are too arbitrary, and by necessity,
reflect more precaution than is necessary (Cadrin, 2011; M. M. Sissenwine et al., 2014). Several
fisheries biologists argue that rigid ways of viewing legally mandated bioeconomic reference
values has led to some success, but there needs to be some flexibility for fisheries scientists in
situations where standard prescriptions are not achieving good results. Cadrin (2011) calls for
more economic analysis to address the economic aspects of MSY and optimal yield. He asserts
that with some flexibility in considering Total Allowable Catches (TACs) in terms of fishing
effort or target mortality (FMSY), stock biomass (BMSY), and Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY),
where fisheries scientists can determine how to achieve successful management results.
In fisheries biologists' analysis of management of groundfish specifically, a common
theme is that there are complications in managing mixed-species fisheries because, while
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measures may allow for the rebuilding of one of the species, others may defy efforts for
restoration (Cadrin, 2011; Murawski, 2010; M. M. Sissenwine et al., 2014). For example, the
New England haddock stock was successfully rebuilt under the same management regulations
that are being called a management failure for cod. Additionally, because the cod are not
recovering, Optimal Yield cannot be achieved for the other groundfish like haddock, because
they occupy the same area and are about the same size as cod. Specialized gear modifications
that preferentially catch haddock over cod151 are allowed by special exemptions in some areas to
deal with this problem. Cadrin (2011) proposes that these kinds of pragmatic solutions need to be
considered while continuing to use fishing effort restrictions for cod so that the economic
mandates of the MSA can be met. This specific and pointed approach to dealing with tough cases
like groundfish with mixed results are echoed by many of the scientists and stakeholders who
feel that sometimes NMFS requires a broader stroke to control fishing effort when a more
directed one would work as well and allow for the industry to survive. Wilson (2013) argues that
finer scale science and management are needed because the larger Georges Bank and Gulf of
Maine studies and management measures are too course and lead to underachievement of OY (J.
Wilson et al., 2013).
A significant discrepancy exists in biologists’ perspectives on management when
ecologists’ management strategies are discussed at the Council and committee meetings, in the
informal communication during breaks, and, in my interviews. Fisheries ecologists' analyses
differ from biologists both in terms of focus and scale of research and interpretations of the
science. In general, the ecologists focus on larger local- and regional-scale and global patterns
and long-term trends which makes their work less immediately and specifically applicable to the
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Haddock swim up when a net approaches, while cod swim down.
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day-to-day crisis resolution work of the management Council. In general, the fisheries ecologists
are more open to incorporation of more social and qualitative epistemologies in their
characterization of the fishery.
A fundamental difference between the biologists’ and ecologists’ viewpoints can be seen
in their framing of the larger goals of fisheries management. Conservation of ecosystem
relationships and functions is a primary goal of fisheries management for ecologists. The
precautionary principle means to ecologists that you would not make any fisheries regulations
that would decrease biodiversity, reduce or degrade habitat that would affect biodiversity or
populations, or allow for the increase of one species to the detriment of another through control
of fishing effort. Two council members and two ENGO researchers that I interviewed
independently brought up their frustration that, while they valued fishing as a livelihood and
desired a productive seafood industry, they could not understand why, when it is a business in a
capitalist market, some Council members and fisheries biologists insist that the failing
groundfish industry must flourish economically in accordance with the MSA and natural
resource development mandates.
An article by fisheries biologist Ray Hilborn reflects a different take on the possibilities of
ecologists’ prioritization of the ecological health in the service of a thriving fisheries economy to
meet socio-economic objectives:
“While EBFM is generally perceived as applying a softer touch on marine ecosystems
than would occur under single-species management, there is an alternative view. It is quite
possible that social objectives might be achieved by numerous forms of ecosystem
manipulation if these objectives are the production of goods and services from marine
ecosystems, and ecosystem knowledge/models are used to support decision making. One
obvious option is deliberate overexploitation of low-value species that prey upon or
compete with high-value species. On land, we shot the lions, wolves and bears and plowed
up the native habitat to produce much higher return of food production from the land than
would be obtained by collecting the native species. We do this in large scale in marine
ecosystems with shellfish culture, especially in Asia. Is this type of deliberate ecosystem
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transformation going to be an increasing part of area-based ecosystem management?”
Athough Hilborn may be somewhat facetious here, a version of this perspective has been
repeated in serious deliberations at Council meetings and among stakeholders about intentionally
overfishing dogfish or killing seals who eat groundfish or allowing greater cod bycatch or
herring overfishing because another species could possibly fill their respective ecological niches.
These perspectives are not shared in ecologists’ publications or by ecologist contributors to
EBFM at the NEFMC.
Part 3: How the biologist/ecologist epistemological conflicts are playing out as the NEFMC
negotiates the development of Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management
Differences in fisheries biologists and ecologists research foci and methodologies affect
what they consider the goals and objectives of the management bodies. During the period before
the EBFM committee began to work on the eFEP, in January 2015, the SSC had a brief, vague
discussion about EBFM after an hours-long discussion about the level of detail to provide about
single stock assessment model complications and uncertainties in their reports on their quota
recommendations. The head of the SSC ended the EBFM discussion saying, “the best available
scientific data may lie in the ecosystems and not the species.” This comment hung in the room
amid palpable exhaustion and frustration after so much work had gone into the painstaking stock
assessment process performed by many people in the room and their colleagues who dedicated
their education and career to the single-species mode of management. The frustration did not
stem from a resistance to Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management itself, but rather, from the
reference to the daunting task of learning and addressing all the new forms of ecosystem model
complications and uncertainties (in addition to continuing stock assessments as a part of EBFM
monitoring for thresholds).
The idea of a “turf battle” may seem like a strong characterization for epistemic conflicts
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among fisheries scientists, but this term is used frequently by fisheries NGO and industry
stakeholders and by university and government scientists to describe some of the tension
between approaches to setting quotas in the NEFMC, specifically the use of stock assessments
and the potential use of ecological models, and ways to use aspects of both. On a broad level,
this “turf battle” plays out through the cherry-picking of biologists’ (or, conversely, ecologists’)
research publications for management debates by different stakeholders and managers to
advance their visions of the fishery and its management. In general, industry representatives,
fishermen, local (and more politically conservative federal) politicians, and state representatives
more often refer to biologists’ studies and descriptions of the fishery to support their arguments
for targeted management strategies as members on the Council or through public comments and
personal communication. ENGOs, non-fisheries coastal industries, more politically liberal
federal politicians, and fisheries “human-environment” scholars more often advance more
holistic fisheries management positions using the research and framing devices of the ecological
literature.
In some specific uses, the “turf battle” referred to implicates the Population Dynamics
Branch and the Ecosystems Assessment Branch at NOAA’s Northeast Fisheries Science Center
(NEFSC). It is used in relation to competition for resources such as funding and dedicated labor
and influence in fisheries management in terms of what can be considered the best and most
objective scientific evidence. While scientists in each of the branches at NOAA and in the
academy express respect for their colleagues in the other branch, there is some level of
skepticism that is also indicated that the “other” scientists can answer the questions necessary for
quota setting in the best way.
According to several individuals working directly on EBFM and developing courses and
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books on it, "…most fisheries coursework on management still probably focuses on singlespecies. There are courses on ecosystems, but not the management aspect.” For example, two
population biologists similarly explained “biologists” way of dealing with the uncertainty saying
that they deal with using data with a lot of uncertainty (e.g. “gut shots,” or predator diets from
stomach contents), they provide multiple possible outcomes within the range of uncertainty, and
give guidance for risk that way. Acknowledging that their vision of EBFM is very different from
the ecosystem scientists, they agree that they are concerned about using output data with a lot of
uncertainty for subsequent models and analyses. One scientist who straddles the population
biology and ecology branches152 identifies as a very detail-oriented person who sees how the
problems with assumptions made in multi-species population dynamics models and ecosystems
models give everyone “heartburn.”
One biologist stated that they understood the use of ecosystems-based reference points for
EBFM, but did not fully understand or know if the vision and work based on ecosystems models
that the PDT and ecosystems assessment branch is proposing is “accepted.” Instead of using
stock assessments as a threshold monitoring mechanism within the EBFM framework, several
biologists said that they feel the stock assessments should still be the starting place for setting
quotas, and then subsequent adjustments and decisions can be informed by ecological models.
For example, they explained that single-species models come up with a probability distribution
for a catch limit which eventually gets boiled down to one number through addressing quantified
uncertainties and risks. In this process, you identify uncertainty, runs statistical tests, and check
for all possible scenarios within that range of uncertainty, and look for answers that are least
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They study ecosystems from a population dynamics point of view through looking at interactions of a single species in
ecological context and using multi-species surveys to do population modeling which is different from ecological modeling. For
example, these types of single-species approaches also account for predation and also model temperature preferences of fishes
too, including big changes in circulation which can affect prey.
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affected by that uncertainty. Ecologists talk about uncertainty in scientific data using different
language and scientific strategies. Ecosystems models and analysis would contribute “a list of
five things that might happen to the ecosystem that you should be careful of. To avoid possibility
1 of 5, set the catch advice a little lower.”
One ecologist argued that ecologists are even more cautious in their approach to
uncertainty than the biologists because they start with identifying different ecological states or
processes that can be inferred and avoid making any decisions that can be deemed “arbitrary or
capricious” using this information about the ecosystem. The ecosystems modelers approach to
dealing with the uncertainty of input data and simplifications of the system in the model
representations is to use multi-model inferences and many different data sets, and identify the
“signal” that comes across consistently in all of the outputs.
Another ecological scientist involved in the NEFMC's EBFM efforts simply stated their
understanding of the problem and path towards a solution: “As things got under control with
fishing pressure, other factors, natural interactions or forcing factors, became more evident and
more important...I personally believe it’s not feasible to achieve target levels for fishing
mortality on individual species. It is an unrealistic vision of precision and control. You set the
advice at a higher level of ecological organization, but then make sure you are putting in
protections, tracking the individual species. From there, you set ACL at level, and watch
individual species. You ratchet down fishing pressure on the group [species caught together] if
necessary.”
They further stated that ecologists realize that assessment of the individual species cannot
be ignored, especially because some of the most valuable stocks have the most vulnerable life
history strategies. They saw conflict arise because stock assessment scientists do not have the
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time to work together with ecosystems scientists. In their vision, ideally, everyone would be on
one team together - "stock assessment scientists, other physical scientists, social scientists" - and
would rethink the way things are done, re-address the spatial management designations as they
are now, and simplify the management so that it is not by species. “This would not be easy, but
would make it possible to coordinate on spatial boundaries.”
An ENGO representative with a scientific and legal background expressed concern that
the population biologists from the NEFSC who participate in NEFMC Plan Development Team
(PDT) committees do not support EBFM because only total biomass mattered to them, ignoring
spatial issues like localized depletion. The ENGO representative was referring specifically to one
NEFSC population dynamics scientist who actually rolled their eyes at the term “localized
depletion” and said they do not know where these ideas came from and did not think they were
relevant or scientifically sound. For this ENGO representative who emphasizes the fisheries
ecology literature, biodiversity is the primary goal. They feel this goal is neglected by the
Council and gave the example that they feel the NEFMC basically wrote off efforts to rebuild
yellowtail flounder because it is not commercially viable anymore and just decided to
concentrate on insuring abundance of scallops.
The New England Council does have a majority of fisheries biologists on the council and
its PDTs because catch limits are based on stock assessments for single-species. According to
many people who are familiar with other regional fisheries management councils, the relative
power to affect management decisions of those with biologist or with ecologist approaches to
conceptualizing the fishery depends on the management council makeup, and this can change
over time. One fisheries ecologist mentioned to me that they are planning to write an article with
an ecologist at a western region Fisheries Science Center contrasting decision-making for habitat
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conservation between the west coast and east coast councils. Ecologists who serve on the EBFM
PDT or contribute to the science that it uses, are very respectful towards the biologists’ studies,
but do express frustration at the repeated statements by population biologists and repeated by
stakeholders that they do not have enough data to understand the ecological complexity and the
models are not running well enough to be implemented any time soon.
The ecological models now have a strong focus on trophic interactions, and this has been
the predominant discussion in the PDT and Council meetings and this has support of the
biologists as well as the ecologists. However, even this modeling approach for management is
not without some controversy. During the EBFM PDT’s work with the herring fishery PDT on
developing a harvest control rule (HCR) based on the understanding of herring as a forage fish,
Hilborn et al. (2017) submitted article that was widely distributed in New England fishery news
networks through press releases and a video concluding that “there is little evidence for a strong
connection between forage fish abundance and the rate of change in the abundance of their
predators” (Hilborn, Amoroso, Bogazzi, Jensen, et al., 2017). This article heavily critiqued the
work of Lenfest, a group of academic scientists (government scientists serve as advisors but are
not members of the research team) that created a report about ways to set control rules for forage
species like herring. This work was promoted by ENGOs such as Pew and Earth Justice, and was
used to support the lawsuit that led to the Council’s prioritization of the herring harvest control
rule based on its role as a forage fish. The Lenfest team rejected their arguments and published a
rebuttal to their criticisms in a Letter to the Editor of Fisheries Research journal (Pikitch et al.,
2018). Hilborn et. al. responded to this critique with a rebuttal of their own published on the
industry news blog Saving Seafood (Hilborn, Amoroso, Bogazzi, Parma, et al., 2017).
Ultimately, the EBFM PDT recommended that the Herring Committee not use the Lenfest-
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designed control rule for herring because it was based on studies in an upwelling system and the
dynamics of New England coast are too different to make the study translatable. However,
outside of the EBFM PDT, the message that was most-widely disseminated by those who wanted
to hear that herring’s ecosystem role was being overblown was that the Council was making
decisions based on incorrect ecosystems science that led to lower catch limits.
Related to this debate, some NEFMC-affiliated biologists critiqued a White Paper on
forage fish that was produced by the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council (MAFMC)
with the research of Northeast Fisheries Science Center ecologists. In the MAFMC’s White
Paper and the NEFMC’s Scientific advice on herring control rules that account for forage
requirements and the role of Atlantic herring in the ecosystem, an article by Smith et al. (2011) is
cited that directly contradicts Hilborn’s arguments and justifies the need more forage in the
system. For ecologists, it follows logically it must be the case based on scientific ecological
principles. As one ecologist said, “Maybe it’s about trying to say something scientifically that
you don’t have the quantified empirical proof,” but are applying the overarching ecological
principal based on generalizable studies.
Another ecological approach to ecosystems considerations represented on the NEFMC is
that of scientists who dive to observe animals under water as individuals operating in a
landscape. One researcher and diver who does this work feels that “other people in region here
[the Northeast Atlantic] do not do this as much.” From their perspective, they argue that it is
more obvious that it is critical to connect habitat to survival. They were frustrated that a direct
discussion over choices of the best science information and relevant scientific perspectives never
happens in the Council meetings and that the process actually works in reverse - a decision is
made and then the managers find the science to be able to say that science made the best
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decision. “This is how the science gets politicized.” They argued that parameterizing ecological
models will be important place to choose best data inputs that represent the ecosystem. As
EBFM progresses, this may be another battleground of influence.
Epistemic Conflict 2: (Mis)Understandings and (Mis)Representations of Socio-ecological
Relationships Affecting the Emergence of EBFM
Just as population biologists and ecologists see and understand New England’s ocean
ecosystems and their inhabitants in different ways, there are a broad range of conceptualizations
of what it means to include humans as part of the ecosystem and therefore part of the analysis
and knowledge formation about EBFM. The spectrum of professional writings about fisheries
management, including ecosystems-based, ranges from almost exclusively quantitative and
positivist scientific and neoclassical economic epistemic views to more constructivist,
qualitative, social theory approaches. When using information to make decisions about humans’
interactions and relationships in the fishery, conflicts also arise from the vested fishery
participants different ways of living and thinking based on their upbringings, experiences,
education, occupations, and communities. In the case of the cultural, social, and economic
relationships, between human actants and with the ecological and physical environments, the
tensions (or dissipative forces in action), in management analysis, decision-making, and support
for regulatory actions tend to stem from an (almost exclusive) privileging of positivist and
quantitative scientific methodologies. This privilege is given throughout all aspects of fisheries
science, socioeconomics, and management without explicit support for substantial contributions
from constructivist and qualitative theory.
Is the cod crisis a science failure or a management failure? This question has been asked
many times and has been answered in many ways (see chapters 3 and 4). Those who focus on the
crisis as a science failure cite the retrospective patterns and other modeling errors, incomplete
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data availability and uncertainty, problems with sampling methodology, bias of the scientists that
affects parameterizations, experimental design, and interpretations of results. Scientists who are
involved in and peer review the science argue that the information they provide is accurate,
objective, unbiased with quantification of uncertainty and that the management’s responsibility is
to take that information, decide what risks are acceptable, and to determine the best policy based
on the best science. There are many aspects to human component of the ecosystem that are
equally as resistant to bioeconomic modeling as biophysical ecosystem components. However, at
moments when the mismatch between experience and quantification overwhelms the discussion
in PDT committee and Council meetings, social objectives and strategies get labeled as
“arbitrary” and “unscientific,” and in those moments, quantification appropriates the language of
experience and loses much of the information in the complexity.
The Magnuson Stevens Act and National Standards, in association with its interpretations
and applications by NMFS and the NEFMC, regulate and legislate scientific inquiry by defining
what counts as ‘good’ science. As discussed in Chapter 4, while the language of what should be
used for fisheries management leaves open the possibilities for qualitative research when there is
an absence of quantified information available, prevailing NEFMC interpretations reflect a
scientism that disregards qualitative social science as irrelevant, impractical, or too ambiguous or
inferential to be adequate for management decisions. Fisheries management is not the only
policy arena where the federal government’s legislation and regulation of acceptable evidence
and its interpretation and application of scientific knowledge has been investigated for its role in
failing policies; education, public health, and environmental policy negotiations also comprise
political battles over epistemic authority and exclusion (Denzin et al., 2006; Lather, 2004;
Lincoln & Cannella, 2004). Although many argue that the ‘value-free objectivist science’ model

233

is not reasonably defended and even a form of “‘true believers’ methodological
fundamentalism,” this is the narrowly defined “scientifically based research” paradigm operating
in these policy sectors (House, 2006). Lather (2004), drawing on Foucault, argues, that the
regulation of what is acceptable to meet “evidence-based” science mandates works “against the
proliferation of research approaches of the past 20 years of cultural studies, feminist
methodology, radical environmentalism, ethnic studies, and social studies of science, a backlash
where in the guise of objectivity and good science, ‘colonial, Western, masculine, white and
other biases’ are smuggled in to service ‘neoliberal states’” (Lather, 2004). Maxwell (2004) sees
narrow definitions of scientifically based research in policy mandates being used to marginalize
qualitative research and recognizes the validity concerns and discomfort level of many scientists,
economists, and social scientists (and fisheries managers) with qualitative methodologies and
alternative analysis of empirical research. He argues that these apprehensions results from a
fundamentalist scientism that misrepresents the actual logic and practice of science and does not
acknowledge the limits of quantitative and experimental research (Maxwell, 2004a).
Some of the conflict can be attributed to the unresolvable differences in stances between
avowed positivists who insist that scientific knowledge provides evidence for the “existence of a
single ‘objective’ reality that can be measured and statistically analyzed to reach generalizable
conclusions” and post-modern constructivists who accept the role of mental and social constructs
in knowledge of the world and therefore, argue for a diversity of useful methods for scientific
knowledge (Maxwell, 2010). Porter (1996) describes the claims of epistemic superiority of
positivists as being grounded in the problematic conflation of scientific “objectivity as
impersonality” with “objectivity as truth.” He argues that not only is an apolitical understanding
of objectivity “contribut[ing] to the project of universalizing experience,” an exclusionary
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political endeavor, but that quantitative research can render people as objects that can be put into
classes to be studied and acted on, and manipulated, abstracting and removing the information in
their individuality and the “facts” become knowledge that, even with the best of intentions, reify
biases of researchers and hurt the object of study (Porter, 1996).
Maxwell (2004) argues that the dialogue about the quality of knowledge contributions to
policy should be shifted away from issues of scientific objectivity to issues of validity for the
criteria we use for deciding between alternative interpretations, explanations, and theories of the
things we study. Rather than an argument over objectivity or a fight over epistemic supremacy
for giving the correct causal answer, scientists and policy makers need to abandon the
assumption that there is one valid understanding that can be described best by quantitative
science, and move forward with evaluating and applying contributions from multiple
methodologies. While quantitative methods achieve validity by delivering causal explanations
through identifying observed regularities, qualitative methods can similarly provide legitimate
causal explanations by identifying observable processes and mechanisms that may elude the
variable-oriented quantitative measurement approaches (Maxwell, 2004b). Becker (1996)
identifies several ways that qualitative ethnographic fieldwork leads to valid and useful
information through observation of daily interactions, listening to actors’ viewpoints and
watching behaviors in personal and public contexts, as daily work is negotiated and performed.
By describing the systems of relationships that “hang together in a web of mutual influence or
support or interdependence”, the researcher shows how actions are “manifestly connected.”
Additionally, the absence of survey questions and need for variable quantification leaves room
for un-hypothesized explanations to present themselves (Becker, 1996).
Some researchers have described the necessity of including qualitative research for
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Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management for understanding and evaluating ecosystem processes,
human dimensions, and human-nature interactions (Busch et al., 2012; De Young et al., 2008;
Fletcher, 2015; Makino & Fluharty, 2011; Smith et al., 2007; Zador et al., 2017). Overview
reports on EBFM and human dimensions published by the UN Food and Agriculture (FAO)
Fisheries and Aquaculture Department and Canada’s North Pacific Marine Organization (PICES)
promote the inclusion of qualitative process-based methodologies of ecology, anthropology,
sociology, psychology, and geography as practices and tools with the potential to contribute to
“defining/selecting goals, objectives, indicators, and targets” (De Young et al., 2008; Makino &
Fluharty, 2011). Use of qualitative assessments of ecosystem services and considerations and
indicators for fisheries management are seen as a necessary part of flexibility and adaptability of
EBFM allowing for the “rapid incorporation of new ideas and data and unexpected events”
(Busch et al., 2012; Zador et al., 2017). Australian scientists have shown the usefulness of
qualitative approaches for ecological risk assessment and management strategy evaluations for
EBFM using “projections based on expert judgement” of collaborative groups assessing
performance on ecological, economic, and social objectives (Fletcher, 2015; E. A. Fulton et al.,
2014; Smith et al., 2007).
There are multiple ways that the epistemic allegiances to positivist, quantitative
knowledge supported by legal mandates and fisheries science and natural resource management
education, play out and affect the fisheries management. The fishermen frequently complain, to
the media, at Council meetings, in surveys and outreach workshops, that NOAA and the NEFMC
do not listen to their critiques of the management process or scientific understanding and will not
include their knowledge about fish abundances and ecological conditions. The scientists
complain, directly to me in personal communication, that the fishermen refuse to accept the
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results of their best methodologies when they indicate that the fish populations are dangerously
low. Even when there are good-faith efforts to address these tensions, there is no resolution.
Several scientists I interviewed felt personally affronted when their scientific research has been
rejected by fishing communities and political representatives. Several interviewees said that their
reputation for good research design and accurate conclusions was a source of self-worth,
identity, personal pride, and necessary for success in a career of scientific research. The attacks
on their scientific methodologies and results and interpretations left them demoralized.
Fisheries scientists are self-criticizing for their "science communication" problems and
believe “explaining the real science better will help.” Tim Requarth, who has taught science
communication courses and workshops (Requarth, 2017) observes the same issue for scientists
trying to communicate about climate change, public health about vaccines, and genetically
modified organisms. This self-criticism is based on the deficit model which asserts that people’s
opinions differ from scientific consensus because they lack scientific knowledge. Daniel Kahan’s
comprehensive 2010 study argues this is wrong: “…public divisions over climate change stem
not from the public’s incomprehension of science but from a distinctive conflict of interest:
between the personal interest individuals have in forming beliefs in line with those held by others
with whom they share close ties and the collective one they all share in making use of the best
available science to promote common welfare” (Kahan et al., 2012).
Books such as Don't Be Such A Scientist: Talking Substance in an Age of Style153 (2009,
Island Press) and workshops (e.g. ComSciCon at Harvard) teach scientists how to express their
scientific analysis in a way that will make those who do not share their viewpoint about what the
results mean see why they should accept what the science says. As is the case with many
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This book was shown to me by a fisheries scientist as an example of one of the books they read in a course in fisheries
management.
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"science communication" studies and courses, the premise implicitly argues for the authority of
scientific epistemology for solving the complex problem at hand. This itself becomes a conflict
of communication – and epistemology – when researchers and practitioners with good claim to
empirical analysis of other forms want to contribute to the understanding of the social or
ecological and their approaches are ignored or dismissed. Many non-scientists who study and
assess the fishery do understand the science and its lexicon, but do not think quantitative
scientific approaches are the best for all analyses and decisions. Some stakeholders do not want
to understand what they believe is politically biased science, and even if it is explained more
clearly, will reject it. Sometimes, scientists also do not realize that they interpret their data
beyond its actual reach to include economic, social, ecological assumptions that they do not
question as not being scientifically determined and they will argue that if others do not agree,
they just really do not understand what the scientists are doing and why it is the best way. Using
quantitatively modeled Management Strategy Evaluation reference value comparisons or
portfolio analysis financial tools to evaluate risk and tradeoffs may not be the only or best ways
to analyze social and ecological success for EBFM, but the entrenched network associations
make this the dominant path forward for the fishery at this moment.
One example showing the subtle nature of this type of epistemological conflicts is evident
in NOAA’s, the NEFSC’s and NEFMC SSC’s growing enthusiasm for developing and using an
MSE for EBFM where the identification of goals, objectives, and tradeoffs could end up being
driven by the availability of quantitative information and predictions of bioeconomic models.
Scientists developed Management Strategy Evaluations as a way to establish scientific
objectivity while providing a path to the managers for using the science for their decisions. MSE
procedures formally display references such as FMSY, BMSY, MSY, and OY in relation with one
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another to guide management decisions by considering tradeoffs that reduce risk for the stocks
and ecosystem (Punt et al., 2016). Punt et al. (2016), explain: “Management strategy evaluation
is at the interface between science and policy. While it would be desirable to keep science and
policy separate, there is a link. Decision-makers need to identify the desirable outcomes that any
management strategy adopted should aim to achieve, while scientific analyses (the MSE) can
inform the decision-makers on the feasible ranges of trade-offs. A well-structured MSE will
utilize the links between policy and science but ensure that a 'wall of science' remains whereby
decision-makers do not decide scientific issues and scientists do not make policy decisions.”
Management strategy evaluations, in this form, are representations of quantitative
analysis of tradeoffs through the comparison of reference values. MSEs are designed to provide
information to managers for their decision-making processes and have the potential to drive the
definitions of goals, objectives, and tradeoffs that privilege what can be analyzed quantitatively
and deprivilege qualitative analysis that may not be suitable for this type of representation. The
central positioning of positivist, quantitative bioeconomic approaches used to obtain the values
for comparison make this specified approach to MSEs a candidate for the “best” tool for
management decisions. This status reinforces the idea that social science understanding is
subjective, and that environmental social science is an ideology that biases scholars results and
interpretations. Although managers can ask the fisheries scientists for specific comparisons they
want to see, MSEs for EBFM regulatory decisions puts significant influence into the hands of
scientists to choose the scientific data and interpretations that they offer for the MSE scenarios,
thereby leading the negotiations over tradeoffs. Without an explicit role for social theory
analysis in a MSE, managers can also focus on MSE evaluations that support their version of
success and feel confident that their preferred tradeoffs are supported by scientifically derived
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data.
It is also proposed that economic portfolio analysis, based on financial investment
strategies, can be used to calculate economic risks and returns across varying mixes and assess
tradeoffs to generate catch limit advice for multiple stocks. Although the non-econometric social
scientists’ theoretical inputs make it into the conversations of EBFM tenets and objectives, they
have yet to appear in the implementation strategies of EBFM in New England. Primary
objectives of MSEs and portfolio analysis are to identify potential strategies and decisions that
are robust to areas of scientific and management uncertainty and to assist with the application of
the Precautionary Principle. While these objectives are necessary, if these positivist, quantitative
(and classical economic, in the case of portfolio analysis) decision-making tools set the agenda
for determining the tradeoffs and how they are evaluated is routinely applied to the exclusion or
devaluation of other types of analysis (ecological theory, social theory), valuable understanding
could be lost by their dominance as the most “objective” and “scientifically sound” tools. In the
tradeoff negotiations for EBFM, different epistemological approaches to uncertainty and
precaution from ecologists, qualitative social theorists, and practicing fishermen could fill in
information gaps, provide alternative strategies that do not need to reduce the uncertainty, and
address some of the EBFM socio-ecological system tenets will continue to vie for a seat at the
tradeoff negotiation table.

5.6 Conclusions
This chapter examined how fishery science and management processes and practices of
the New England Fisheries Management Council and its associated contributors are translating
Ecosystems-Based Management theory and federal guidance on EBFM into the beginning stages
of development of an Ecosystems Fishery Management Plan. Through this research, it became
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evident that what is described as negotiations of best science and best strategies for
implementation for EBFM, at a closer look, include contests between actants to determine what
and whose knowledge is used, how scientific information is interpreted, what the goals are and
when and how they are articulated, and what the risks and tradeoffs are and how they are valued.
Disciplinary differences and contradictions between biology and ecology approaches and
between positivist, quantitative scientific and social scientific approaches and other empirical
approaches that are primarily qualitative, based in ecological and social theory require time and
energy to negotiate and threaten the cohesion and success of the EBFM. Additionally, this
analysis showed that the values conflicts rooted in the interests, ethics, and social and views of
fishery participants affect their acceptance of science and social science contributions to fisheries
management. This requires scientists and managers to be reflexive about the inherently political
nature of their practices as they are working for a successful fishery. This understanding of
“strong objectivity” is further discussed in the concluding chapter.
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion: Socio-ecological Transformations
Overall, WGNARS [International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) Working Group
on the Northwest Atlantic Regional Sea] members found that trust and inclusivity were
paramount in developing transdisciplinary work.
Geret DePiper, Sarah Gaichas, Sean Lucey, Patricia
Pinto da Silva, and Robin Anderson in
Operationalizing integrated ecosystem assessments
within a multidisciplinary team: lessons learned
from a worked example (DePiper et al., 2017)
6.1 Introduction: Shaping New Regulations through Shaping New Realities
Scientific information is critical for environmental governance, and legal instruments that
mandate the use of peer-reviewed scientific studies to support policy are powerful tools for
ensuring that decisions are made with information that has a strong record of improving
conservation of ecosystems and long-term use of renewable resources and ecosystem services. It
is also critical to recognize that scientific knowledge produced for environmental governance is
not passive, static, or singular – and that, like social science epistemologies, scientific knowledge
is situated, reflecting the context in which it is produced, the identities and relationships of its
producers, and the associations of the objects or phenomena about which it is produced
(Haraway, 1991; Latour, 2005). In Sandra Harding’s terms, this is a “stronger” objectivity than
the framing of scientific objectivity as value-neutral research (Harding, 1991). John Law’s
insight is invaluable for environmental governance and science-based policy creation: social
science (from quantitative neoclassical economic models and econometrics analysis to surveybased sociological studies to political economic theory to ethnographies) does not measure and
observe disembedded, fixed things. Instead, all science research observes and participates in
performances, or “realities enacted into being,” and therefore physical and biological science,
along with social science, help to make the realties they produce knowledge about (Law & Urry,
2004). Since the realities that we study are enacted in practice, the emergent objects and
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phenomena of these realities are different in different relations, or multiple (Mol, 2002).
Recognition of these aspects of scientific and social scientific knowledge production does
not make the information provided for use in environmental governance any less valuable. In
fact, researchers reflections on our own methodologies not only helps us to improve our practices
“to be sensitive to the complex and the elusive” and “to be more mobile,” but also to use them to
be a part of “shap[ing] new realities” (Law & Urry, 2004). This perspective may cause fisheries
researchers and policy makers to fear the implication that this makes methodologies and
practices political. But this fear can be at least partially overcome with a switch of their focus
away from trying to (hopelessly) rid the world of political epistemologies to embracing an active
role in the negotiation of ontological politics (Law, 2002; Law & Benschop, 1997; Mol, 1999).
For example, while a fisheries researcher or manager, one element in the agencement of an actornetwork, may not control the emergence of a preferred reality (Mol, 1999), she can consider how
her research practices can mobilize environmental governance concepts such as sustainability
and resiliency (which are multiple, too) to reflect the actor-network’s consensus on what a
successful, equitable, thriving fishery looks like (Simon & Randalls, 2016). This understanding
has the potential to transform frustration with complexity and uncertainty into liberation from the
need to guarantee correct predictions about the future state of the system based on its current
state (Kay, 2008).
In researching the emergence of Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management (EBFM) in
New England in the context of the region’s groundfish crisis, I observed how sciencebased resource management is discursively conceptualized, constructed, and enacted, based on
epistemic and value “conflicts and compromises” between scientists, managers, and
stakeholders. Specifically, I analyzed how individuals propagate the institutional intentions of
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science, government, and industry through everyday practices, processes, and associations. The
actions of these individuals create and negotiate conceptual frameworks to implement rules and
regulations for EBFM in New England. I have determined, through my ethnographic
observation of fisheries management meetings and other fisheries-related events and
through conducting interviews and tracking drafts of official management documentation, that
governance and policy discourses contribute to the construction of the very reality that they
describe and effectively perform. I found that the differences in the experience of (and therefore,
conceptualization of) marine ecosystems by fisheries ecologists, fisheries population
biologists, and fishermen is as great as the differences in experience and understanding of
human dimensions of the fishery by economists, anthropologists, sociologists, managers, and
fishermen. The development of EBFM objectives and implementation strategies is a continuous
arbitration and shaping of these (sometimes conflicting) realities of the socio-ecological
system. By creating and maintaining the institutions, paradigms, and regulations, fisheries
science and management define and specify the socio-ecological system that is required for their
conceptualization of the regional fishery to operate.
Decreasing issues of scientific and social scientific uncertainties with a shift to the
inclusion of information about ecological relationships may increase the likelihood of achieving
predicted outcomes for the fishery; however, ecosystems-based fisheries management
cannot succeed based on this limited benefit. Awareness of the roles of scientists and managers
in co-constructing the fishery that they measure and govern can open up opportunities for
reimagining fisheries governance based on their collaboration with fishing communities to
develop creative new visions of “success" for New England fisheries.
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6.2 Actor-Network Theory Analysis of New England’s Ongoing Groundfish Fishery Crisis
A primary question that this dissertation research sought to explore is how multi-scalar
ecological, cultural, social, and economic processes, in conjunction with practices of fisheries
science, social science, and management, mediate and produce the ongoing crisis status of the
New England’s groundfish fishery. This question was formulated with the proposition that even
if you could know for certain all the compounding factors causing the cod population to crash,
EBFM, an unproven management strategy focused on ecosystem dynamics, might not be able to
address all of these ecological and social causes directly and to the satisfaction of the scientists,
managers, fishing communities, and other stakeholders. Skepticism that EBFM will not be a
celebrated panacea for the cod crisis is underlain by examples of major management
interventions in the past, such as sector catch shares, that have become explanations for the
problems themselves through their interactions and feedbacks with all of the “causes” they set
out to redress.
Analysis of explanations for the groundfish crisis in management and public discourses,
and in academic literature, indicates that what is seen as the problem, and how it is causing or
exacerbating the crisis, is dependent on when, where, and how an individual or group
participates in the fishery, whom they associate with and learn from, and what they read and
view about the fishery (Chapter 3). Because of different lived experiences and epistemic
inclinations, amateur and professional analysts of the crisis blame some combination of
fishermen’s actions, the seafood industry’s actions, the global seafood market, consumer
environmental awareness campaigns, the Magnuson Stevens Act, general governmental
bureaucracy, the NEFMC’s decisions, the sector catch share management regime, NOAA
fisheries scientists’ actions, ENGO’s actions, the biology and ecology of groundfish, climate
change, predators of groundfish, and competition from other coastal sectors.
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6.2.1 Multiplicity
An actor-network analysis of this web of blame reveals that the “groundfish crisis” is
actually many different phenomena at once. A more structural socio-ecological system analysis
might consider a list of factors involved in the problems of the groundfish fishery, organize them
in ways to consider their inputs, outputs, and feedbacks, identify areas of significant and/or
compounding problems to focus research and strategies for improvement or change. While this
type of analysis is useful for untangling some of the complicatedness of the issues of the fishery
and finding troublesome patterns and compounding factors that exacerbate problems, it lacks
awareness that the fishery is not actually a single object for analysis. Not only is the fishery
conceptualized, experienced, and analyzed in multiple ways, but it is also, itself, many different
things. The fishery coheres for all who are engaged with it through their practices and discourse,
but any analyst trying to identify or rank the contributions or urgency of factors that contribute to
the crisis has an incomplete perspective on the multiple(s) of the fishery that they engage with
and can see. This perspective is situated not only in the life-long experiences (education, ethics,
political understanding, relationships, everyday personal and professional practices) of the
analyst, but also in their understanding 1) of how knowledge is produced and 2) of ontological
singleness or multiplicity.
Awareness of the multiplicity of the fishery and its elements, such as the groundfish, does
not mean that nothing can be known about problems in practices, processes, relationships, and
ethics that can be useful for making deliberate changes to how the fishery is managed. However,
for multiplicity to be applied to management and given the opportunity to contribute its
improvement, it does necessitate a re-envisioning of what it means to manage a fishery.
Acceptance of the multiplicity of the crisis by the fisheries’ actants, or at least a truce in the
battle for one, dominant crisis narrative, could decrease resistance to the development of
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adaptive and experimental approaches to conservation strategies, fishery economic and labor
markets, and government regulation and assistance. As long as some actants’ explanations are
devalued as subjective and partial, rather than being accepted as a multiplicity of understandings
that are enacted in practices that produce divergent realities, the crisis debate will continue to
consume effort and proposed solutions will be based on limited understanding of the actants with
the most established associations in the network. Recognition and exploration of multiplicity of
the actual groundfish could also affect researchers and managers practices concerning
uncertainties about stock population status and risks to conservation. When researchers and
managers recognize that their enactments of the concept of uncertainty through their practices
affects the ways they and others carry out their role in the crisis, it can encourage them to
creatively explore how they think of it, articulate it, and negotiate ways that address it.
Even implicit acknowledgement of this multiplicity opens up space in management
discussions and debates for difficult, but necessary, on-the-record negotiations of the present and
potential roles fisheries play in increasing the mutually-constituted well-being of humans and
non-humans directly and indirectly affected by fisheries. This proposition invites re-thinking and
new imagining of what and how we identify conservation concerns and economic concerns and
their relationship with one another. Instead of assuming what a sustainable conservation strategy
is or what a fisheries economic market is and what they should be, recognition that there is not
one conservation or one market, and laying those all out on the table to see how they are
interacting (e.g. the work of Kevin St. Martin on economic diversity in fisheries) can get this into
the knowledge production and decision-making spaces as goals and strategies are formulated,
before any work is done on developing regulations.
Can this happen? There are decades of research moving fisheries management in the
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direction of inclusion of different perspectives and contributions and EBM theory implicitly
includes ideas of multiplicity, in its own terminology. If fisheries economic success is modeled
using only information that assumes market demand and guaranteed and sustainable economic
growth of the industry, it seems that this reality of the fishery is elusive, if not doomed. But
recognizing that the fishery and its related industries are have many different economic realities
for many different actors in the fishery, it is possible to imagine economic success as something
different, use different information for the modeling and goal setting.
6.2.2 Unstable Power Dynamics
The illusion of a single fishery for analysis is reinforced when the network is cohering
well; its multiplicity, while always there, becomes easier to see when there are strong dissipative
forces in the network. Examination of the power dynamics show just how contingent this
network is and shines a light on its multiplicity even as many actants and their associations work
for its coherence. An analysis of the power dynamics operating within the fishery identifies that,
although there are some patterns of powerful associations that have remained relatively stable
throughout the period of this dissertation research (mostly based on legal mandates, council
membership, and institutional momentum in terms of practices and associations), shifts in power
dynamics happen frequently and have significant effects on the network’s forms and functions –
and its coherence.
Governmental institution elements of the network that enact and perform the
management regime -- including the MSA, NMFS, NEFSC and GARFO, NEFMC, the Northeast
Multispecies Fishery Management Plan including the sector catch-share system, and Congress
and the Executive Office – are currently stabilizing the network by negotiating common, legallymandated definitions of the fishery and assessment of its failures and successes. ENGOs, the
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seafood industry, fishermen, university scientists and social scientists, and local and state
politicians bring in new information and multiples of the fishery that become part the negotiated
idea of the fishery that is studied, measured, acted upon for management. These actants’ power
depends on their lobbying, rhetorical skills, representation and access, and how their practices
align with government institutional wants and needs. But what is becoming obvious (but is least
prepared for in discussions, research, and discourse) is that the translations of the actants’
associations in the “least and/or most uncertain capacity” category in terms of power dynamics
such as the global seafood market, endangered species, climate change, other coastal sectors, and
regional predators (see Table 3.5c) are beginning to make the fishery and its manageability look
unstable. The actants and their associations in this category tend to compete with or limit the
success of fishermen.
The groundfish “crisis” and efforts to develop EBFM strategies indicate this flux is
presently very active in the New England fishery. “Environmental” actants – physical ocean
changes and biological and ecological changes related to climate change, global and regional
economic, industry, energy-use changes, political party changes are all “challenging” the stability
of the more entrenched power dynamics. These are elements that the current form of
management needs to study, measure, predict and account for – and their actions may result in
the dissipation of the resource management elements of the network. If the fishery multiples are
going to continue to cohere enough to be considered a common phenomenon for management,
the practices and discourse of Ecosystems-Based Fisheries Management will need to work to
strengthen this coherence of multiple understandings and valuations – and ontologies. EBFM
strategies will need to imagine different ways to successfully negotiate the powerful actions of
these environmental associations, even in the face of uncertainty and disagreement about risk and
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significance of these changes.
Examination of these power relations show just how fundamental recognition of coperformation is for producing network processes that are successful in terms of keeping all the
elements bound together. These cooperative and co-creative associations are described and
promoted in socio-ecological approaches for Ecosystems-based Management such as interactive
governance with its focus on collaborative innovation. As the power dynamics are experiencing
growing instability in the face of the “environmental” and economic changes, integration of
anthropological, sociological, and ecological qualitative theory with socio-economic quantitative
models is necessary to produce the knowledge needed to set goals and implement actions that
live up to the management needs of a complex, rapidly-changing network. This means that the
network will function very differently, riding the wave of changing power dynamics by accepting
and even encouraging a less hierarchical and more inclusive processes and actions and
definitions of management.
6.2.3 Network Dissipation and Coherence
A third area of insight developed from investigation of the performation of the groundfish
crisis comes from observing ways the fishery network undergoes dissipation and coherence. If
EBFM has a chance at meeting the mandate to rebuild groundfish stocks and perpetuate the
fishery, EBFM developers and implementors will need to monitor and address dissipative
translations and foster cohering ones. Considering the economic and cultural history of
groundfish fishing in the geographical region under the management of the NEFMC, the
persistent coherence of this fishery for centuries as a lucrative economic enterprise despite
periods of ecological instability and social upheaval, is a testament to the success of the
associations that construct it. However, many fear the acceleration of technological changes since
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the latter half of the twentieth century and the interrelated cultural, economic, and ecological
changes could be leading to so much instability that the groundfish fishery dissipates completely.
Dissipative forces that threaten to cause the network to fail include: 1) a longstanding
state of poor relationships and a lack of trust between the fishermen and the managers, scientists,
and government and ENGO representatives; 2) rapidly changing cultural, economic, and
environmental circumstances that are creating anxiety about uncertain futures; and 3) a highly
partisan political environment that is putting ideological divisions about environmental
conservation and economic policies in high relief. With an understanding of the multiplicity of
the fishery and shifts in its power dynamics it becomes apparent that for Ecosystems-based
Fisheries Management to effectively hold things together, there must be cooperation and
flexibility in knowledge building and strategy experimentation not seen in the present
functioning of management. Cooperation and inclusive participation are proving to be very
difficult in the current divisive environment of strong commitments to polarized ideological
stances. The formation of cultural, ethical, political, and epistemological factions is jeopardizing
compromise and consensus, and making the multiplicity of the fishery very obvious.
Conservation is being set up against economic growth in a way that ignores the indivisibility of
human-nature, or socio-ecological systems. Prevalent distrust of science and resistance to
government regulation in the U.S. has propagated rhetoric about “government overreach” and
regulating fisherman “out of business” and taken over the debate on how to achieve a successful
fishery.
Fortunately, the groundfish network is being held together by several long-standing
forces, too. The democratic regulatory processes of the United States government, including
Congressional lawmaking, require that participants in the fishery work together to find ways to
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meet goals for both the benefit of the country and the benefit of thriving marine ecosystems.
Forces that have continued to keep the groundfish fishery functioning through its most tentative
times include the legal mandates that require that fisheries management in the United States is
democratic and transparent. This makes the management process time-consuming and heated,
but it also keeps all of the humans in the fishery working together on a common (if actually
multiple) project. This cohesion is reinforced by popular support for fisherman as representatives
of hard-working, adventurous Americans who honor their cultural heritage despite the financial
and physical risks. This keeps the fishermen and their plight in the media and on politicians’
agendas. While there may be a lot of conflict within the fishery, every last actant supports the
mission of plentiful fish in the ocean.
Institutions associated with the fishery – the fishermen’s organizations, the seafood
companies, the media, the political election system, the government scientific organizations, the
ENGOs – are slow to change because of the momentum that has been generated to do things in
familiar ways. But it is this very momentum created through all of the efforts, resources, and
money invested in the fishery that keeps everyone connected to one another and to the fish and
their environments. No one is aiming to completely drive this fishery into the ground. Whole
lifetimes and livelihoods are dedicated to its success. The sheer investment in terms of cash and
resource by the American government to keep the fisheries from collapsing means that these
efforts will not be abandoned without a fight. The collapse of this fishery is devastation to
everyone and willingness to explore the idea of EBFM may come out of desperation for some,
but this desperation may be what opens the space for the experimentation and news ways of
working in the face of complexity and rapid change.
Finding a cohesive way to deal with (scientific, economic, socio-cultural, management)

252

uncertainty will involve a lot of trust-building to get all participants in the fishery to accept
success in management as a pragmatic form of truth. Analysis of current dissipation and
coherence activities indicates that management interventions will need to include more
epistemically-inclusive and transdisciplinary approaches. EBFM will need to provide
opportunities for experimentation and adaptive learning, taking advantage of the ways the
network establishes stability through common goals, interacting cultures and livelihoods, and
commitment to democratic and transparent governance.

6.3 Effects of the Groundfish Crisis Enactments on the Construction of EBFM
A second direction of inquiry for this research focused on how ongoing groundfish
governance processes are affecting the New England Fisheries Management Council’s efforts to
construct the ecosystem as a category for governance through Ecosystem-based Fisheries
Management. This question was answered through two channels of investigation. The first
channel examined social science literature on the New England fishery that sought to understand
the problems that were making management of the groundfish fishery unsuccessful; many of the
studies examined promoted EBFM as a general strategy for solving those problems (Chapter 4).
Comparison of how diverse types of social science research with different foci show that
information and knowledge they offer for decision-making in the NEFMC groundfish fishery is
valued differently and this affects the creation of management strategies and regulations. The
second investigative channel for this question used ethnographic data, discourse analysis, and
document content analysis to observe how EBFM is beginning to emerge in the NEFMC and
how network associations are affecting the early work by the Ecosystems-based Fisheries
Management Committee and its Plan Development Team (Chapter 5). Similar to the production
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of the groundfish fishery’s crisis, the emergence of EBFM in New England is translated by the
associations of the specific actants – humans, non-human beings, and other material and semiotic
elements – who form and perform this network. Through close ethnography, it was possible to
observe the “overflowings” and transformations of historical and dynamic interpersonal, cultural,
political, socio-economic, biological, and ecological relationships that have driven scholars to
develop new frameworks to describe and support human-nature relationships and environmental
management such as socio-ecological systems (SES) theory and ecosystems-based management
(EBM) theory. Cataloging epistemic hegemonies in fisheries management and observing the
network rearrange itself around contested and multiple ontologies of socio-ecological “truth” and
values, it becomes clear that SES’s and EBM’s calls for flexibility and adaptability will require
“trust and inclusivity” for transdisciplinary experimentation to become an effective strategy of
EBFM (DePiper et al., 2017).
6.3.1 Social Science Literature on EBFM in New England
Analysis of social science academic literature on the New England groundfish fishery
crisis showed that while studies using very different methodologies concluded that EBFM could
address uncertainty in the science, socioeconomics, and management, the studies did not always
agree on what specific EBFM intervention was needed or how that intervention could be helpful.
Commonly, studies conclude that a shift to Ecosystems-based Fisheries Management offers
potential to address failures in the current management system, but different analytical
approaches look to solve differently perceived problems. This is an important finding because it
illuminates the experience that how EBFM is developed and will eventually be implemented in
New England is influenced by how the current problems in the fishery are seen and what
proposed solutions are given consideration.
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The quantitative modeling methodologies of solution-oriented natural resource
management (NRM) research that have moved groundfish management in the directions of quota
systems and catch shares, have also identified problems created by federal subsidies for fisheries
and the lack of a common conservation ethic across all of the stakeholders in the fishery. NRM
approaches look to EBFM to 1) provide better information about ecological and socio-economic
relationships; 2) promote the integration of science, management, and harvest activities; 3) help
negotiate a common conservation ethic across all stakeholders; or 4) to develop ways to adapt to
environmental changes that are occurring in the fishery and areas that affect the fishery. Taking a
different tack, the empirical research of political ecologists focuses on challenging some of the
assumptions in socio-economic and socio-ecological information and understanding used for
fisheries management in the U.S. and other industrialized nations, and in particular those based
on neoclassical economics and capitalist labor relations. The political ecology studies show that
other types of relationships – decisions and actions based on cooperative, non-market-based,
socio-ecological connections – play a significant role in the way fishermen structure and carry
out their work. The political ecology scholarship sees EBFM as a way for the management to be
more fully participatory in terms of knowledge production and decision-making and as way to
include an understanding of social well-being as including cultural and ecological connections,
as well as different forms of economic success.
Although there are frequent overflowings of descriptions and predictions that are used in
management decision-making, the preference for consistency of information content and format
resists inclusion and development of “emergent” or “alternative” ideas into the discourse and
decision-making from research areas such as political ecology, or other post-structuralist or
critical social sciences. Because multi-disciplinary natural resource management approaches
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such as quantitative bioeconomic modeling are currently evaluated as the “best scientific
information available,” this affects what current problems in the fishery are seen and therefore
what proposed solutions are given consideration. Established and peer-reviewed procedures exist
to integrate the different types of quantitative data provided by standard set of natural resource
management methodologies that have the approval of scientific consensus by trusted academic
communities. These types of research and analysis are more likely to identify direct causes and
effects that can be acted on in rationalized ways and are therefore more likely to be used for
decision-making by managers.
National Standard 2 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act does provide guidelines for the use of
qualitative information when there are conflicting quantitative assessments and when significant
uncertainty cannot be resolved with quantitative analysis. This opens a door for knowledge from
analyses of dynamic processes of power and translation within the network to play a role in
governance of the New England fishery. Not being able to quantify uncertainty with these
approaches is still a hurdle for this to happen and this suggests that there needs to be a shift in
how uncertainty is identified, categorized, assessed, and used for evaluation of tradeoffs with
Management Strategy Evaluations, but also how management thinks about the necessity of the
reduction of uncertainty to make decisions. In order for socio-ecological systems theory to serve
as the basis for EBFM, NS2 would need to explicitly call for inclusivity of a “wide array of
epistemic communities” for collaborative learning and transdisciplinarity, where the focus is on
creating new methodologies that integrate natural and social science research using both
quantitatively- and qualitatively-derived knowledge (Kay, 2008). This would direct the Fisheries
Management Councils to have explicit conversations about their willingness to use peerreviewed research from many different natural and social science approaches that may or may
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not make a case for council members’ preferred courses of action. If EBFM is going to create
space for collaborative learning in hopes of adaptive management turning around a failing
groundfish fishery, there will need to be a true spirit of careful experimentation with
management ideas that come out of a very different understanding of how to determine what the
“best science” is and how it is applied.
6.3.2 Ethnographic Research on EBFM in New England
Observing the performance of New England’s fishery governance in the early phases of
constructing Operational Framework for EBFM made clear how some of the same associations
and translations specific to NEFMC groundfish fishery negotiations are taking form in EBFM
development efforts. But new associations and dissipative forces, particularly within scientific
research contributions to the network, also became apparent. Even for those who conceptualize
and analyze fisheries management solely as negotiations and actions by humans, the power in the
associations of many other actants such as the warming oceans, the changing currents, the
migrating and disappearing fish, and the polarized political forces feeding the distrust of
government and science is being taken under consideration in their understandings of what
fisheries management (and environmental governance) is and how it is shaped by this power.
Specifications of the NEFMC
The dynamics specific to NEFMC that create conflict in the groundfish fishery are
performing that same work in the EBFM discussions and framework building. For example,
mistrust of the ecosystems science continues to be fanned by resistance to management strategies
that have the potential to reduce quotas from several Council and EBFM Committee members,
including industry representatives and state representatives supportive of their states’ fishing
industries. Also, since stock assessments are still a part of the EBFM implementation strategy for
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setting thresholds and monitoring, arguments that the work of both the population biologists and
the ecosystem scientists are biased, uncertain, and inaccurate continue to be publicized and
politicized. This results in significant time spent wrestling for control of the official narrative of
the Council including challenges to its prioritization of EBFM efforts and to the feasibility of
making significant changes in the way quotas are set and regulations are developed and carried
out. This supports the depiction of NEFMC as being averse to formalizing conservation goals
that they would be held to if quotas under EBFM were reduced.
Looking at the specific characteristics of the NEFMC that affect its development of
EBFM, the dominant official discourse reflects the fishery of the winners of the battles for the
“consensus reality” of the fishery. What is described as negotiations of best science and best
policy, at a closer look, are intermingled with contests between actants to determine what and
whose knowledge is used, how scientific information is interpreted, what the goals are and when
and how they are articulated, and what the risks and tradeoffs are and how they are valued. The
winners, the actants and their associations who write the majority of what becomes the
widespread narrative of the fishery, may support their assertions with their chosen “best science”
but exclude other information and knowledge which may be empirical, meet peer-review or
equivalent quality standards, and may stand up to intellectual scrutiny and experience as more
accurate, more relevant, or complementary information.
Epistemic Conflicts
The “winners” of these conflicts are the ones who are making the translations of EBFM
theory into the management what they would like, or at least what they are trained to like, to see.
Population biologists are concerned that ecosystems scientists, and in particular ecological
modelers, are moving toward a radically different approach to providing the biological status of
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the fishery through modeling fish guild interactions that will be the primary information for
setting quotas, relegating the stock assessment to a monitoring tool with EBFM. The different
ways that fisheries biologists and ecologists conceptualize and present uncertainty and risk for
management decisions by managers needs to be understood by managers and incorporated into a
workable system for use in EBFM – along with ways other epistemologies regard and handle
uncertainty. Quantitative, positivist approaches leave little room for qualitative, constructivist
approaches in the advancement of the Management Strategy Evaluation and Portfolio Analysis
tools that can be used to test management scenarios and evaluate tradeoffs in decisions made
under the EBFM paradigm.
Fisheries biologists described how, starting with measurements they take, uncertainty is
provided with data points and calculated as the data is used in models for extrapolation and
prediction. Guidance for risk comes from providing multiple possible outcomes of scenarios to
managers with a range of uncertainty values. Whereas ecosystems modelers use biological,
ecological, physical, and chemical data and information to determine different possible
ecological states or processes and give guidance for management decisions based on how this
information about the ecosystem indicates maintaining or improving the system’s biological and
ecological integrity, giving guidance to avoid decisions that risk causing a decline, especially if it
is likely to cause positive feedback or irreparable damage. These differences in descriptions and
applications of uncertainty and risk – and differences in research foci and methodologies affect –
need to be addressed when management decides in the goals and objectives using information
from ecosystems scientists so that not only quantifiable risk is privileged. This also important for
choices made by researchers for parameterizing ecological and bioeconomic models. Managers
need to understand the various ways that uncertainty and risk can be framed and addressed and
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remain open to new ideas without insisting that desired regulatory actions dictate what science
they trust and advance in the management debates.
Explicitly discussing differences in biological and ecological methodology might help
prevent justifications of the cherry-picking of biologists’ (or, conversely, ecologists’) research
publications for management debates that occurs by managers who are advocating for one
stakeholder over another. In the early stages of EBFM development in New England in 20142017, the fisheries biologists and ecologists had not had a lot of time or resources to work
together on development of the NEFMC’s Example Fisheries Ecosystem Plan (eFEP) to see how
their methodologies might be complementary, or even possibly develop transdisciplinary ways of
framing and analyzing the ecosystem. In the meantime, as EBFM is developed, it is important for
the scientists to acknowledge the validity of each other’s ways of uncertainty and risk and
methodologies and think of how to bring this reflexivity to the managers.
Similarly, at this early stage of EBFM development, quantitative, positivist science is still
firmly disciplining network practices without opening ways for information to come in to
provide insights and new ideas into areas that may not be quantitative or function in a capitalist
economic way. Entrenched natural resource management paradigms, tools, and targets define
acceptable managerial interventions and those individuals and institutions considered to be the
most successful managers. Despite a “paradigm shift” to socio-ecological systems focus on
multiple economic and non-economic benefits and a different understanding of the integration of
human-nature systems through EBFM development, policy is still steered by neoliberal
economic development assumptions and dominance of familiar scientific practices and tools.
Prevailing interpretations of the MSA and National Standards by the NEFMC and NMFS
have demonstrated a scientism that devalues more critical qualitative social science that
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challenges the situated nature of resource management scientific objectivity. Deeming qualitative
or theoretical social science understanding as subjective leaves environmental social science
research contributions in a particularly untrustworthy light as ideological and biased beyond
value. More substantive support is needed for the inclusion of constructivist and qualitative
theory, as well as more reflection by the scientists and economists on the tools, methods, theory,
and assumptions that are being privileged as best science, even in the face of their inability to
improve the fishery. Rather than waging political battles over epistemic authority and exclusion,
avowed positivists, who rely on measurements and statistics for knowledge production, must
make some room for post-modern constructivists, who show that even the positivists’ work
includes mental and social constructs in their understanding and therefore, argue for the use of a
diversity of knowledge-building methodologies. The discussions can then turn to evaluative
criteria for applying specific information from multiple interpretations, explanations, and
theories that meet the needs of management strategies and decisions for complex systems that
defy prediction and necessitate experimentation, flexibility, and quick responses to new data and
unexpected events.
Despite discussions of non-econometric social science theory in management committee
conversations and the prevalence of EBM theory language in these discussions on EBFM tenets
and objectives, the implementation strategies of EBFM in New England do not currently include
these ideas explicitly. New England’s EBFM operating framework, prediction focuses on
trophic-level groups that theoretically show more stability in aggregate, but management still
requires decisions to be made from these predictions on species-specific quotas and control rules.
Representations of the fishery processes using ecological models combined with quantified
comparisons of reference values in management strategy evaluations and/or portfolio analysis to
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define and weigh tradeoffs permits managers to use the information provided about ecological
and socio-economic relationships as predictions that offer control over the productivity of fish
populations and the economic returns through the regulation of fishing effort and practices.

6.4 Insights into opportunities for more equitable and successful governance strategies
This dissertation research of the New England fishery as a dynamic and contingent
network positioned its analysis to contribute to natural resource policy and management theory
and strategy and to yield insights into opportunities for more equitable and successful
governance. Applications of social-ecological systems theory, with the inclusion of an actornetwork sensibility of performativity, for the design and implementation of Ecosystem-based
Fisheries Management has great potential to benefit scientists and managers by providing
accurate and useful information about knowledge production and ontological politics as they
work towards successful governance of a complex “human-nature” system.
An actor-network theory perspective on fisheries postulates that science, economics,
social science, and management practices not only describe and measure the seafood industry,
fishermen, fish, and their environments, but also form and shape the realities of the fishery. The
research and management practices that go into translating these EBFM implementation
processes in the NEFMC’s work gives shape, and will continue to shape, not only to the
Fisheries Ecosystem Plan, but also to the ontology of the fishery itself – including all elements of
the fishery (researchers included) and the fishery as a whole. Callon’s conceptualization of
performativity provides ways to observe this description-construction of the fishery to inform
fisheries governance. I observed this process as the New England Fisheries Management Council
continued attempts to reverse a collapsing cod stock while, at the same time, began developing
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ways to operationalize a new, holistic “ecosystem-based” management scheme that changes
many of the primary research, assessment, and management practices. These observations can be
useful for those participating in environmental governance and encourage contributing
researchers, decision-makers, and stakeholders to reflect on their role in both the creation of
states of crisis and of opportunities for cohesive associations that enact a successful fishery.
For fisheries to function effectively, it is vital to work toward 1) greater reflexivity of
scientists and economists on how their contributions are situated and 2) expanded efforts by
managers to fully engage contributions of social scientists and fishermen and stakeholders to
propose new strategies that, in the face of uncertainty and complexity, actively work to improve
socio-ecological relationships and minimize risk of irrevocable harm. This call for self-critique
and broadening of epistemological acceptance by fisheries scientists, economists, and managers
does not mean that scientific understanding is then undermined or replaced by contradictory
interpretations, such as some fishermen’s experiential claims of localized abundance leading
them to conclude that there are thriving cod stocks or stakeholders’ or politicians’ dismissal of
climate change or its effects on marine ecosystems or coastal communities. All knowledge
claims and contributions can be held to the standards of being verified with well-understood and
documented regional trends and avoiding the introduction of potential risk to the socioecological system that is identified as possible. It is a false and dangerous dichotomy to propose
that either managers must only trust and use narrowly-defined scientific methodologies and
information for policy or they are allowing unreliable, unresearched, indiscriminate or arbitrary
knowledge claims, or even knowledge claims that can be refuted by what is determined to be
knowledge from a more reliable and relevant source.
In this current climate of partisan media communications and divisive political rhetoric
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consisting of disprovable conspiracy theories, bad-faith “alternative truths”, historical
misrepresentations, and outright gas-lighting, natural resource management science has an
invaluable role in providing accurate and helpful information. But, because fisheries are complex
socio-ecological systems, scientists and managers must learn how to examine their full range of
motivations and context for their interpretations, identify and critique the assumptions that
underlie the scientific, socio-economic theory and economic systems that their methodologies are
based on, and acknowledge that other epistemologies qualify as useful and theoretically and
empirically-sound knowledge contributions. Scientists must be willing to work closely with other
knowledge producers to integrate their ideas because what is filling in the holes of uncertainty is
not always “best science” but rather a lot of assumptions that come out of the historical,
intellectual, and political contexts that go unquestioned. Social science, with its methodologies
that allow for understanding of the complexity of human psychology, social behavior, culture,
government systems, and have a different understanding of the relationship between humans and
nature as more integrated.
Social-ecological systems contributions to Ecosystem-based Fisheries Management that
include an actor-network sensibility of performativity are embracing this understanding of
knowledge production and ontological politics154. While consensus on the specifics of what the
best socioecological future is for New England fisheries may be very difficult to achieve, the
general concepts contained in the principles, biophysical considerations, and management
objectives of Ecosystems-based Management theory, as summarized in Table 6.1, are promising
starters for participatory and cooperative discussions and negotiations of goals for that future.

154

As does the post-structural political ecology research on fishing communities of anthropologist Julie Olson and geographer
Kevin St. Martin discussed in chapter 4, Section 4.3.2.
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Table 6.1 Summary of the principles, biophysical considerations, and management objectives of
Ecosystems-based Management theory
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

EBM principles
The fishery is a dynamic and interconnected socio-ecological system.
Feedbacks occur in socio-ecological systems and must be accounted for.
Compounding factors affect socio-ecological systems and must be accounted for.
Change and uncertainty as fundamental aspects of socio-ecological systems and must be
accounted for.
Social well-being in the socio-ecological systems includes more than profitable industry and
must be accounted for.
EBFM marine biophysical considerations
Reduction in bycatch
Conservation of marine habitats
Reduction in negative impacts of human interference in trophic and other ecological
relationships of marine life
Adaptation to environmental changes such as those related to climate change and pollution
EBFM Management objectives
Flexible management that allows for timely changes to be made to address negative outcomes
Adaptive management with an iterative process of decision making to work with changing
conditions, complexity, and uncertainty
Participatory management to integrate human needs, values, agency, equality, and culture into
management decisions
Inclusion of non-fishery interactions in management analysis and decisions
Inclusion of multiple (economic and non-economic) benefits for humans and non-humans in
management analysis and decisions
EBFM implementation strategies detailed in NOAA Fisheries Ecosystem-based Fisheries
Management Road Map and NOAA’s Integrated Ecosystem Assessment Approach155 address
many of these principles, considerations, and objectives. The set of processes from these
guideline documents are proposed in the Draft Operational Framework and Operating Models to
support and Example Fishery Ecosystem Plan for Georges Bank that the NEFMC EBFM PDT
was beginning to develop over the course of the fieldwork for this dissertation in preparation for
the Example Fishery Ecosystem Plan, or eFEP. These EBFM implementation processes include:
1. Evaluation of ecosystem components
2. Definition of social and ecological indicators
155

Based on work by (P. S. Levin et al., 2006, 2009, 2013). A graphic depiction of this approach with detailed annotations is
available here: https://www.integratedecosystemassessment.noaa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-09/iea_loop_w_description.pdf
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Setting of thresholds for the ecosystem
Determination of uncertainty and risk
Negotiation of tradeoffs
Management Strategy Evaluations
Implementation of Management Actions
Observation and Monitoring

A goal-definition process is not included in the Draft Operational Framework and Operating
Models to support and Example Fishery Ecosystem Plan for Georges Bank, but the following
overarching goal is included in the Draft Example Fishery Ecosystem Plan (eFEP) for Georges
Bank, submitted at the NEFMC Council Meeting in August 2019: To protect the ecological
integrity of US marine resources as a sustainable source of wealth and well-being for current
and future generations. Additionally, strategic goals, derived from Magnuson-Stevens Act
definition of Optimal Yield have been drafted in the NEFMC Risk Policy Document:
1. Optimize Food Provision through targeted fishing and fishing for species for bait
2. Optimize Employment
3. Optimize Recreational Opportunity
4. Optimize Intrinsic (Existence) values
5. Optimize Profitability
6. Promote stability in both the biological and social systems
The principles, considerations, and objectives in Table 6.1, along with the implementation
processes, overarching goal, and strategic goals listed above, contain many concepts that are
open to a wide range of interpretations and constructions. Each of these concepts aligns with
socio-ecological systems (SES) and ecosystems-based management (EBM) theory that addresses
complexity, uncertainty, and human-nature integration in different ways that the current fisheries
management status quo. Without a comprehensive understanding of SES and EBM theory and
without reflexivity by the scientists and managers who are creating the formal EBFM policies,
these concepts will lose their intended usefulness through manipulation of their meaning to suit
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their disciplinary understanding and desired outcomes.
6.4.1 Narrowing the gap between the theory and the practice in NEFMC
Even in the face of distrust and exasperation of regional fishermen and industry
stakeholders, faith in and commitment to the NEFMC and its management processes persists
among fisheries scientists and managers despite the difficulties addressing the groundfish crisis,
as witnessed by the following comments at a January 2017 Council meeting by former New
Bedford Mayor and NOAA administrator John Bullard:
Certainly, this issue, in complexity, is enough to blow all of my fuses: because this is very
challenging, this is all very necessary, because we are dealing with a very complex
ecosystem and this is an attempt to try and come up with a system that mirrors that
complexity. I think the major comment I have is that it’s really necessary to press on
through that complexity and keep pressing on until things, like going through the fog,
eventually become clearer and things start to fall into place with the optimism that as you
work at it and work at it, that they will start to fall in place …so there are a lot of moving
pieces, but this effort is important, you’ve dived into the really deep end of the pool. I was
going to say, ‘I’m sure it will get easier’ — but it doesn’t.
The Council is making headway on moving away from a narrow focus on single stock
science to much broader range of socio-ecological indicators, with more humble strategies of
coping with and adapting to environmental and societal change. To define these ecological
indicators in a way that full addresses EBFM principles, ecological considerations, and
management objectives, fisheries scientists need to acknowledge that applying these ecological
indicators to management strategies "must be defined through negotiation with interested
stakeholders with huge differentials in levels of power and influence” (Bavington, 2010, 69).
Those involved in these processes need to recognize that, as the scientific and economic
language emerges in the construction of the eFEP, managers and stakeholders are being trained
and “disciplined” to conceptualize the ecosystem in the way that the PDT can communicate
complex concepts. As a scientific construct, defining ecological indicators implies "a dominant
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role for scientists in both understanding nature and determining appropriate conduct" (Bocking,
2004, 98). This hegemony brings a huge responsibility to the fisheries scientists to learn about,
interact with, and include knowledge on power relations in terms of justice and equity and on
different, and necessary, understandings of nature and human-nature systems that do not come
from scientific approaches.
The expanded representations of fish and marine ecosystems that the proposed eFEP
offers do not extend to the people in fishing community representation of their psychological,
social, cultural, and economic practices and their ideas about their livelihoods and success in life
in the context of the need for conservation of the fishery. Implementation strategies are restricted
by the dominance of scientific representations and neoliberal economic development
assumptions limiting how ecosystem-based management theories are realized. As the scientific
and economic language emerges in the construction of the example Fisheries Ecosystem Plan,
managers and stakeholders are being to conceptualize the ecosystem and tradeoffs in the ways
that the EBFM Plan Development Team uses to communicate complex modeling concepts. The
operating framework for developing eFEP is privileging quantitative data and modeling for both
understanding what the socio-ecological system is and for how it should behave. As a
dominantly scientific and neoclassical economics construct, it is muscling out meaningful
contributions from research and experience that are based in other epistemologies and ethics. For
fisheries to provide answers demanded by governments (note that American fisheries
management bodies fall under The Department of Commerce) modern science and resource
economics - with their emphasis on quantification, prediction, and control – are given exclusive
roles of providing the information that set the conditions for negotiating tradeoffs and making
consensus-based decisions. At moments when inability to quantify ecosystems and human-nature
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relationships overwhelms the discussion in committee meetings, qualitative social and ecological
objectives and strategies are sometimes labeled as arbitrary because they are unscientific.
Without serious deliberation and inclusion of qualitative contextual and historical
interconnections of humans and non-humans in fishing communities by the Plan Development
Team, there is currently no explicit pathway for getting relevant qualitative social theory into
management to meet several of the other tenets and objectives invoked by EBFM theory. EBFM
as currently being constructed is obscuring the possibility that ontological complexity might
mean that we must learn how to live within complex ecological systems as opposed to how to
manage them.
New knowledge production and application strategies are needed in the face of uncertainty
and complexity. If the EBFM Committee and the Council continue to design regulations
depending on assumptions of outcome controllability, they are missing the major warning signs
that management needs to be reimagined, not just fixed using the same assumptions and limited
ideas about what management is and how it “should” function. Problems that require recognition
of irreducible uncertainty or complexity in linked socioecological systems are poorly addressed
by managerial solutions that require controllable and predictable objects to manage (Bavington,
2010). In actuality, we have little control over the abundance and stability of the flow of prey
like herring or predators like groundfish as resources producing economic value. Flexibility and
adaptability for EBFM theory means more than having mechanisms to quickly implement
alternative options for control rules, quotas, and closed areas that are based on predicted
scenarios when the intended outcomes are not manifesting. At present, the NEFMC is trying to
look at declining stocks and management failure as an indication to fix anomalies within the
current Natural Resources Management dominant conception. There is a strong belief that better
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organization is the key to improvements. The lack of initiative to try to reimagine a truly socioecological and inclusive EBFM for New England is driven, in part, by the NEFMC’s need to
move quickly and show progress. Amending and changing fisheries management plans is legally
is slowed down enough even without having to deal with lawsuits by NGOs, industry, or
politicians.
Some of the most time-consuming debates and personally hostile interactions between
those involved in management are related to epistemological differences. Negotiating
epistemological compromises and reaching consensus for defining problems and setting research
agendas is a necessary first step toward democratic and well-considered solutions. Meaningful
application of adaptive management strategies potentially relieves some of the pressure from
agreeing to try a strategy that does not seem like the best action based on one’s assessment. But
adaptive management requires that managers are responsive when the outcomes defy their
original assessment of the best strategy. This responsive process might be easier to negotiate if
there was explicit acknowledgment of the differences in epistemic and political viewpoints that
lead to different experiences, understandings, and realities of the fishery were discussed in good
faith that the ultimate goals include thriving fish populations that allow for an economically
productive fishery. This is where conservation and economic development meet, and how to do
this process is not obvious or easy, but broad enough to be adaptive with the objectives and
strategies.
Current acrimonious partisan politics in the United States are reflected in the relationships
in fisheries management in New England.156 Many of the debates borrow the soundbites from

156

However, in the negotiations on balancing economic development and jobs with ecological conservation, it is notable that
Democratic U.S. Senators from Massachusetts, including Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey, (and formerly, U.S. House of
Representative from Massachusetts, Barney Frank, have been critical of NOAA and the NEFSC when regulations have reduced
quotas for fishermen (see letters to NEFSC). Several people I interviewed indicated that they all have been given advice by a
New Bedford political researcher, Bruno Freitas, who has heavily influenced their positions to side with the economic benefits to

270

polarized media; the fisheries conflicts are commonly framed in terms of “freedom”,
“overreach”, “national interests”, “democracy”, “transparency” with different groups claiming
the sole correct interpretation and application of these terms to support their arguments. While
not a single person identified themselves to me or in public forums as a Democrat or a
Republican, individuals did use the respective political rhetoric that is being employed by
politicians and partisan media pundits. Prioritizing conservation over economic growth and vice
versa is, unsurprisingly, aligned with the career and institutional contributions of individuals to
the fishery. Further, these ethics align with the personal histories and formative educational and
career experiences that lead to strong personal convictions about the appropriate prioritization of
goals and strategies to achieve both conservation and economic growth.
By acknowledging these epistemic and value conflicts, it may be possible to explicitly
address them. Because there is rarely an overt conversation about their differences in value
systems and accepted knowledge sources by scientists, managers, industry stakeholders,
politicians, and community members, there is a lot of wasted potential on hidden (or
unacknowledged) agendas, influence campaigns, and debates about details. These discussions
are being carried out implicitly in workshops and forums, and between individuals in private
conversations. If a debate occurred at the level of goals and objectives, would it make the
management process more efficient down the line? This would not be easy, but it would be a
more direct way of addressing the conflicts that hinder management.
With awareness of the performativity of fisheries management and the translation that
occurs in associations in the fisheries network, we can begin to think about how to achieve
cohesive translations and successful actor-networking with EBFM. But of course, this opens the

local industry over local conservation issues. In reference to the groundfish quota reductions, Senators Warren and Markey wrote
a pointed letter questioning the science of the NEFSC related to the stock assessments.
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door for many more questions. For fisheries scientists, graduate curricula need to increase
interdisciplinary training and grapple with attempts at transdisciplinary methodologies and
knowledge production. Convergence science, or the “Transdisciplinary Integration of Life
Sciences, Physical Sciences, Engineering, and Beyond” is touted by federal science
organizations as the emergent multidisciplinary research paradigm for solving “vexing research
problems, in particular, complex problems focusing on societal needs” with “deep integration
across disciplines” (National Academies of Sciences, 2019; National Research Council, 2014;
National Science Foundation, 2020a). However, what this looks like in practice in the National
Science Foundation’s Convergence Accelerator (C-Accel) program is that the professional areas
represented in the “and Beyond” in the phrase above include business leaders and stakeholders
and non-profits, but it still sounds like the same non-critical, epistemologically-exclusive,
quantitative sciences-dominated management paradigm (National Science Foundation, 2020b).
What you do not hear about in the discourse around “convergence science” is the inclusion of
researchers in the fields of political economy, political ecology, or other relevant poststructuralist approaches. In order for the “critiques” of critical perspectives to move beyond
criticism, they need to be given the opportunity to be a part of these multidisciplinary teams
aiming toward transdisciplinarity. Knowledge from scholarship on equity and intersectionality
and inclusion and opportunity for the marginal groups and non-anthropocentric viewpoints will
continue to interact with the fisheries network and could be included in a flexible and adaptive
management regime that is seeking to experiment with including different epistemological
approaches and transdisciplinarity.
Support of global and federal organizations and institutions for this more inclusive type
of convergence science” is what is needed for natural resource management. This would allow
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for aspects of EBFM implementation like Management Strategy Evaluation to expand definitions
and monitoring criteria of evaluative concepts like stability and risk. In the tradeoff negotiations
for EBFM, different epistemological approaches to uncertainty and precaution from ecologists,
qualitative social theorists, and practicing fishermen could fill in information gaps, provide
alternative strategies that do not need to reduce the uncertainty, and address some of the EBFM
socio-ecological system tenets. In this case study of the New England fishery management
network, positive change is a fishery where there is not constant crisis for the fish, the fishermen,
the seafood market, the lawmakers & the laws, the scientists, the ecosystems. Awareness of the
performativity of a network offers ways for the researcher (and those who see the way things are
happening through this lens) to effect changes that form, ideally, a successful network. EBFM
requires explicit reflection on the practices and processes of management carried out by fisheries
scientists and managers. This can be done by analyzing how ideas developed by socio-ecological
theory such as adaptive management, co-management, incorporation of non-capitalist relations,
and biodiversity for ecosystem resilience are emerging in the fishery network and how they are
being translated into scientific studies, management mechanisms, etc. — or in many cases, how
they are meeting resistance and may disappear.

6.5 Concluding Discussion
Without a comprehensive and deep understanding of Socio-Ecological Systems Theory
EBM theory and without reflexivity by the scientists and managers who are creating the formal
EBFM policies, the ecosystems concepts they offer will lose their intended usefulness through
manipulation of their meaning to suit their disciplinary understanding and/or desired outcomes.
For awareness of multiplicity to be applied to management and given the opportunity to
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contribute its improvement, it would necessitate a re-envisioning of what it means to manage a
fishery. For example, it calls on researchers and managers to recognize that their enactments of
concepts such as uncertainty and risk through their practices affects the ways they carry out their
role in governance. If researchers and managers can articulate these differences, they might be
able to begin to conceive new ways to understand and address them together. This change will
require creativity, experimentation, epistemological inclusion, and new imaginings and
methodologies and imaginings through transdisciplinarity - all elements of EBM theory. To work
with and negotiate the multiplicity and the rapid changes affecting the power dynamics and
coherence of the fishery necessitates a relinquishment of exclusionary scientism. Inclusion of
other epistemologies that can get at human-environment system aspects that science cannot
address is critical for real change to happen with EBFM. This needs to be happening now at level
of setting goals, objectives, and strategies for EBFM.
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